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A Brief History of 295th Jasco
UNIT HISTORY OF THE
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
The 295th Signal Company (Special) was activated 3 April 1943 at Camp Bradford, Virginia in accordance with T/O & 2 11 517S, dated 9 September 1942.(l) The Commanding Officer at the time of activation was Capt. P. B. Whittemore Cadre of approximately 20 EM.
The mission of this organization was to furnish beach communications during the assault phase of an infantry divisions amphibious landing operation.
As the result of lessons learned in amphibious landings in North Africa and Sicily, the Joint chiefs of staff decided to reorganize companies of the above type in order that certain specialist personnel, particularly for the control of the supporting naval fire for these operations, be included.
At Camp Bradford, Va., the company participated in amphibious training and training in specialist communication subjects. Four officers and seventy-four enlisted men were placed on DS to Alliance,.Nebraska, in June 1943, to operate communications for umpires in airborne troop maneuvers.
1st Lt. I. R. Obenchain assumed command of the organization 15 June 1943. Unit departed Camp Bradford, Va., 3 August 1943 and arrived U.S. Naval Amphibious Training Base, Fort Pierce, Fla., 4 August 1943.
Company underwent amphibious training with Engineer Combat Group at Fort Pierce, Fla., and took specialist and unit training.
Communication teams of unit participated in amphibious landings in the Solomon Islands, Chesapeake Bay, Md., in September and October 1943.
Unit departed Fort Pierce, Fla., 8 October 1943 and arrived camp Pickett, Va., 10 October 1943.
The 295th Signal Company (Special) was reorganized as a Joint Assault Signal Company, hereafter referred to as JASCO, on 11 November 1943,. under T/O and T/E, 11 147 Signal, dated 21 October 1943, with all changes. The organization consisted, briefly, of the following:
a. Headquarters platoon with a commanding officer, executive officer, supply officer, sixty nine (69) Army enlisted men and five (5) Navy enlisted men.
b. Shore Fire Control Section with nine (9) Field Artillery officers in grade of captain; nine (9) Naval officers in grade of lieutenant (sg); forty five (45) Army enlisted men.
c. The Air Liaison Section with thirteen (13) Army Air officers in grade of captain; thirty nine (39) Army Air Force enlisted men.
d. Shore Party Communication, Section with ten (10) Signal Corps officers in grade of first lieutenant; one hundred ninety (190) enlisted men.
e. Strength of 34 O's, 1 WO, 343 EM, 9 Naval O's, and 115 Naval EM.
10 .naval officers and 115 Naval EM attached to unit per ltr orders FE 25.7, P16-3/00/MM Serial 2401 ATB Camp Bradford, Va., dated 18 November 1943.
Unit staged for overseas movement and company time devoted mainly to completion of all firing and training.
Departed Camp Pickett, Va., 5 December 1943 For Port of Embarkation; arrived Camp Stoneman, California, 11 December 1943; and sailed from San Francisco Port of Embarkation 27 December 1943.
Arrived Pearl Harbor, T.H., 6 January: 1944 and stationed at Schofield Barracks, T.H., 7 January 1944.
Elements of organization departed Schofield Barracks 23 January 1944 for Marshall Islands invasion. Unit participated in landings at Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Majuro in the Marshalls. (2) The return of the unit's detachments was completed 8 March 1943.
Remainder of company participated in simulated amphibious landings and specialized training.
115 Navy EM relieved from attachment and transferred to Fifth Amphibious Force, c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, per VO Fifth Amphibious Force (21 April 1944).
Between the 7th and 28th of April 1944, elements of the organization engaged in amphibious maneuvers with two regiments of the 27th Infantry Division.
On 18 May the tactical elements of the company accompanied the division on a final dress rehearsal, returning to Oahu 25th May.
This tactical echelon of the 295th JASCO had a strength of 42 Officers and 335 EM (including 82 EM attached from the 27th Infantry Division). Combat elements sailed from Pearl Harbor, between 28 ,May and 1 June 1944.(3) The company headquarters composed the rear echelon of 2 officers, 1 .WO and 43 EM. Awards, decorations, and casualty lists attached. (4&5)
Rear echelon moved from Schofield Barracks to Fort Kamehameka, T.H., 18 May 1944 and was attached to Rear Echelon, 27th Infantry Division.
Roar Echelon embarked and sailed from Honolulu, T.H., 28 July 1944, and arrived in Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides 8 August 1944 and erected camp site in preparation for the return of combat elements from Saipan, Mariannas Islands. Combat elements of JASCO sailed from Saipan on 22 August 1944 and arrived Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, 6 September 1944.
Attached EM from the 27th Infantry Division reverted back to their organization 6 August 1944.
Unit relieved assignment Central Pacific Base Command and assigned to South Pacific Base Command 8 August 1944.
Informal ceremony held 14 September 1944 for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. Troops commended for Saipan operation. Entire JASCO participated.
Company followed no set training schedule as time was to be spent in rest, recuperation, and repairing of equipment.
Company alerted for movement to staging area in preparation for Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, P.I., operation.
On 14 October 1944, 88 EM were attached to unit from 27th Infantry Division. 33 additional EM were assigned as replacements on the same date.
Company sailed from Espiritu Santo 15 October 1944 and arrived at Bougainville, Soloman Islands where unit was relieved from 27th Infantry Division and attached to XIV Corps 19 October 1944.
Company time mainly spent in construction of camp area; firing on range from 8 through 10 November 1944; inspection and repair of organizational property, clothing, and equipment. Off-duty hours were devoted to organized athletics.
Company alerted for movement 30 November 1944. Combat elements were attached to the 37th Infantry Division for the Luzonoperation. One officer and 6 EM comprised rear echelon at Bougainville.
Combat elements loaded between 10th and 15th December and sailed from Bougainville 16 December 1944. Arrived Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Unit Philippine Islands 9 January 1945 and assault forces landed at 0930.(6)
One EM attached from 27th Division suffered a gunshot wound in the arm. No other casualties.
Company time spent in setting up bivouac area, perimeter defense in Binmaley, and military police duties in Port Saul, San Fabian, and Binmaley.
Organization relieved from attachment to XIV Corps and attached to ASCOM, Sixth Army 22 January 1945.
Major Irving R. Obenchain, 024658, relieved from assignment and transferred to GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area. Captain Vincent W. Fox, 01643552, assumed command of organization on 6 February 1945.
Unit sailed from Lingayen Gulf, P.I., 8 February 1945 and arrived Mindoro, P.I., 10 February 1945.
Unit relieved from assignment Sixth Army and attachment to ASCOM and assigned to Eight Army and Attached to X Corps 10 February 1945. Unit attached to 24th Infantry Division 11 February 1945. Relieved from attachment to X Corps and further attachment 24th Infantry Division and attached to 41st Infantry Division 22 February 1945.
Rear Echelon from Bougainville, S.I., joined organization at Mindoro on 25 February 1945.
Two Army, officers, 3 Navy officers, and 24 EM attached to 186th RCT, 41st Inf Div on 26 February 1945 in preparation for Palawan, P.I., V 3 operation.(7) These men returned to Mindoro for duty with organization on 4 March 1945.
Eighteen (18) officers and 101 EM were dropped from the assigned strength of the organization and accounted for on separate morning, report of Detachment #;1, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) 6 March 1945 for the V-4, Zamboanga operation. D-Day was on 10 Marc1945.(8) Awards and decorations.
(9) Relieved from attachment with 41st Inf Div and attached to 24th Infantry, Division 7March 1945.
Detachment #1, 295th JASCO, accounted for on morning report of 295th Joint Assault Signal Company 30March 1945.
Attached EM from 27th Inf Div relieved attachment and transferred back to original units 15 March 1945.
Unit relieved attachment to ASCOM and attached to Eight Army for further attachment toX Corps 10 February 1945.
Unit alerted for V 5 (Mindanao) operation in early April 1945. Four officers, one warrant officer, and 102 EM composed the rear echelon of this organization at Mindoro, P.I., for the V-5 operation. Remainder of unit composed of approximately 30 officers and 223 EM, sailed from Mindoro, P.I., 14 April 1945; arrived Polloc Harbor,Parang, Mindanao, P.I., on 17 April 1945.(9)
Unit reorganized and equipped, effective 26 April 1945, under T/O and E11-147S(30 December 1944) pursuant to authority USAFFE letter, FEGC 322, dated 1° April 1945, Subject: Reorganization of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company Under Latest T/O and E, and General Order No 86 Hq Sixth Army, 26 April 1945.(10)
Wire teams operated and maintained communications in X Corps CP area.
Unit cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, from 17 April 1945 to 1 July 1945 per General Order No 82, Hq X Corps, 11 July 1945.(11)
Lt. (jg) Warren B. Woods, 270441, USNR, WIA Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 3 May 1945. 1st Lt. James M. Amick, 0574735, WIA Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 4 June 1945.
Two officer and 17 EM from rear echelon at Mindoro, P.I., joined the organization 4 June 1945 at Parang;, Mindanao.
Company headquarters sailed from Polloc Harbor, Mindanao, 5 June 1945 Arrived Bugo (Del Monte) Mindanao 7 June 1945 where combat elements returned to company headquarters between Both and 25th June 1945. Awards and decorations(4)
Twenty one officers and 170 EM departed for TDB Amphibious Training Group, Cubic Bay, Luzon, P.I., 1 July 1945.
Unit sailed from Bugo, Mindanao, 4 July 1945 and arrived Zamboanga, Mindanao, 5 July 1945. Remainder of rear echelon joined organization at Zamboanga 5 July 1945.
Unit relieved from attachment Eighth Army and further attachment to X Corps and reverted to duty under assignment to Sixth Army.
Time spent vainly in erection of camp area.
First contingent of 20 EM eligible for release under Readjustment Regulations departed for Disposition Center on 16 July 1945.
Officers and EM on TDB Amphibious Training Group, Cubic Bay, Luzon, P.I., returned to duty 24 July 1945.
Major Vincent W. Fox, 01643552, (Commanding Officer), duty and command to TDB United States 45 days on 1 August 1945. Captain Thomas W. Hart, 01643648, assumed command of company same date.
Twelve Air Liaison officers and 38 EM dropped from the assigned strength of organization morning report and accounted for on morning report of Air Liaison Section, 295th JASCO, initiated 8 August 1945.
Second contingent of 13 EM eligible for separation from the service departed for Disposition Center 16 August 1945.
Unit relieved from control of Sixth Army and passed to control of Army Forces Western Pacific effective 20 August 1945, and further assigned to HQ Southern Islands Area Command, APO 952, and attached to 368th RCT,. APO 717, effective 20 August 1945.
Seven remaining; Naval officers relieved assignment and assigned to COMSERVPAC, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 24 September 1945.
Captain Thomas W. Hart relieved of duty and command attached unassigned to 28th Replacement Depot, APO 318, 26 September 1945, for separation from the service under readjustment regulations.
Twenty officers relieved assignment and attached unassigned to 28th Replacement Depot, APO 318, 26 September 1945, for separation from the service under readjustment regulations.
Captain Leroy S. Simon, 0416179, FA, assumed command of the company.
Eight EM over 90 points relieved assignment and attached unassigned to Disposition Center, APO 318, effective 10 October 1945.
Six EM, 38 years of age or over, relieved assignment and attached unassigned to Disposition Center, APO 318, effective 10 October 1945.
Eight EM under 60 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th(EI) Rad Team, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 17 October 1945.
Eleven EM under 60 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th(DB) Msg Cen, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 17 October 1945.
Thirty Five EM 60 to 69 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th (DB) MC, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 20 October 1945.
One hundred and eighty five EM relieved assignment and assigned Hq 31st Infantry Division, APO 31, effective 17 October 1945.
Pursuant to authority contained in General Order 217, GHQ AFWESPAC, APO 707, dtd 10 October 1945, unit inactivated. No personnel assigned, attached unassigned or atchd from other organizations. Effective 10 October 1945.
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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
18 March 1944.
SUBJECT: Report on Downside Operation
TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.
We left Pearl Harbor 23 January 1944 and sailed to Kwajalein Atoll. Here on 31 January and 1 February, 1944, the Army and Marines began their attack on Japs installed there. Our regiment, the 106th Inf was held in reserve to all operations within the atoll but as the operations went better than expected, we were not committed. However, we were constantly on the alert for an immediate movement to locations where reinforcements were necessary.
After the Kwajalein Atoll was secured, we sailed on to Eniwetok for the Downside Operation. Here we were committed on 19 February 1944 on the island of Eniwetok. We were to go ashore in the fifth wave. The type of craft used were LVTs or Alligators. To get into these craft we were transferred to an LST the night of 18 February and here set about loading our equipment into LVTs prior to the push in the morning.
At 0745, 19 February, we roared out the front of the LST and joined other LVT's in our wave. There was only a very short rendezvous, not in circles but in about 100 yards advances toward the beach. At approximately 0945 our LVT first hit the coral and its bow reared up into the air, only to be struck by some sort of Jap shell in her bow. We shipped water very rapidly but due to the fact that we had touched the beach, it didn't sink. They took the LVT up out of the water and here on a beach, no more than 50' wide and 15 or so feet high, we unloaded. The greatest difficulty here was getting our equipment out of the LVT and onto dry land. The men were exposed about 12 feet above the beach as they put the equipment over the side of the LVT.
We were originally ordered to land on beach Yellow II but were landed about 200 yards north of this location in very hostile territory. Here we met the 8th team completely set up and operating under all kinds of enemy fire. After a trip on two up and down the beach, I located the Shore Party Commander on his proper beach. We immediately moved all men and equipment of the 9th team to this location and set up our radio and switchboard.
It had been planned by the Regiment Commanding Officer that we we would work one radio station in a three station net, consisting of one station at Yellow Beach I, one at Yellow Beach II, and one on board the AP40. It was approximately five minutes after we moved to our new location that our radio was set up and transmitting. There were several urgent messages awaiting transmission and as the battalion Signal section had been blown up while still in the water, we were practically the only means of communication from this beach to the transport.
The transport did not have sufficient radio equipment nor personnel to man the frequency assigned to us so we received no answer. In fact we never did receive and answer for all of the four days that we were on the beach. However, we retuned our transmitter and receiver and sent the traffic to the AP40 over the regimental command net which was manned on the APA. We used this frequency and net throughout the operation. Wire was installed in short time and we had very little trouble on our local lines. However, the lateral line and the line to the inland battalion were constantly being removed from service by LVT's and bulldozers crossing the very narrow, steep beach. We ran many lines laterally before the area was secured to the extent of putting wire overhead. A great deal of trouble was encountered by foot troops on the island from hidden Jap snipers, so linemen were not ordered to climb and put wire overhead until the area had been secured and mopped up. Our 536 local net was useless as the frequency of the 536's were the same or very near to the SFC net and interference was terrific. The shore party commander did not desire the use of this net as all installations were so close together on our very limited beach, so we did not use them. We did not use all of our EE8A's on installation. On the third day ashore the inland battalion drew same from us for use inland. Shortly afterward we set up a signal dump on a bulldozer sled and issued equipment to the inland battalion as they needed it. Panels, our BD 71, extra wire, empty rubber bags,flags, batteries, signal lamp and other signal equipment salvaged from the beach were put in this dump. Our second 284 was given to the Commanding Officer of the inland battalion within about five hours of landing as his had all been destroyed.
At night all men were dug in and blacked out and very little activity was in progress. Telephone operated all the time and radio very infrequently.
From my observations of our activities and our surroundings, I would like to make the following suggestions for improvement of our operation toward fulfilling our mission:
1. Our 284 radios are too large and bulky to get ashore as safely as could 610's which could be carried by less personnel and carried on the personnel at all times, therefore lessening the exposure to enemy fire during the period of unloading on the beach. We need our own personnel manning our radios on board ship to insure contact when it is most vital. 610's are voice radios which are used principally on landings and the range satisfactorily covers the distance between ship and shore stations. 130 assault wire is desired for its small bulk and ease in handling both in landing and setting up. In the whole four day operations we used less than 2 1/2 mile of wire and our lines were being replaced time after time all day long. A lighter type of switchboard would expedite unloading and make it much easier to dig in. The deep dry sand is quite difficult to maintain a deep hole in especially with huge explosions rocking the islands continually. No use of telegraph was made which eliminates the necessity of the repeater coils. Light wire and switchboards require less equipment to supplement them such as reel units.
Our 03 rifles were issued for use with the grenade launcher but as we had no occasion to use this weapon, they could easily be omitted. Firing of grenades would have only resulted in killing our own troops in all directions inland and laterally. These weapons are clumsy for defense in a foxhole where our primary danger existed. Either carbines or TSMG's or .45 cal pistols would be more satisfactory, the ideal situation being nearly obtained if a11 weapons be alike for simplicity in obtaining ammunition. The above mentioned weapons can be fired rapidly and have a greater capacity than 03 rifle and are easier to use. Our waterproof covering were God-sends to us as sand and water were constantly jamming up unprotected weapons. On the trip from ship to shore, the LVT was flooded many times but our weapons and equipment were kept bone dry by our protective rubber bags and covers.
In conclusion, I noted that throughout the invasion, it was not too difficult to accomplish our mission but with lighter, smaller equipment, we could have done a more efficient job not only as regards materials and supplies but in safeguarding the lives of our men.
Roy W. REPP
2nd Lt., 295th JASCO
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
18 March 1944
SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations Eniwetok Operation.
T0 : Commanding Officer, 295th JASCO.
BLT 106-3 and attached units sailed from Pearl Harbor 23 Jan and arrived at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands on 29 Jan. After standing by as a floating reserve of this operation, a portion of the task force, including BLT 106-3, acting on information captured from the Japs, sailed for Eniwetok Atoll. The captured information proved to be correct insofar as military installations were concerned but was not up to date as to the strength of the Jap garrison. Subsequent information revealed by natives on the captured island of Engebi, on Eniwetok Atoll, resulted in a complete revision of plan of attack on the island of Eniwetok as the Jap garrison was considerably larger than anticipated. All assault elements transferred from the transport to LST's on D-l day and on D-day personnel were boated in LVTs located on the tank decks of the LST's and at 0730 headed for the rendezvous area. Due to the extremely narrow landing beach, waves were divided into small segments, so that each wave consisted of several small waves. Signal Detachment Team #8 was scheduled to land in the first segment of the third wave, but through error landed in the first segment of the first wave at approximately 0910.
Since the beach was practically deserted, it was assumed initially that the inland battalion had departed inland and the hazards encountered previous to attaining the shelter of the Jap built, 15 foot high fire wall, caused no particular consternation. A large well built hole, dug in the side of the dune offered perfect protection and concealment for the large and bulky switchboards but the project was abandoned when it was determined that the hole contained several homicidally inclined Japs. All the installations were then dug in closer to the water's edge, all of which spots were later found to be directly under the muzzles of a Jap 70 MM Howitzer battery. At approximately H hour plus 30 minutes the 9th Signal Team landed on this same beach and departed south where other elements of their battalion were then landing. Shortly afterward the third battalion shore party landed about 200 yards north of the original beach and established themselves there. It was then decided to move installations closer to the Shore Party and the movement was effected swiftly. The swiftness was probably occasioned by mortar fire to the left, mortar fire to the rear, and hostile small arms fire to the right (inland). Upon reaching the shore party area mortar shells commenced falling like hail stones. The Japs were attempting to hit a large number of DUKWs which were landing a battalion of Field Artillery and as the shells were falling somewhat short,the shore party was receiving most of the fire.The DUKWs were driven off about the time the mortar shells were falling approximately 3 or 4 feet from the ditch in which lay most of the Shore Party. After the installations were dug in this time, very little further trouble was encountered except from snipers and marauding Japs who infiltrated at night.
No difficulty was experienced in getting any
message to its destination although it was necessary several times to use nets other than
those assigned. Snipers made it impossible to string wire overhead and the tracked
vehicles constantly cut the lateral and inland telephone lines. Radio was the only
dependable means of communication for the first 2 days and there was no failure of this
medium. However the U.S.S. Custer failed to respond on the Army Ship-Shore net and after 3
days, this radio was turned over to the battalion to replace one of theirs which had
burned out a generator. The Custer responded properly on the Navy Ship-Shore net. The
erstwhile lateral net radio was tuned to the frequency of the Regimental Command Net and
some traffic was sent out over this net. Most of the traffic was received and sent over
the Inland radio which was an SCR 195 furnished by the Infantry. On about the third day
wire was placed overhead and no further repairs were necessary. There was no delay of any
kind in delivering messages to destinations as all were clear text and sent vocally.
Encoding or CW would have occasioned some delay and virtually all messages were urgent in
the assault phase.
On the fifth day all equipment was turned over to the Regimental Communication Officer and attached Assault Units sailed for Pearl Harbor.
1. The B0-71 and/or BO-72 should be replaced by the special assault switchboard weighing only a few pounds. The weight and bulk of the normal switchboard make it extremely unmanageable for assault work under fire.
2. The regular Inland, and Navy Ship Shore Nets should be retained but the Lateral Net should have its own PERSONNEL & RADIO ABOARD SHIP as the ships are generally unreliable.
3. The SCR 284 should be supplanted by some small, compact, battery ' "-I. The Sea 284-should be supplanted by some small, compact, battery , operated set which can be unloaded easily and set up quickly, such as the SCR 610. Lack of versatility would be offset by the above mentioned shipboard installation which would have all nets available.
4. W130-B should be issued in lieu of W110-B as the latter is too bulky and heavy for temporary assault installation. The prime consideration, however, is for the safety of the men who have to unload all this bulk under enemy fire.
5. The Thompson Sub Machine Gun appears to be far superior to the Carbine for use by Signal men. It is much less susceptible to stoppage from sand and is much easier to handle from a fox hole. The '03 rifle is useless as its grenade launcher cannot be used successfully except by assault infantry. Highly recommend men be armed with pistol in addition to Tommy Guns.
6. Each man should have at least twenty dollars in order that he may purchase items from the ships store, and buy chits for use in the ship's barber shop, and the ship's soda fountain - mostly the latter as it is a long, hot, trip.
7. Men should have locks for Duffle bags as there is considerable pilfering, but there was no case of a locked Duffle bag being slit and robbed.
8. CHAP-STICKS should be an item of issue. Most men suffered from lack of this or similar preparation.
CHARLES C. GILLIAM
1st Lt., Sig C
HEADQUARTERS 27th INFANTRY DIVISION
c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 19 March 1944
S E C R E T
Subject: Report on Use of Air Support, Eniwetok Island, 19-21 February 1944
To: Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, APO 958,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. (THRU: Channels)
1. A total of eighteen (18) air strikes were performed in close support of the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, at ENIWETOK Island on 19-21 February 1944. All these missions were flown in response to requests from the Battalion Commander through his Air Liaison Officer. It is believed that this is the most extensive use of close air support at the call of a single battalion for a comparable period of time on record in this theater.
Air bombardment was conducted in areas in front of the infantry to blast enemy positions. Frequently, these target areas were selected in advance of artillery or naval gunfire, thereby alleviating the necessity for ceasing that supporting fire to permit air strikes. The target charts were carefully studied by the Battalion Commander and Air Liaison Officer and those areas in advance of the troops that appeared most suited for defensive positions were placed under air bombardment.
Strafing attacks were performed in
preparation for an infantry advance and were conducted as close to friendly front lines as
was necessary. All strafing and bombing strikes were accurate, timely, and performed in
good order. There were no casualties among friendly troops as a result of our air support
in missions called for this battalion. While it was difficult to determine the actual
effects of this support because of the complete devastation, it is felt that the strafing
and bombing was both destructive and neutralizing, and materially aided the infantry in
the accomplishment of its mission.
(a) Bombs finally silenced enemy
mortar fire that had been quite harassing.
(b) Strafing tended to cause the Japs to run out of the brush to the beaches where they were killed by our troop
(c) Many bodies were found with large holes in them that very likely were caused by .50 caliber fire.
(d) Strafing from a dive angle of 45° -60° penetrated the underground installations that were lightly covered and inflicted casualties in them.
(e) A near-miss uncovered an installation which was observed by the pilot who immediately requested permission to attack. It required not over three (3) minutes to obtain clearance for the attack. This attack was successful in helping to neutralize this area.
2. APPREHENSION AMONG FRIENDLY TROOPS. Despite the fact that strafing and bombing were extremely accurate, an undue amount of apprehension existed among them as indicated by the following:
(a) In a strafing attack on 20th of
February in support of an advance, a tank commander repeatedly charged that VF fire was
hitting his tanks. This was not so, since the Air Liaison Officer was in the front line
and observed that the fire was falling sufficiently in front of the tanks. Empty brass was
falling among them. Although this was pointed out, the Battalion Commander was finally
compelled to order the attack to cease.
(b) At another instance, troops thinking an air attack was coming beat a hasty retreat some fifty (50) feet as an added safety precaution. This was not necessary and such action is a "dead give-away" to the enemy of what is about to happen.
(c) In a strafing mission on 21st of February, VF were laying a continuous preparation fire across the battalion front. The Battalion Commander and this officer were in the front lines observing the effects of the attack. Again apprehension was felt by the troops although the fire was definitely observed falling in the area requested. It was necessary for the Air Liaison Officer to persuade the troop commander not to call off the mission, Later, at the commanders request, the VF were ordered to strafe areas further in advance of the troops. This was accomplished immediately. In this instance, control of aircraft already engaged in a mission was exceptionally well-effected.
(d) Later, after troops had been accustomed to close support, they gained confidence and moved forward closely behind their supporting air attacks.
Recommendations. More air ground exercises wherein aircraft bomb and fire in front of the infantry must be conducted prior to an operation. Ground troops should also have an indoctrination course in bomb effects and air support tactics.
Air Liaison Officers should maintain a position as far forward as practical in order to observe the results of air strikes and to be able to take immediate action in the event of inaccurate bombing or strafing, and also to give CSA any necessary corrections to improve the effect.
3. COMMUNICATIONS. Radio communication was excellent. The Air Liaison Officer remained forward with the troop commander during all air attacks and communicated with his radio station at the CP by means of SCR 536 radio. In several instances, more effective communication and orientation would have resulted had he been able to talk directly with the Air Coordinator. It was not possible to bring his SCR 193 that far forward.
Front line panels were not always displayed. In attacks that were delivered several hundred yards in advance of the line, it was not thought necessary to put them out. They were displayed, however, whenever requested by the air, and whenever close strafing was expected.
4. COOPERATION. The cooperation of the
Battalion Commander was excellent. Missions were suggested by the Air Liaison Officer as
frequently as he deemed advisable. These were always accepted by the Battalion Commander
with an open mind. From the experience gained in this operation, it is felt that unless
the Air Liaison Officer is accepted as an advisor to the Battalion Commander and remains
close to him during the operation, many opportunities to use air support effectively will
be neglected. Usually a troop commander is busy with his other responsibilities and can
not be alert for every opportunity to use air support advantageously. The Air Liaison
Officer must constantly suggest the use of air whenever its need is indicated. To do this,
the Air Liaison Officer must have prestige in the eyes of the troop commander and his
officers and men. One good means of obtaining such prestige is to be well informed on all
phases of the air plan, on the capabilities and limitations of aircraft and bombs, on
current air support tactics, on the ground plan of operation. He should have his own plan
of operation well thought out and make absolutely clear what he can and cannot do, and
exactly what assistance and cooperation he must have from the infantry.
This officer conducted orientation classes on use of air support while enroute to the objective. He kept himself posted at all times (thru CSA) as to what aircraft were available for missions, weight and number of bombs to be used on each strike, number of aircraft to be employed, when every "pass" in a strike was about to start. He further kept himself posted constantly on the location of the front lines (thru Air Observer) and was able to advise, and sometimes correct, the troop commander. He was always advised when the strike had been completed and passed this information to the troop commander immediately.
5. PROCEDURE. When q mission was decided upon, the time aircraft would be available was obtained from CSA. The location of the front line was given as accurately as possible. The Battalion Commander would pass the word along to his front line elements to stop and take cover at a certain time, usually about ten (10) minutes before the attack was to commence; panel were displayed in as conspicuous location as possible, i.e., on rear upper level of tanks, in clearings, on beaches, etc. Naval gunfire, tank fire, artillery and mortar fire were stopped if necessary. As soon as the air attack was completed, CSA notified the Air Liaison Officer who was alongside the Battalion Commander and the troops moved forward immediately. This did not hold up the advance of the line unduly in the last strafing mission, troops were moving forward within five minutes after the attack was completed.
strafing, after the effective firing has ceased, a section should make another pass firing
a safe distance ahead of the advancing troops for the purpose of deceiving the enemy and
keeping him uncertain and pinned down. The Japs were fairly quick t resume their positions
on cessation of fire.
(b) Strafing should be used as close to our front lines as safety permits, but bombing should not be conducted closer than 200 yards to our troops except for extreme cases. One bomb in the wrong place would cause a lack of confidence among all ground troops and tend to nullify the advantage of close support.
(c) Troop commander must be impressed with the necessity for keeping his line under control if he wishes to use air. Tanks also must be held up or brought back into the line.
(d) Flotation gear should be provided for AGL equipment. This should include carbon-dioxide inflatable space incorporated into waterproof bags of portable radio equipment.
(e) Small maps of the area to be attacked, such as the air target and gunnery charts, should be supplied to troop officers. They were constantly using the Air Liaison Officers maps rather than their own which were not as easily handled.
7. The Naval Air personnel who supported this operation should be commended on the organization of their attacks, the dispatch with which they responded to a call for support, and the marksmanship and accuracy with which they executed their missions. The commander of TF 106-3 should be commended upon the manner in which he personally controlled his troops and upon the cooperation with which he received and put into effect the suggestions and requests of the Air Liaison Party.
THOMAS W. HEFFERAN, JR.,
Captain, Air Corps,
Air Liason Officer, TF 106-3
[Identical Document addressed to Regimental and Battalion Commanders over signature of
HAROLD F. GREIR
Lt. Colonel, AGD, Adjutant Genera is not reproduced here.]l
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Report of Flint Lock Operation as Observed by Lt. Howell
17 February 1944
I embarked aboard APA 55 D-9 days for the flint lock operations. I was attached to BLT 17-3 as a Signal Observer. The following is a report of my observations as they occurred. The conclusion of this report will contain recommendations which I feel will be beneficial in future operations.
Shortly after the convoy had sailed a conference was held of all Troop Officers and attached Officers by the Battalion Commander and a complete briefing of the ensuing operation was had. The complete operation was described and discussed. The missions of all units concerned were described and opened for discussion. The orders and maps were made available for study. The mission of BLT 17-3 was primarily that of support for BLT 17-1 and 17-2. However alternate plans were also in readiness in case of situation changes. A ship board Training Schedule and areas for training were announced by the Battalion S-3. This schedule included Orientation Periods for Troops by Battalion Staff Officers and members of the JICPOA Team aboard, Physical Training and Training in the use of explosives.
I observed the Training of the Shore Party Communication team during the trip to the Transport rendezvous area. Other than the Periods of Physical Training time was spent in map study, S.O.I. drills and mission of the team upon landing. The training aboard ship was sufficient to enable the team to set up a beach in a minimum of time. Radio operators were very familiar with call signs and frequencies, wire men were well up on what work would be required of them and message center personnel were drilled in the use of Shackler code and the AWC.
Prior to D-day hand carried equipment was taken from the small closet which the Shore Party Signal Officer was able to arrange for to store Team equipment in and given to the men assigned to carrying same in. This closet or locker was on the main deck and enabled the team to get to their equipment on short notice. However small pieces of equipment were kept by the troops in their compartments.
Reveille on D-day was at 0-300 with breakfast at 0330. Small boats were lowered into the water rapidly and circled off the transport waiting for call to their nets. Some of the small boats were davit loaded and the balance net loaded. H-Hour for the assault on Carlos and Carlson Islands was set for 0-930. BLT 17-3 was to be a floating reserve waiting on call from BLT 17-1 and BLT 17-2. All Landing Teams were in the water during the Naval shelling of these two Islands. After the Assault Battalions had landed it was decided that BLT 17-3 would land on Carlos Island. No support being required on either Island.
Upon landing on Carlos Island in the afternoon of D-day I found that the Shore Party Communication Team attached to BLT 17-1 had set up the necessary beach communication. One Radio (TBX) being operated in the Ship to Shore net. One Radio (SCR 610) operating in the Traffic Boat Control net. And one Radio (SCR 284) maintaining a listening watch in the Rgt Command net. No lateral communicaitons were in operation as there were no adjacent beaches. Communication with the Shore Party Communication team attached to BLT 17-2 on Carlson Island could be had through the Rgt Comd net if necessary. Wire communications with the SPC -Bn Headquarters and O.P. 2 was installed.
BLT 17-3 was moved toward the southern end of the Island (Island was completely secured at this time) and bivouaced for the night. A beach on the lagoon side fo the Island was found more suitable for landing supplies. The SP Communication Team with BLT 17-3 and Co Commander of the 50th Engr Bn proceeded to set up and make this beach ready for operation. The transport Division had moved into the lagoon at this time. A green light was erected for the right flank marker and a white light was used to mark the left flank. The Naval Section of the beach party proceeded to order the small boats in to shore. First boat load of suppplies moved across this beach at approximately 2130. The SP Comm. Team had in the meantime placed a TBX Radio in the Ship to Shore net, a SCR 284 in the Rgt Comd net maintaining a listening watch only, and a SCR 610 in the Boat Control net. Wire communication was established with the beach operated by BLT 17-1 Shore Party on the Ocean side of the Island and with the SPC Comm BLT 17-3 - Bn Hq BLT 17-3 and the outposts set up for security of the Beach Party. Assault Wire (W 130) was used for this purpose. No local net (SCR 536) was necessary on this beach as the length of the beach would not exceed fifty yards. Message center was set up in the center of the beach along the dune line. However SCR 536s were available for the purpose. The switchboard used for the purpose of wire communication was ABD 72. Security for the beach was furnished by the Co C 50th Engrs and consisted of 3 .30 Cal. water cooled machine guns. The Naval Section used Visual signalling to guide the smaller boats in. Supplies were unloaded across this beach for approximately 4 hours. And then only after several boats had become beached was it decided to suspend unloading until daylight.
D and 1 found the beach on the lagoon side of the Carlos Island again in operation. Engineers were repairing the pier which had been damaged by shelling but could with minor repairs be used for handling supplies. Msg Center was moved down nearer the foot of the pier as this was the most convenient location when supplies were started across the pier. I checked the fox holes and camouflage of the shore party installations and found them excellent. Upon checking the wire installations I found them too low but upon talking with one of the Shore Party Wire men and found that the lines were being policed and raised at the time. A wire line had been added to Rgt Hq. This enabled the SP to communicate with any installation on the Island. Radio communication remained the same as before (TBX in ship to shore, SCR 610 in Boat Control net and SCR 284 maintaining a listening watch in the Rgt Comd net). There were sufficient Naval Signal men to maintain communication with all small boats and a PA system had been added for additional control of incoming boats. Additional wire lines were being added to the SP switchboard as requested and the SP wire team started to repair the W 130 used in the assault phase with W 110. A complete log was being kept in Message Center of all incoming and outgoing traffic. This log contained time filed, time cleared and a description of the text. Up to the late evening all traffic had been handled in the clear with the exception of one message which had be encoded in the AWC. Radios were operating on voice having handled only one message in C.W. During the night of D plus 1 all radios stood by on a listening watch and Message Center was operated all night. Incoming supplies were stopped shortly after dark.
D plus 2 BLT 17-3 was ordered to embark aboard APA 55 for the night preparatory to supporting an assault on Burton Island by BLT 17-1. The Shore Party Comm Team was to remain behind on Carlos Island and only the SP Comm Team attached to BLT 17-1 was to accompany. I arranged to accompany a detachment of the 50th Engrs on this operation in order to observe communications on this operation. Aboard the APA 55 briefing by the Co Comdrs and Detachment Comdrs was conducted. Reveille on D plus 3 and immediately after breakfast troops and Detachments of BLT 17-3 were embarked in small boats as a floating reserve for BLT 17-1. H-Hour was at 0930 and landing was to be effected on Orange Beach 4 which was at the southernmost tip of this island. Air and Naval bombardment preceded the initial landing and the reserve was across the same beach. Troops were transferred from LCUs to gators prior to landing. I landed with the 50th Engr Detachment and we were met by M.P.s who guided us to an area selected for bivouacing. Fighting was still in progress upon landing. Machine gun fire was aimed at the gators as they crossed the beach. The machine gun was out of range and no damage was done. Only about 400 yards of the island had been completely secured, at this time. I found that visual flank markers had been set up and a SCR 610 was in the beach control net. Signalmen were in fox holes on the beach available for contact with small boats. TBX was in the ship to shore net and a SCR 284 was maintaining a listening watch in the Rgtl. Comd. net. Wire communication included BLT 17-1, BLT 17-3 - SPC Message Center, Beach Master Radio Stations and the outposts. Message Center was well dug in beach not camouflaged. The Message Center log showed time and description of the messages. All traffic had been handled by voice and in the clear. Approximately 30 messages were handled in the first day of this operation. A concise log was being maintained by the Message Center Chief. However Message Center had encountered some difficulty in having all outgoing traffic pass thru this agency, several attempts having been made by officers to give outgoing messages directly to radio operators. Immediately after dark a Japanese ack-ack gun opened fire on this end of the island causing all beach personnel to remain closely in their foxholes. This fire continued up until approximately 0300 D plus 4 days. A mortar battery set up a short distance back of the dune lines was attempting to knock out this gun. I went over to the comabat point for this battery and found the six mortars in the battery were controlled by telephone from the control point. EE8 telephones and W-130 wire was being used for this purpose. I found that their communication was being continually interrupted by the Cannon Cos tanks moving in. Their wire lines had not been placed at sufficient height to protect them from being broken by the tanks.
At daylight on D plus 4 I went out to Orange Beach and checked with the SPC. I found that only supplies as were actually necessary for this operation were being brought in and that these supplies were being requested as needed. Prisoners and casualties were being evacuated across this beach also. Activity on the beach was light and the personnel on this beach were staying well under cover. Small amounts of supplies crossed the beach all morning but the work was so light that a detail from the shore party was put to work collecting and burying enemy dead. All resistance ceased and the island was declared completely secured shorty after noon hour. The balance of the day was spent in general policing and picking up of equipment. At approximately 2030 the shore party communication was ordered secured and prepared for embarkation. I embarked aboard LST 226 at 2300 and attended a briefing of the following days operation.
D plus 5 I landed with the assault troops on Beverly Island in the second wave. No shore party troops were landed on this operation as very little resistance was met and the assault troops were only ashore approximately 2 hours. However, I did observe that a SCR 536 carried by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer failed to function at first but was finally got into operation. Contact could be maintained by the Liaison Officer and the front lines by the Bn Radio (SCR 300). So no confusion resulted. Upon securing this island the troops embarked for Carlos Island where we bivouaced for the night. Upon arriving back at Carlos Island I found that in the absence of Division wire personnel they had been called upon to install a wire system on the island. I found approximately 18 telephones working out of a telephone central located near the Supply Beach. SP Message Center was still in operation.
D plus 6 the Bn were ordered to prepare for embarkation aboard the APAs for the journey back to our base. I boarded the APA 11 approximately 1530 this day.
D plus 8 we sailed from the Lagoon. A meeting was called of officers and a training schedule and training areas were announced. The remainder of the trip back was uneventfull.
In view of the observations I was able to make, is respectfully submitted the following recommendations and the reasons for same:
1. That each SPC communication team be allowed to carry a 1/4 ton truck and trailer to assist in getting its equipment ashore.
2. Each team be required to carry at least 4 Dr 8s with W-130 wire. This wire can be carried by two men and wire can be laid in four division echelons at once.
3. That at least 8 lance poles be landed in the assault phase. Not all beaches will have trees available for overheading wire and it is imperative that wire be overhead immediately.
4. That personnel be given additional training in the value of camouflage. Also training in camouflage methods.
5. That a conference be held between the SPC, SPC Sig Officer, and B.M. prior to operation for the purpose of coordination and mutual understanding.
6. That personnel be thoroughly instructed in the danger of Booby Traps and Duds - personnel was found to be extremely lax on this item.
7. That a 3-day supply of batteries be carried ashore in the initial phase for all battery operated equipment. On two instances SCR 610s were out of service due to lack of fresh batteries
OBSERVATIONS AT BURLESQUE AND CAMOUFLAGE (ROI ISLAND)
KWAJALEIN ATOLL, M. I., FEBRUARY1944.
The Naval gunfire and bombing was so heavy and devastating that it was hard for this observer to believe any living thing could have survived until D-day. All machine-gun emplacements, pillboxes and block-houses were located and completely neutralized, except for one two-story block-house on camouflage which subsequently proved to be an ammunition storage depot.
Bombers effectively neutralized all air strips on camouflage; wrecked and burned the two hangars, and destroyed approximately eighty planes of all types on the ground. Only three planes tried to take the air and these were shot down.
The defenders evidently expected the attack
to come from sea ward where their heaviest fortifications and installations
were located. However the landing was effected from inside the lagoon where most of the reef dangers were eliminated and the beaches better adapted to amphibious operations. Landings were effected under a naval barrage and our casualties were small. The Japanese resistance was not severe, though their casualties were very heavy. It is estimated that their losses were between 25 and 30 to 1 as compared to ours. It is this observers belief that most of the Japanese casualties occurred before our forces landed. in covering both islands thoroughly, I do not believe you could find a spot where a circle could be drawn with a 12 foot radius that would not contain a shell hole or bomb crater.
Japanese small arms ammunition and aerial incendiary bombs were scattered all over both islands. From the thousands of beer bottles I saw in the pill-boxes and trenches I would say that the Japs were allowed some of the better things of life. Many were cultivating small vegetable gardens closely adjacent to their dugouts.
The pill-boxes and block-houses were built of reinforced steel and concrete and all interior partitions wore of the same construction. The entire shore line was studded with pill-boxes at intervals of 1 to 200 feet. Their large gun positions were all knocked out as were their radar and radio stations. Their radar equipment seemed crude.
AS I left the Island this afternoon there were still an undetermined few of the enemy scattered about Camouflage. They hide in tunnels and underbrush during the day and forage for food at night. They have accounted for 20-odd Marine casualties during the past two days. Prisoners, as usual, were few and included among them were some women who had no visible means of support other than their native attractiveness.
The "dead disposal squads" , who are all volunteers, have had a busy four days. I saw three trenches each approximately 50 yards long, 15 feet wide, and 8 feet deep half filled with dead Japs, and two others that had been covered over with a sign "279 JAPS BURIED HERE." I saw one water filled bomb crater and counted 15 Japs and 1 pig floating in the bloody water. I saw small fragments of dead bodies being swept from the floor of 1 block-house which the Navy was making ready for headquarters site. The stench of death pervades both islands.
The communications men were busy stringing wire everywhere along the beaches and the bulldozers and trucks were tearing the hell out of it. The beaches were lined with LCT'S, V'S, M'S, LST'S, Alligators and Ducks. The ensign who manned the control boat seemed completely bewildered and hoped somebody would come along-side who knew which beach he was supposed to land on. But in spite of the control boat and the lack of lifting gear ashore, the cargo boats are plying from ship to shore all day and all night and the strategic materials and supplies are hitting the beach in tremendous volume. The large C-2 type ships are being completely discharged in 4 days. The assault troops are beginning to move out and the garrison forces and operating units are moving in.
The electric lights are burning brightly over Burlesque and Camouflage tonight. One air strip is already fit for service and both islands are well secured with numerous AA batteries.
I further observed that there were enough K rations scattered around to have fed me well for months. The Marines tell me they are short on cigarettes and I think lots of the K ration boxes are opened Just to obtain the cigarettes and the food then cast aside. It is definitely recommended that a bountiful supply of cigarettes be sent in as soon after the first wave lands as possible.
The assault troops hit the beaches travelling light, carrying only their rifles, knives, spare ammunition and canteens. Their packs were sent in later.
Last night three unidentified planes were located twelve miles away. We stood G.Q. for 1 hour and 15 minutes. No raid, but during the alert all ships sent out their small boats with smoke pots. The smoke screen set up was very effective.
FROM USS MARYLAND -- NEWS BULLETIN, FEB 9
Vice-Admiral Terou Akiyma killed at Camouflage.
Japanese losses outnumbered those of the attacking Americans by approximately 30 to 1.
Admiral Nimitz announced that the Japanese suffered losses of 8122 killed, 264 captured for a total of 8386. Losses of American soldiers, sailors, and marines were 286 killed, 82 missing, 1148 wounded for a total of 1516.
The conquest of the KwaJalein Atoll was accomplished at a cost far less than the Gilbert Islands battle in November, in which Americans lost 1092 killed and 2680 wounded in a far smaller operation. This was due in large part because the Yanks were able to put to good use the lessons learned in the Gilberts and the surface ship and plane bombardments that preceded the landings on Kwajalein were probably the greatest in the history of warfare.
There was no evidence of mines either outside or inside the lagoon. Marine assault troops report that they found no land or personnel mines or booby traps.
A Jap transport, sunk in the initial bombardment, lies about 1200 yards due south of Camouflage in the lagoon.
No alerts for the past two nights. More cargo ships have moved into the lagoon. The islands are brilliantly lighted tonight as work goes on 24 hours per day. All cargo ships are using sufficient lights to discharge.
Three battleships and two cruisers left the lagoon this morning. The SARATOGA and two AA Cruisers departed this afternoon. We have seen various task groups leave and return in from 48 to 72 hours, indicating that they are carrying out other bombardment missions close by.
We received 100 marines from the assault forces this afternoon. They report that 15 more Japs were killed last night. It seems that Camouflage was literally covered with underground tunnels.
We expect about 1500 marines aboard tomorrow. They present a miserable spectacle, with a week's growth of beard, and fatigue uniforms torn and dirty.
Last night at 2030 we were alerted for unidentified planes. All ships set up a smoke screen. Planes approached within 15 miles and then disappeared.
Today we completed discharging and took 1400 marine assault troops aboard. These marines are a part of the 4th Marine Division, and came assault loaded direct from San Diego. Some came all the way in LSTS.
We are ready to get under way now, but must await the reloading of the other ships in our task Group. The Commodore has made me Officer Guard Mail messenger. Each morning I make a trip to the MARYLAND to pick up Guard Mail for task Group 51.6 and take messages to the Chief of Staff, Task Force 53 for the Commodore.
At 1300 today the Navy took over the islands from the Marines. The Island Base Commander is Captain Gwen, USN. The Garrison Group is composed of Acorn 21, the 109th CB Battalion, the Marine Guard, and the Harbor Control Group. There are about 4500 men in this Garrison Group.
Among the group we are transporting back to the Maui Base is Lt. Col. Carlson of the Carlson's Raiders fame.
So many marines complain that their carbines were not effective after getting wet and clogged with sand. There was some complaint of the .45's, but no complaint of the M-1 and Browning. Bazookas were used in this operation also.
Well, Tojo reaped his revenge upon us this morning. Quoted below is the Navy Intelligence Officer's report of the air raid:"0200--By radio from Island Base Commander of Roi Island. TG alerted for approaching enemy aircraft bearing 245 degrees, distance 51 miles; succeeding bearings and distances 295 degrees--45 miles; 285 degrees--45 miles; 325 degrees--45 miles. Number and types undetermined
0209--Condition Red assumed--all hands
called to G.Q.
0215--Smoke pots on ships and small boats set off
. 0220-- four search lights on Roi Island searching skies
. 0229--AA firing on Roi Island and from 3 ships in the lagoon.
0240-_Several large bombs were dropped on Roi Island and direct hits made on the fuel and munitions stores piled on the southern beach, setting off tremendous fires and explosions from the munitions and rolling flames and smoke from the fuel. Immediately after the first bomb struck a stick of about 8 small bombs were observed bursting in succession north of the southern beach of Roi. All AA fire ceased and searchlights went out when first bombs hit.
0420--smoke pots secured by order of Island Base Commander.
0600--Ships of TG sent boats and medical officers and corpsmen and medical supplies to Roi and to SS TYPHOON--that ship having been designated to receive all casualties from Roi.
0900--Fires on Roi Island still burning.
_ _ _ _ _ _
At about 0240 a bomb struck the water about 1000 yards off our starboard quarter. We were well Covered by our smoke screen at this time, as were most of the ships in the lagoon; however, some ship abeam of us in the vicinity of the MARYLAND and the BALTIMORE opened up with AA fire. Fires started on the beach simultaneously, with direct hits made in our oil and ammunition dumps. As the oil drums exploded it sounded like heavy gunfire, and the tracers from the ammunition dumps looked like a mammoth 4th of July celebration. I counted 8 different fires at one time.
At 0600 the Commodore ordered me to Yokohama Pier on Camouflage to dispatch the casualties in LCV'S to the SS TYPHOON. I dispatched 23 boats with a total number of 252 wounded to the TYPHOON BY 0930. Better than 65 percent of these men had head injuries, and 5 died enroute to the TYPHOON. After combing both islands and seeing that the stream of wounded was reduced to a mere trickle of walking cases I moved back out to the TYPHOON. We were not able to get all the wounded aboard until 1400. At about 1700 we saw the last fire extinguished on Burlesque. When I left the TYPHOON there were only 11 known dead, although we hadn't had any recent intelligence from the beach.
At 1800 we departed along with the SS ROBIN WENTLEY bound for Maui with about 3100 marines aboard the two ships.
C. W. HUSSEY
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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
2 March 1944.
SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations, Majuro Operation.
TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.
1. Attached units departed aboard the USS Cambria on 22 Jan 44.
2. On 23 January 1944 destination was revealed and maps, photos, and orders issued, and information disseminated to enlisted men.
3. Officers were required to stand compartment guard duty enroute.
4. On D day, 31 January, the harbor of Majuro was entered and the approach to objective made, following the mine sweepers. Naval gunfire was being launched and aircraft on station for missions. Word from reconnaissance troops put ashore during the night caused gunfire and strafing to be ceased. At approximately noon the atoll was declared occupied and placed under the Military Governorship of C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, U.S.N. The C.O. and staff went ashore for reconnaissance and troops remained aboard until D plus 1 when a non-tactical move ashore was exercised. Attempts were made for release of attached units at this time, to no avail; the reason given was the expectancy and probability of another mission assignment for the BLT.
5. From D plus 1 until D plus 22, a constant effort to obtain release was maintained. On D plus 22 attached JASCO personnel were detached to the Island Commander for disposition.
6. Arrangements were made and troops embarked aboard AO 75 USS Saugatuck 230700 for return to Pearl.
1. I recommend a thorough document describing JASCO in its entirety be prepared and distributed to all infantry units.
2. I strongly recommend a change in T/O for A.G.L. teams to be armed with the carbine except the driver who should carry a TSMG.
3. It is urgent that A.G.L. teams be increased in enlisted strength to six (6) men involving an additional radio operator, radio mechanic, and a basic.
4. Iron bound orders involving immediate release of personnel should accompany units being detached.
5. A.G.L. officers should contact the Commander Support Aircraft prior to sailing for briefing on subsequent missions.
WILSON H. DONKLE
295th Joint Assault Sig Co
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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
5 March 1944
SUBJECT: Report of Operations, SFC Team #5.
TO: Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.
1. Naval Gunfire was not necessary on the Sundance Operation. Prearranged shore bombardment commenced as scheduled, but ceased upon receipt of reconnaisance reports.
2. After the BLT had completed its landing operation and it was ascertained that no naval gunfire would be used, I contacted the Battalion Commander in reference to release of my team, and acting as officer in charge of J.A.S.Co. units as directed by Battalion Adjutant, I represented Signal and A.G.L. teams. I received no satisfaction and was told merely that no release could be given as yet.
3. At different times during our stay on the island I inquired of the Battalion Commander about our release. I know that the other team commanders did likewise. Each and every answer I received was different from the previous one.
4. Orders issued for our release by 295th were ignored. These orders were issued with CPA authority.
5 . Duties not in accord with normal duties and functions of both officers and men were assigned to us. Attached orders will indicate that. The E.M. of the J.A.S.CO. were assigned such duties as road repair and care and guard duty which seemed to come quite often. Privates were standing guard every other night.
6. Recommendations: I recommend that in future operations , orders assigning members of the J.A.S.CO to various units indicate that teams are assigned for special duty only (combat mission). Also I believe that separate orders for each team be made out for release so that when each teams mission is complete it may be relieved as their combat efficiency is no longer present. Therefore, when Naval Gunfire ceases, the SFC team should be relieved.
JOHN J. COHEN
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
14 March 1944.
SUBJECT: Report on Sundance Operation.
TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.
On 22 January 1944 the team embarked upon the Cambria and sailed from Honolulu on the 23rd.
Although bunks were allotted us, none were available and the men had to sleep and live on the deck. This situation was reported to the proper officers but nothing was done to rectify it.
While enroute to Sundance Atoll, orientation classes were had daily. The information given the officers was transmitted to the men at the earliest convenience.
On D-1 day the Marine Rcn unit attached to BLT-2 landed and found no opposition. The Navy was notified and immediately ceased fire.
The Cambria and its escort sailed into the lagoon on D day with no opposition. A small reconnaissance party went ashore and when they returned the battalion commander decided to wait until D plus 1 to debark the troops.
On D plus 1 the troops went ashore and prepared living quarters.
The communication team set up a switchboard and had communication with Battalion Headquarters. Later on as dumps were established, we laid lines to them. This was the extent of our communication while supplies were being carried over the beach.
On D plus 2 day we were detached from the Engineers and attached the Headquarters Company for duty. The men helped the battalion communication section in laying wire, standing radio watch, and operating the battalion headquarters switchboard. These same men were also called upon to do K.P., Guard Duty, and to help build roads. This additional duty was questioned by Captain Donkle and Captain Cohen, but it could not be helped.
The Battalion Commander refused to release us until 23 February. Repeated efforts were made to obtain this release prior to this date because there was no assault phase and transportation was available at all times.
On 23 February we boarded the tanker U.S.S. Saugatuck and proceeded to Pearl Harbor, reaching there 1 March. We then procured transportation and came directly to the Company Area.
I recommend that future orders be so worded that release from combat units may be assured. Also that the new, modified, lightweight version of the BD-72,together with five miles of W-130 be used in the initial assault phase of the landing.
MANNING A. ELDRIDGE
1st Lt., 295th JASCO
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OPERATIONS REPORT 295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY - SAIPAN
1. Attachment of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company to the 27th Infantry Division on the 12th of March 1944 was the first indication of an impending operation. The organization at the time of attachment was assigned to the Signal Officer, Central Pacific Area.
2. Prior Combat Experience - Some members of the organization had had prior combat experience during the capture of the Marshall Islands. All Naval enlisted personnel had participated, all Shore Fire Control enlisted personnel, four Army Field Artillery Officers (spotters), four complete Air Ground Liaison parties, and three complete Shore Party communication Teams. Approximate total participating was 11 officers and 215 enlisted men from an organizational strength of 43 officers and 460 enlisted men.
3. During the period prior to the operation itself, general specialist instruction was conducted in all sections in order to improve each individual in the performance of his assigned duties.
4. Joint Assault Signal Company Organization - Before continuing this report it is desirable for the reader to understand the basic organization of the Joint Assault Signal Company. First, it is a unit designed for attachment to an amphibious assault division. As a unit it has three missions: (1) Provision of a means to each Battalion Landing Team for the control and direction of supporting naval gunfire; (2) Providing parties to request air support and to advise infantry commanders on the use of aircraft in the support of ground units; (3) To furnish teams for beach communications during initial phases of the amphibious assault.
The first mission is the duty of the Shore Fire Control Section having an authorized strength of 9 Field Artillery captains, 9 Naval lieutenants (senior grade), and 45 Army enlisted men. The section consists of nine Shore Fire Control parties, one for attachment to each infantry battalion. Each has a Naval Gunfire Spotter (Field Artillery Officer), a Battalion Naval Liaison Officer (Navy Officer), an enlisted Field Artillery Scout, two radio operators, and two wiremen.
The second mission is performed by the Air Ground Liaison Section with an authorized strength of 13 captains (Avn) and 39 Air Force enlisted men. This section has 13 equal parties of an officer, two radio operators, and a driver. One party is attached to the Division Headquarters and one to each Regimental and Battalion Headquarters.
The remaining mission is carried out by the Shore Party Communication Section whose authorized strength is 10 First Lieutenants, Signal Corps, 190 enlisted men (Army), and 108 enlisted men (Navy). Ten teams, for attachment to Shore Party Engineer Companies, of an officer, 19 Army enlisted men, and 10 or 11 Navy enlisted men form the section.
A Major as Company Commander, a Captain as Executive Officer, a Warrant Officer as Supply Officer, 69 Army enlisted men (30 are basics), and 5 Navy enlisted men make up the Headquarters Platoon of the organization.
In the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company the senior officer in each section has been appointed Section Commander and in-so-far as possible each section is treated as a company except that the commander does not have command responsibilities nor can he act as the commander in such matters as exercising the 104th Article of War, etc. Due to the size of the organization it was found necessary to appoint officers to act as S-3 and Personnel Officer in addition to their other duties. This is not completely satisfactory as the officers concerned are unable to be with their teams or parties during a large percentage of training time, and during combat they cannot operate in staff positions.
Chart number one shows the administrative organization of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company, and chart number two shows tactical attachments to elements of an infantry division.[ Charts are not reproduced.]
5. Detachment of Navy enlisted men - The Naval enlisted personnel in the Shore Party Communication Teams had the duty of working with the Navy Beach-Master and furnishing for him communication from the beach to the ships and laterally to adjacent beach-masters. As these personnel were unable to train with the beach-masters with whom they would work in combat, and due to the administrative difficulties of Naval enlisted personnel within an Army unit, all Naval enlisted men were returned to the Navy on order of the Commanding General, USAFICP, on the 21st of April 1944. The mission of these men was also assumed by the Navy. This change meant that the Navy enlisted men were to be no longer considered for use during the operation that was to come, and also that there was no Army controlled radio channel linking the beach and the combat loaded transports. It was of course possible for the Navy Beach-Master to handle Army traffic over his circuit, but he would naturally give his own messages priority and also there would be delay of the message passing through the ships communication office before delivery to the proper Army personnel.
6. Additional Personnel for Air Ground Liaison and Shore Fire Control Parties Another problem had been encountered in the fact that the Table of Organization strength for the Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison Parties was not sufficient for performance of their mission. This fact was agreed to by Army and Navy Headquarters in the Central Pacific Area, but authorization had not been obtained for the assignment of additional personnel, During the Marshall Islands Operation, Parties with the 7th Infantry Division had strength as follows: Air Ground Liaison Parties - 6 enlisted men; Shore Fire Control Parties - 13 enlisted men.
Considerable study was given to the subject of additional personnel, and this organization finally decided that the minimum number of men for a Shore Fire Control Party would be ten and for an Air Ground Liaison Party - five. It was originally hoped that these additional specialist personnel would be attached to the organization from units under Headquarters, USAFICPA, but the 27th Division was directed to furnish the personnel from its own organic units. The matter was presented to the 27th Division Chief of Staff and it was decided that personnel would be placed on temporary duty with the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company for the Forager Operation. At the same time the Chief of Staff prepared and forwarded a recommendation for a change in the Table of Organization to increase each Air Liaison Party to five enlisted men and each Shore Fire Control Party to ten enlisted men.
On the 24th of April 1944, 82 enlisted men were placed on temporary duty with this unit. Each Infantry Regimental and Battalion Headquarters furnished two radio operators to work with its attached Air Ground Liaison Party, and the Division Signal Company furnished the two radio operators to complete the Division Air Ground Liaison Party. One radio operator and one wireman came from the Division Artillery for each of the nine Shore Fire Control Parties, while each Infantry Battalion supplied a radio operator, a wireman, and a driver-wireman to complete them. In addition, two regiments sent three radio operators while the third regiment furnished three radio operators and two wiremen, to constitute the Regimental Naval Liaison Officers Party (the Regimental Navy Liaison Officer being attached to the Division from Fifth Amphibious Corps but not bring his own communication personnel or equipment).
7. Training of Shore Fire Control Parties - On the 24th of April the preoperational training of the Shore Fire Control Section was turned over to the 27th Division Artillery. During the period 2nd May to 18th May all of the parties participated in communication exercises with Navy ships, in firing and spotting of Field Artillery on the Schofield Range, Oahu, T. H., and the firing of destroyers and cruisers at Kahoolawe, T.H.
8. Training of Air Ground Liaison Parties - Prior to the operation, the various parties of the Air Ground Liaison Section continued communication drills and participated in direct air support problems with squadrons of planes based on Oahu, T. H. One party was able to go to Maui, T. H., another to Kauai, T. H. to engage in amphibious Air Ground Liaison training with the 33rd Infantry Division. Remaining parties had problems with various battalions of the 38th Infantry Division in their training on Oahu. An SCR 284 radio had been obtained for each Air Ground Liaison Party in order that each party would have a portable as well as a mobile radio set. Both sets were used during the training period.
9. Shore Party Communication Section Training and Establishment of Ship-Shore-Lateral Net - The Shore Party Communication Teams were engaged during this period in unit and specialist training. Near the end of April it was decided that our organization would place a radio team on each of the fifteen ships that were to transport the Division. The purpose of these teams was to establish an Army controlled ship-to-shore radio net. The net was designated as the ship-shore-lateral and is pictured in chart number three. As battalion landing teams were loaded on nine of the transports, each Shore Party Communication Team with each of these ships was designated to establish a radio team operating an SCR 284 aboard. Each team would use its other SCR 284 on the beach as the land terminus of the net. This left six ships for which teams were to be furnished, and the tenth or extra communication team was used for this purpose. Its members were all given special voice radio training with the SCR 284 and teams of either three or four enlisted men each were created. Six extra SCR 284's were obtained for the use of these personnel. During this same period it was determined to use the SCR 300 for the inland net to the battalions, with the beach station as a part of the battalion SCR 300 command net. Nine SCR 300's were drawn for the organization, and radio and message center personnel of the Shore Party Communication Section were trained in their operation.
10. Administrative Planning-Personnel and Equipment - Early in May, in conference with the Division Signal Officer and a representative of the Division G-4, it was decided which elements of the Joint Assault Signal company would accompany the Assault Echelon. On the basis that all tactical personnel would be attached to different units, all supply, motor, mess, and administrative personnel of our organization were to remain in the Rear Echelon. As space on the ships was already at a premium and as previous operations had not indicated its need, transportation was not to be carried on the operation for the Shore Fire Control Parties or the Shore Party Communication Teams. The only transportation to be taken on the operation was; a half-track personnel carrier mounting the SCR 499; a one ton trailer with power unit for the SCR 499; 13 - 1/4 ton trucks (radio equipped for the Air Ground Liaison Section); and a 1/4 ton truck for the Company Commander.
11. Additional Frequencies for SCR 536 Radios - SCR 536's were to be used for inter-team and party communication. An additional two of these sets (making a total of four) had been obtained for each Shore Fire Control Party. This added to a total of eighty nine SCR 536's to be used on the operation (27 in 9 Shore Party Communication Teams; 26 in the Air Ground Liaison Section; 36 in the Shore Fire Control Section). The remaining problem was to obtain frequencies that were reasonably clear for these radios. The original twelve ground force frequencies of course were already in use by the regiments, so finally it was possible to obtain seven additional frequencies. Crystals for these channels were ground by personnel of the Signal Officer, USAFICPA, and sets were alined as follows:
a. 26 for Air Ground Liaison Section on Frequency A.
b. 9 for all 1st Battalion Shore Party Communication Teams on Frequency B.
c. 9 for all 2nd Battalion Shore Party Communication Teams on Frequency C.
d. 9 for all 3rd Battalion Shore Party Communication Teams on Frequency D.
e. 12 for all 1st Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties on Frequency E.
f. 12 for all 2nd Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties on Frequency F.
g. 12 for all 3rd Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties on Frequency G.
This arrangement was completed just in time to deliver the CSR 536's to the various teams and parties prior to final sailing.
12. Additional Equipment - Other non-Table of Equipment items procured for use on the operation were:
a. 2 ED telephones for each Shore Fire Control Party to be used with CSR 284 remote control units.
b. Quartermaster pack-boards on which to lash CSR 284's.
c. 9 small, lightweight, 10 drop switchboards especially constructed by personnel of the Signal Officer,
USAFICPA, for use by the Shore Party Communication Teams.
d. 5 miles of W-130 wire for each Shore Party Communication Team.
13. Authorized Equipment Not Taken - Items of authorized equipment that were either turned in or not taken on the operation were as follows:
a. 11 Charging sets SCR 169.
b. 22 EE65A Test Sets. -
c. 220 Lance Poles.
d. 22 Converters M-209 originally authorized for Air Ground Liaison and Shore Fire Control Parties.
14. Amphibious Maneuvers - Between the 7th and 28th of April, elements of the organization engaged in amphibious maneuvers with two regiments of the 27th Infantry Division. On May 18th the tactical elements of the company accompanied the division on a final dress rehearsal returning to Oahu, 25th of May.
15. Distribution of Personnel for Operation - On return to Oahu our tactical elements remained attached to the various regiments and battalions. Final check indicated that our Rear Echelon to remain on Oahu would be 2 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 43 enlisted men (including sick in hospital, mess, supply, motor, and administrative personnel). The tactical echelon of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company had a strength of 42 officers and 385 enlisted men (including 82 men attached from 27th Division). A Field Artillery officer from the 592nd Joint Assault Signal Company was also attached to the unit as an observer.
The Commanding Officer, 2 radio operators, 2 radio repairmen, (one attached to Division Air Ground Liaison Section to care for SCR 499), one telephone repairman and a driver comprised the Headquarters for the tactical echelon of the organization. Shore Party Communication Section strength, including special radio teams for ship-shore-lateral net, was 10 officers and 212 enlisted men; that of the Shore Fire Control Section was 18 officers and 102 enlisted men; and that of the Air Ground Liaison Section was 13 officers and 65 enlisted men. For the operation attachment of various teams and parties were according to Chart #1, except that Shore Fire Control Parties now had ten enlisted men and Air Ground Liaison Parties had five.
16. Embarkation and Sailing - Attachments of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company with the 106th Infantry sailed from Pearl Harbor on the 28th of May. Remaining elements finished loading with the Division by 31 May and sailed for the Marshalls on 1 June 1944. During the voyage, troops received ship-board training and orientation while the staff engaged in Command Post exercises for the operation. Our convoy reached Kwajalein Harbor 9 June 44.
17. Planning Conference at Kwajalein - On the 10th of June a conference was held aboard the USS Fremont to decide final details for the assault on the Marianas. On the subject of supporting naval gunfire, one of the Regimental Commanders desired to have a radio net or some means of communication established whereby any naval gunfire mission would be referred to him for approval prior to firing. The Commanding Officer of the Joint Assault Signal Company opposed this suggestion as such a procedure would further increase the time delay in obtaining naval gunfire support; it would involve the use of extra radios, additional frequencies and operators which were not readily available; and necessary approval by the Regimental Commander for each mission would leave little or no responsibility on the Spotter and Battalion Naval Liaison Officer who would probably be looking at the terrain instead of a map. After some discussion, the Regimental Commanders request was denied.
18. The Assault - Sailing from Kwajalein on 11 June we arrived in our assembly area to the north-west of Saipan at 160550. By afternoon of the sixteenth of June it was evident that all or part of the 27th Infantry Division would be committed on Saipan. The 165th Infantry was to land in column of battalions on the night of the 16th. Radio silence was lifted and by 2100, 16 June, all ship stations in ship-shore-lateral net were in contact (except ships carrying 106th Infantry which had not as yet reached Saipan). The 27th Infantry Division Staff and Headquarters of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company landed on the 17th of June. During the initial landing our organization suffered no casualties. However, during the evening of the 17th of June, a Japanese plane strafed Blue Two Beach, Wounding two Shore Party Communication Section enlisted men.
19. Status of Signal Supplies - The possible threat of an attack by the Japanese Fleet had caused the majority of our transports to stand out to sea. Not much signal equipment had been unloaded before the ships departed and the Division Signal Officer asked our organization to: (1) Turn over to him as much of our signal equipment as we could. (2) To establish dumps of signal equipment at our beach locations, keeping lookouts on the beach for 27th Division Signal supplies and securing same in the dumps from pilfering. In response to the first request, a total of 22 SCR 536s, 9 SCR 300s, and 3 SCR 284s were turned over to the Division Signal Officer. The dumps established by the Shore Party Communication Section were operated until all Division Signal supplies were ashore.
20. Participation of Shore Party Communication Section - A Shore Party Communication Team has the mission of establishing communications on an assault beach. A plan of the communications to be established by three teams is shown in Chart #4. In the Saipan operation the 27th Division did not make an assault landing but landed on a secured beachhead. On these beaches the Marines had their shore parties including communication teams from their own Marine Joint Assault Signal Company. As both Army and Marines still had to handle their own equipment across the same beach, all communication teams operated with their respective shore party companies. Had there been assurance of landing across a secured beach, nine communication teams would have been unnecessary as they were not all needed at Saipan. Army communications were as shown in Chart #4 with the addition of wire trunks to the Marine Joint Assault Signal installations. Actually had there been sufficient coordination, one communication team with additional equipment would have been adequate for each numbered beach.
When the infantry battalions had moved inland about 2 1/2 miles, contact through the SCR 300 radio net was lost. This situation, however, was normal as now the beaches were under Division G-4 control, and it was no longer necessary for the battalions to directly contact the beaches. Supplies were by that time following normal channels.
The ship-shore-lateral radio net proved very satisfactory. The majority of messages handled by the net were concerned with supplies and the unloading of ships.
The Shore Party teams suffered due to the lack of transportation. During the operation, each of the nine teams changed location at least once and several of them moved four or five times. It was impossible for them to move all of their equipment without transportation. Transportation had to be borrowed and always caused delay in the movement of the teams.
As the beaches were consolidated and Shore Party Engineers were relieved for other duties, the communication teams concerned accompanied the engineers and provided for them their internal communications.
On 29 June the Division Signal Officer asked that the communication teams of our organization furnish 25 enlisted communication specialists to act as replacements to the Infantry Battalions and Regiments. During the operation a total of 50 (18 high-speed radio operators SSN 766, 21 wiremen including 2 wirechiefs, and 11 message center men including 1 message center chief) enlisted men from the Shore Party Communication Teams of our company were used as replacements. This was agreeable to the organization commander as it did not interfere with his mission and it would help the division. However, in one instance, objection was made to the fact that three high-speed radio operators attached to one battalion were placed in front line platoons or companies to operate either SCR 300's or SCR 536s. This action was deemed as improper use of specialist personnel, and a message was sent confirming the unit commanders objection (see Journal 3 July 44). The three men concerned remained in their original assignments until after Saipan was secured.
On June 30th the Division Signal Officer directed that one communication team be attached to the 106 RCT and one to the 165 RCT for the purpose of signal salvage. The two teams were attached and on the 2nd of July, another one was sent to the 105th RCT for the same purpose. All together 3 officers and 56 men were engaged in this work.
On the 2nd of July the Signal Officer directed the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company to take over and operate all signal facilities at the Division Rear Echelon and also to furnish additional personnel to assist in the operation of the Division Signal dump. One communication team was assigned to each task effective 3rd or 4th of July (as soon as they could borrow transportation to move).
Saipan was announced secured on the 9th of July, and plans were immediately started for the Tinian assault. At this time everyone believed that the 27th Division, less the 105th Infantry, would actively participate in the operation. Most of the Shore Party Engineers were detached from the Division, and on the 18th of July it was announced that communication teams of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would not participate in the capture of Tinian.
The remaining difficulty was that the unattached teams now had no place to ration. The organizational kitchens were left in the Rear Echelon, and finally three teams were attached to the Division Quartermaster Company, one to an infantry battalion and one to the Division Ordnance Company for rations.
On the 6th of August enlisted men who had been on temporary duty with Infantry Battalions and Regiments were returned to their own communication teams, thus ending the active participation of the Shore Party Communication Section for the period of this report.
21. Participation of the Shore Fire Control Section - The nine Shore Fire Control Parties of our organization landed on Saipan with their individual battalion landing teams. Including the enlisted personnel for the Regimental Naval Liaison Officers Party, 9 Navy Officers, 9 Army Officers, and 102 enlisted men comprised the Shore Fire Control Section for the operation. The 27th Division landed in reserve and at first was not used as a complete unit. Consequently various battalions made many movements, and the main difficulty encountered by Shore Fire Control Parties was the movement of their party and communication equipment without vehicles. Definitely transportation is necessary and should be allowed for these parties on any operation in which the land mass is comparable in area to Saipan.
The Shore Fire Control Parties remained with their battalions throughout the Divisions stay on Saipan. Each party made a separate report on its operation through their own Battalion, and a separate Naval Gunfire report was submitted through the Division by the Division Naval Gunfire Officer to cover party activities. The most consistent use of the parties was for providing night illumination during the operation. Several support naval gunfire problems were fired successfully.
Some points concerning the employment of Naval Gunfire which are due consideration are:
a. It is a supporting weapon used to greatest advantage prior to the establishment of shore based artillery.
b. It is often impossible to fire naval gunfire at a target when Field Artillery can be used--as the trajectory of
naval guns is quite flat and would unnecessarily endanger troops adjacent to the target sector.
c. Due to the
present system of obtaining naval gunfire, Shore Fire Control personnel are unable to
immediately state to
the Infantry Commander whether or not supporting naval fire can be obtained. In this sense
the naval gunfire
procedure is inferior to that of the Field Artillery whose Liaison Officer can almost immediately promise or deny fire in any particular area to the Infantry Battalion Commander. Possibly the placing of more responsibility for the safety of naval gunfire on liaison personnel would improve this situation.
d. The value of naval gunfire to destroy the enemy's morale should not be under estimated. Most of the captured prisoners on Saipan stated that naval gunfire was their number one fear.
e. When supporting ships are not in position, it often takes some time to fire a mission even after approval.
f. If proper arrangements are made naval ships can be used for counter-battery fire using air observation.
Chart #5 sketches the intended communication system to be used by a Shore Fire Control Party. The greatest difficulty encountered in this system was that most Spotters found it almost impossible to carry their SCR 284 far enough forward to serve its intended purpose, even with the use of remote control lines. Hardly would the radio be set up before it had to move, and also as time was too limited for digging foxholes, all operation personnel would usually be exposed to enemy fire. Therefore almost every party went through the operation without the use of an SCR 284 with the spotter at his forward observation post. Direct communication from spotter to NLO was first tried using the SCR 536. This attempt in most cases was unsuccessful due to the mountainous terrain and limited range of the SCR 536. Some parties were able to borrow SCR 300s from the Infantry Battalions and established a system as depicted in Chart #6. Other parties depended upon already established infantry wire or radio to link spotter and NLO (Naval Liaison Officer). All of these systems had the disadvantage of no direct contact between the Spotter and the firing ship, and possible wide spread employment of the SCR 300 involves the use of an infantry radio with a limited number of clear channels.
In addition to the normal destroyers and cruisers used for supporting fire, some work was done with LCI-G's. Saipan was officially secured on 9 July, however, commencing about 30 July the 27th Division spent seven days in a final mop-up sweep covering all territory north of Mt. Tapotchau. Along the coast were many cliffs honey-combed with caves. An LCI firing 40 mm shells into the caves was used on each coast. Shore Fire Control personnel were on shore and on the ships, and control of fire was directed at various targets from shore using either SCR 284 or SCR 300 radios.
During the operation a Spotter and a Naval Liaison Officer were killed, a Spotter and a Naval Liaison Officer seriously wounded and evacuated. Several enlisted men were also casualties. To prepare for the possibility of active participation on Tinian, all Shore Fire Control parties of the 165th and 106th Infantry were brought to full strength by use of party personnel who were originally attached to the 105th Infantry. Also a Spotter and a Naval Liaison Officer were placed on temporary duty with Northern Troops and Landing Force. The Navy Officer stood duty on the cruiser Louisville, the Spotter (Army Field Artillery Officer) was attached to the 3rd Battalion 25th Marines. While the Spotter was on this duty, he adjusted 16" gunfire from the battleships California and Tennessee, and on the day prior to securing Tinian, he was wounded by a sniper and evacuated.
Upon completion of the operation, many opinions were advanced by the various officers of the Shore Fire Control Section. They are presented here for the purpose of information only. Recommendations concerning the Shore Fire Control Section are in the section on Summary and Recommendations.
a. Four Army and four Navy Officers stated that the position of the Battalion Naval Liaison Officer was unnecessary--various reasons: that NLO's radio relay work could be done by a communication sergeant; that NLO's work could also be done by the spotter; that an Army Officer could act in the position as well as or better than a Navy officer; and that continued use of Navy officers in such a position caused them to decrease in value to the Navy due to the lack of shipboard experience.
b. Shore Fire Control parties might work better if placed in an organization with only one instead of three primary missions.
c. A party of ten men is sufficient providing T/E transportation is taken on operations.
d. The Naval Gunfire Spotter (Army Officer) at the forward observation post needs relief during a long operation.
e. The use of Regimental NLOs should be continued.
f. If the use of Battalion NLO's is continued a more rapid system of replacement should be instituted, as a Naval Liaison Officer can be trained in a few weeks.
g. If Battalion NLO's are used they should be attached to Army units only during an operation.
h. When Shore Fire Control parties are not in use by a front line battalion, they should be sent to a Rear Area.
i. The SCR 284 is too heavy a radio for use in front lines by the spotter. A lighter radio with same frequency band is desirable. If possible it should be battery powered, as the use of the noisy hand generator is quite dangerous in the front lines.
j. SCR 536s, due to limited range in mountainous country, are unsatisfactory for spotter to NLO contact. SCR 3OOs were tried and found very satisfactory.
k. Shore Fire Control party T/O should rate party chief as S/Sgt., (Basis: A S/Sgt. is in charge of each Air Ground Liaison Party) and men filling same positions in different parties should be authorized the same grades. This is not now the case.
l. Obtaining additional personnel for parties other than by assignment would only be satisfactory if men stayed with parties continuously.
m. Eliminate the Battalion NLO and replace him with a Field Artillery officer. Between the two Field Artillerymen one would always be at the Battalion CP, and they could rotate in the position of Forward Observer.
n. Form a regimental team of one officer and five enlisted men within the Joint Assault Signal Company.
o. Quartermaster gas cooking stoves should be provided each party.
p. SCR 284 should be replaced as soon as possible by SCR 694.
q. SCR 300s should be used to replace SCR 536's.
22. Participation of the Air Ground Liaison Section - Thirteen Air Ground Liaison parties totaling 13 officers and 65 enlisted men participated in the Saipan operation. Parties were attached to Battalion, Regimental, and Division Headquarters and remained attached until departure from the island. Twelve of the parties were equipped with: 1/4 ton truck mounting SCR 193 and SCR 542; 2 SCR 536~B; panels; sound power telephones and wire; and an SCR 284. The Division party had a half-track personnel carrier mounting an SCR 499, SCR 542, and SCR 284; and a 1/4 ton truck mounting a BC 191 transmitter and two BC 312 receivers.
The plan of assault was that an officer and three men with the portable radio would accompany the Infantry Commander. The fourth radio operator and the driver would bring in the mobile radio as soon as vehicles could be landed. During the operation a great number of these vehicles did not reach their parties until five days after the original landing. The 1/4 ton truck with the Division Party was actually for the use of the Support Aircraft Commander if he came ashore with the Division. This vehicle went ashore with the Division Party on the 17th of June, and it was the 22nd of June before the half-track and SCR 499 were landed.
The planned communication system for the Air Ground Liaison Parties is depicted in Chart #7. The system was actually used during the operation, and either the SCR 536 or sound power telephones were used for communication to the radio station proper during those periods when the Air Liaison officer was elsewhere. No communication problems were encountered during the operation. A minor difficulty was that the power unit for the SCR 499 began to develop ignition noises in the receivers. The SCR 542, an expensive VHF radio with which each party was equipped, was not used in the operation. Some higher authority should determine whether or not liaison parties will in the future use the SCR 542 for direct ground-air contact. If this radio is not to be used in the future, all of them should be turned in.
As stated before no communication difficulties were encountered, but as far as demonstrating to the Ground Force Commanders the value of close air support, the operation was not too satisfactory. Several reasons for this statement are advanced below:
a. In the initial phases the availability of aircraft was very limited due to engagement with the Japanese Fleet.
b. The 27th Division as a reserve division had not received as much consideration in planning for air support as had the assault divisions. For instance, the 27th Division had no permanently assigned observation plane while the other divisions had at least one apiece, if not more.
c. Availability and capability of Field Artillery were excellent.
d. Terrain within the Division boundaries was very poor for air support missions.
e. Front lines were so irregular that it was impossible in many cases to run close support air missions because they would endanger adjacent units.
f. Elapsed time between request and delivery of missions was too long to satisfy Infantry Commanders. During air support missions it was necessary to cease Naval Gunfire and Field Artillery, thereby presenting another problem in coordination -- particularly when expected time for arrival of aircraft was uncertain when a mission was requested. The Regimental Air Liaison Officer with the 105 Infantry reported average time lag for all missions which he requested as 61 minutes.
g. Observation planes were seldom able to spot sources of artillery or mortar fire falling on our troops.
h. Results from observation missions, when positive, were sometimes reported so late that their value was greatly decreased .
To quote from the Division Air Ground Liaison officer, "Air support rendered this division was not dependable and left much to be desired both by the Air Ground Liaison parties and the Unit Commanding Officer (Infantry Commanders). It is felt that this operation did more harm for air ground support than it did good, since in many cases, it was the first time that Unit Commanders had a chance to exercise the"air arm".
A listing of all mission requests by the Air Ground Liaison section reveals the following, information:
DATE-TIME UNIT TYPE DISPOSITION REMARKS
105 RCT Obsn
No A/C available
191143 105-1 Strafe Approved-canceled No longer desired
191309 105 RCT B&S Disapproved No A/C available
191335 105-1 Divobomb Disapproved No A/C available
191457 105-1 Dive-bomb Approved-cancelled Friendly tps advanced
191641 165-2 Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
191645 105 RCT B & S Approved A/C available mission longer desired
Number of missions requested-------7
Too close friendly tps
200748 105-3 Obsn Approved No enemy activity obsvd
200820 105-1 Divebomb Disapproved No A/C available
201020 16-3 B & S Disapproved No A/C available
201109 105-3 Obsn Disapproved Reason unknown
201230 105-3 Divebomb Disapproved Friendly tps in area
201400 165 RCT Strafe Disapproved No A/C available
Number of missions requested-------7
211103 105-1 Bomb Approved Artillery prevented planes
from approaching target
211131 105-1 Bomb Approved Missed target 100 yds
211245 105-3 Bomb Disapproved Artillery not secured
211450 165 RCT Obsn Approved No enemy activity reported
211615 105-2 Rockets Disapproved Too close to friendly tps
Canceled by 165 ROT
Number of missions requested-------6
221515 105-2 Obsn Approved Positive results
221620 105 RCT Bomb Approved Good results, wrong target
Number of missions requested-----3
No enemy activity observed
231145 165-2 Strafe Disapproved No-A/C available
231401 165-2 Bomb Approved Missed target
231430 165-2 Strafe Approved Positive results
251440 165 RCT Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
Number of missions requested-----5
No A/C available
240707 106-3 Obsn Approved Successful
240742 165-2 Strafe Disapproved No A/C available
240747 165 RCT Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
240815 165-2 Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
240842 165 RCT Obsn Approved Affirmative results
240845 105-2 Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
240858 165-2 Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
241255 106-3 Obsn Disapproved No A/C available
241335 165-1 Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
241407 106-2 B & S Approved Effective results
241450 165-1 Obsn Disapproved No A/C available
241459 106-2 Obsn Approved Effective results
Number of missions requested---13
Hit wrong area
250800 105-2 Bomb Approved Good results
250950 Div-AGL Obsn Approved Effective results
251134 105-2 B&Rocket Disapproved No A/C available
251445 105-2 B&Rocket Approved Very good
251446 105-2 B&Rocket Disapproved No A/C available
251542 106-3 Smoke Disapproved No A/C available
Number of missions requested---7
Difficult to see target
260720 106-3 Bomb Disapproved Tps too close
260757 165 RCT Obsn Approved No enemy activity in area
260821 106-2 Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
260825 106-3 Bomb Disapproved Tps too close
260947 165 RCT Strafe Disapproved No A/C available
261444 165 RCT B&S Approved Missed target endangered own troops
261525 165 RCT Strafe Approved Unsuccessful
261530 106-2 Obsn Approved Heavy emplacements
261545 106-2 Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
261556 106 RCT Obsn Approved Enemy Arty observed
261706 106-3 Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
Number of missions requested-12
165 RCT Bomb
Bad weather,planes returned
270832 165 RCT Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
270847 165 RCT Bomb Approved Tps on move,unable to coordinate mission
271530 106 RCT Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
Number of missions requested -4
Observed smoke in area
280745 106 RCT Obsn Approved Enemy field pieces
281340 106 RCT Obsn Approved Friendly tanks in area
281457 165-2 Bomb Disapproved Friendly tps too near
281642 106-2 Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
Number of missions requested- 5
Troops too close
290931 106-2 Bomb Disapproved Troops too close
290943 105 RCT Obsn Approved Field guns & mortar fire
291317 106-2 Bomb Disapproved Friendly troops too close
Number of missions requested-4
Enemy activity observed
300800 165-3 Obsn Approved Naval gunfire hitting target
301030 106 RCT Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
Number of missions requested-3
Observer saw own tps
010745 165-3 Obsn Approved No enemy activity observed
010822 165-3 Obsn Approved Strong installations Many foxholes
010912 106-2 Bomb Disapproved Tps too close
010915 106-2 Bomb Disapproved No A/C available
011035 105 RCT Obsn Approved No enemy installations observed
011400 106-2 Bomb Disapproved Troops too close
011450 106 RCT Obsn Approved Observed tanks No arty fire
Number of missions requested-8
No enemy activity observed
020640 Div-AGL Obsn Approved No enemy activityNo installations
020729 Div-AGL Obsn Approved Canceled by Div-AGL
020745 165-3 Obsn Approved Observed emplacements & trenches
020844 165-3 Obsn Approved Few pill boxes road clear for tanks
021254 Div-AGL Obsn Disapproved No A/C available
021410 165-3 Obsn Approved Very little activity no artillery seen
021546 Div-AGL Obsn Approved Very little activity Arty falling at road junction
Number of missions requested-8
Arty positions empty
050744 106-2 Strafe Disapproved Tps too close
030835 106-2 Bomb Disapproved Tps too close
031320 165-1 B&S Disapproved Tps too close
Number of missions requested--4
Strong points of defense
041506 165-1 B&S Disapproved Front lines too close
Number of missions requested--2
061046 165-2 Obsn Approved No tps or guns foxholes obsvd
061100 105 RCT Obsn Approved Deserted enemy installations observed
061112 165-1 Obsn Approved No tps Field guns
061338 165-2 Obsn Approved Positive results
061340 165-2 Strafe Approved Accomplished good results
061344 165-2 Strafe Approved Accomplished along beach
061402 165-2 Strafe Approved Accomplished along beach
061416 165-2 Strafe Disapproved No A/C available
061424 165-2 Obsn Approved No enemy activity in area
Number of missions requested-10
105 RCT Obsn
No enemy activity observer in area of
070935 165 RCT Obsn Approved Several buildings no activity
071126 Div-AGL Obsn Approved Japs on beach men in water and up and down beach
071424 Div-AGL Obsn Approved Observer saw 2 Japs in area
071655 Div-AGL Obsn Approved No activity or troop concentration
Number of missions requested-5
Troops too close
080924 Div-AGL Obsn Approved 1 Steamroller, several trucks observed
Number of missions requested -2
Number of air missions requested by AGL parties.
1. Total number of missions requested by AL parties-----------------115
a. Observation----------------------------------------------------58 or 50.4% of total
b. Bomb, bomb & strafe------------------------------------------57 or 49.5% of total
2. Number of missions approved by support air command----70 or 60.8% of total
a. Observation--------------------------------------------52 or 89.6% of requested missions
b. Bomb, bomb & strafe----------------------------------18 or 31.5% of requested missions
3. Number of approved missions successfully flown------59
a. Observation----------------------------------------52 or lOO%
b. Bomb, bomb & strafe-------------------------------7 or 38.8%
An examination of all bomb, and bomb and strafe missions requested by the AGL parties,
disapprovals for the following reasons:
a. Troops too clove----------------------------15 missions
b. No aircraft available-------------------------20 missions
c. Miscellaneous---------------------------------4 missions
It should be borne in mind that the ratio between observation, bomb, and bomb and strafe missions, in this operation being approximately even, is not a true figure for a normal operation. The principle reason being that the Air Liaison Officer keeping abreast of aircraft availability would not request a bomb mission if he knew that planes were not available at the time. There were very few times when an observation plane was not available for a mission.
Further conclusions drawn from the operation concerning use of air support were:
a. Very close air support is of uncertain value after artillery has been landed. After initial assault the major use for support aircraft should be for attacks against enemy troop concentrations, lines of communications, supply dumps, and any buildings that might become future enemy strong points.
b. It would be desirable if aircraft when used for support missions could be available in such quantities that any Infantry Commander could rely on delivery of support within twenty minutes after initial request.
c. Air Commanders should realize that Ground Commanders can neither foresee their needs, nor afford delay in receiving air support when that need arises. Availability of aircraft, to be of a reliable value, should be continuous and immediate during the day-light hours.
d. Aircraft pilots must be completely impressed with the seriousness of their mission. They must never undertake to bomb or strafe on their own initiative. Such action if resulting in casualties to our own troops causes complete lack of faith in air support within the particular unit. Also the loss of morale is much more than when troops are shelled by their own artillery, as in case of aircraft the individual enlisted man questions, "Cant the________ see what hes doing?".
e. When Ground Commanders decide to use support aircraft and stop artillery and naval gunfire, they should receive highest consideration and priority. If the mission can not be flown, the Air Liaison Officer must immediately be notified in order that artillery and or naval gunfire may be quickly resumed.
f. Close air support would be much more successful if the Battalion Air Ground Liaison Officer was permitted to talk directly to his supporting planes.
Unit recommendations concerning the Air Ground Liaison Section will be found under Summary and Recommendations.
Opinions advanced by the Air Ground Liaison Section included:
a. That air support be considered as a weapon for use prior to landing of Division Artillery.
b. After artillery support is established, return the Battalion Air Liaison Parties to Joint Assault Signal Company control, leaving the Division and Regimental Parties to handle air support missions.
c. An extra frequency is needed for the section in order that a net connecting all parties could be established. This net to set up an air mission before the actual request over the support air request net.
d. The present Air Ground Liaison Party in authorized only three enlisted man. Each party should be increased by the assignment of two radio operators to satisfactorily operate in combat.
23. Participation of Joint Assault Signal Company Headquarters - The Commanding Officer, two radio operators, two radio repairmen, one telephone repairman, and a driver were the only headquarters personnel on the operation. The driver, a radio operator, and a radio repairman worked with the Division Air Ground Liaison party, and the other radio repairman helped out in the Division Signal Repair Section. The headquarters was called on from time to time to submit various reports, and to disseminate orders and information to all Joint Assault Signal Company personnel. Contact was maintained with the Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison Sections by use of division means of communication. To contact the Shore Party Communication Section, an SCR 284 radio was established at headquarters working into the ship-shore-lateral net. The organization headquarters stayed with the Division Command Post throughout the operation and until departure from Saipan. The headquarters handled as well as possible all administrative matters (actual administrative personnel had been left in Rear Echelon on Oahu) and made all personnel changes necessitated by Signal Officer's requests and the filling of vacancies prior to the move to Tinian.
Certain occurrences which indicated the necessity of the presence of the entire Headquarters Platoon were:
a. It was necessary to compile equipment shortages prior to the Tinian operation and also prior to departure from Saipan.
b. Distribution of bulk equipment to teams and parties was necessary prior to the Tinian operation.
c. Many administrative and medical reports were called for by Division Headquarters.
d. The organization was unable to reform after cessation of hostilities as mess and supply personnel andequipment were not available.
e. Repair of our signal equipment through division channels was slower than if our own repair section had been present for maintenance.
24. Casualties - Casualties suffered during the operation did not cause any team or party to collapse--as personnel replacements were furnished from other parties or sections. Tabulation of casualties was as follows:
KIA MIA WIA & EVAC
Shore Fire Control Section
2 off, 8 EM
3 off, 5 EM
Air Ground Liaison Section 2 off, 3 EM 7 EM
Shore Party Communication Section 2 EM 4 EM
Total casualties: KIA--4 officers, 16 enlisted men; MIA-one enlisted man; WIA & Evacuated 4 officers, 16 enlisted men.
25. Equipment Expenditure - Roughly 16% of the 295 Joint Assault Signal Companys signal equipment was lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond repair during the stay at Saipan. Some of the major items were: 5 out of 58 SCR 284's; 17 SCR 536s out of 89 (does not include 22 SCR 536s turned over to Division Signal Officer); 2 out of 18 BD 71's; 1 out of 9 PA-5 s (the one missing, seemingly was stolen); radio equipment in 3 out of 13 - 1/4 ton trucks (1 destroyed completely by enemy action on 7 July, radio equipment in other two ruined by salt water when vehicles were landed in the lagoon).
26. Summary and Recommendations
a. 42 officers and 385 enlisted men of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company participated
in the capture of
Saipan. 82 of those enlisted men were on temporary duty with the organization from units of the 27th
b. The Shore Fire Control, Air Ground Liaison, and Shore Party Communication Sections, with a small Headquarters comprised the tactical echelon of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.
c. Teams and parties of the organization remained attached to other units throughout the Divisions stay on Saipan, as the company did not have supply, motor, mess, or administrative personnel on the
d. Shore Fire Control Parties, Shore Party Communication Teams, and the organization headquarters were without sufficient transportation for efficient operation on Saipan.
e. The SCR 694 is needed to substitute for the SCR 284.
f. SCR 300s or similar radios would be desirable for inter party communication in the Air Ground and Shore Fire Control Sections
g. Air support during the Saipan Operation was not particularly successful for the 27th Division
h. The entire organization Headquarters Platoon was needed on the operation.
i. Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison Parties are not authorized sufficient strength by present Table of Organization. The most satisfactory means of gaining sufficient personnel is by assignment.
j. Due to our organization and tactical attachments, difficulties were encountered in receiving administrative reports from our parties with the various regiments and battalions.
k. Various occurrences or considerations which indicate that the present organization of the Joint Assault Signal Company is insufficient, and that it can be greatly improved are:
(1) The assignment of Naval Officers to the Joint Assault Signal Company is unnecessary.
(a) The duty of liaison officer to a Battalion Commander on the subject of Naval Gunfire can be properly discharged by an Army Field Artillery Officer.
(b) Release of the Navy Officers from the Joint Assault Signal Company would increase the overall operating efficiency of the unit. It is not a question of lack of cooperation, but in the Service consciousness, appreciable differences in training, different customs, and different regulations. This situation is most difficult during periods between operations when the unit is in training.
(c) Navy Officers do not as a rule have the same attitude towards responsibilities for their men and equipment that is desired in an Army Officer.
(d) Navy Officers are not covered by Army Regulations for such administrative procedure as: pay, discipline, and keeping of records. Action on the above items, of course, can be accomplished, but there is often delay which does not seem necessary if an Army Officer can adequately fill the Navy Officers position.
(e) The present system of attaching a Naval Officer to each Infantry Regiment about one month prior to an assault should be continued. In the past, these Naval Liaison Officers have been attached from the Vth Amphibious Corps. A Naval Office should also be attached to the Division Headquarters.
(2) The present Table of Organization indicates assignment of Army Air Force enlisted men to the company for duty within the Air Ground Liaison Section. The duties of these men could just as easily be performed by corresponding specialists from the Infantry or Signal Corps, which action would result in far greater harmony within an organization.
(a) Air Force enlisted personnel have received a different type of training than have personnel from Army Ground Force units.
(b) The assignment of Army Air Force enlisted men results in difficulties for the men themselves and for the unit which of necessity must give them ground force training. Most of the Air Corps enlisted men originally assigned to this unit came wishing that they could go back to an Air Corps unit and many still desire transfer.
(c) As the duties of the enlisted men within the Air Ground Liaison Section can be performed by communication personnel of any branch, consideration is desired to replace these men by Signal Corps enlisted men in order to avoid the difficulties described above.
(3) The distribution of Technician Grades to the Joint Assault Signal Company on an allotment basis has resulted in many instances where men hold same jobs in like teams or parties but are not allowed the same rating.
(4) The Shore Party Communication Section is the only one that does not call for any captain vacancies for officers.
(5) The Table of Organization makes no provisions for a Section Commander or for a Section Sergeant. Of course these people are appointed to these duties within the company, but it is not the most satisfactory solution for handling the problem especially during combat when these same men must fill only their duties as party personnel.
(6) The Table of Organization makes no allowance for the following staff personnel who are deemed necessary: S-3 (Plans and training), Personnel Officer and Adjutant, and Motor Officer. Officers are appointed to fill these positions during training periods, but it was found they are greatly needed during combat when the original appointees are no longer available due to team or party duties.
(7) Within the organization there it no provision for organic medical personnel.
(8) During training periods or during combat there is no provision for administrative control of the 13 officers and approximately 112 enlisted men who work with each Infantry Regiment. As comparison, some Field Artillery Batteries have only 108 enlisted men. Present organization makes all dissemination and assimilation of information to and from personnel within the unit most difficult.
(9) The present organization is too centralized. There is no division of command responsibilities and the centralized supply system for an organization of this size and amount of equipment is unwieldy.
(10) The present organization does not supply sufficient personnel for proper administrative action within the company.
Recommend that in order to correct deficiencies within Joint Assault Signal Companies, that they be reorganized in accordance with attached letter from the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, and proposed Tables of Organization and Equipment pertaining thereto.
Incl: copy letter 27th Division dated 9 Oct 44
and all enclosures thereto.
AIR GROUND LIAISON SECTION.
295 JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL. COMPANY
. 6 AUGUST 44
SUBJECT: AIR GROUND LIAISON REPORT FORAGER OPERATION, SAIPAN
.TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, 295 JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY,
1. THIS REPORT COVERS THE ACTIVITIES, COMMENTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE A.G.L. SECTION OF THE 295 JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY, ATTACHED TO THE 27TH INFANTRY DIVlSION. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WILL BE MADE IN THIS REPORTMAY NOT APPEAR TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE SAIPAN OPERATIONIT IS FELT THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOTEWORTHY ENOUGH T0 BE MENTIONED AT THIS TIME,
2. DURING THE PERIOD FROM 16 JULY 44 TO THE TIME WHEN THE ISLAND WAS SECURED THE AGL PARTIES WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN ATTEMPTING TO GET AIR SUPPORT TO THEIR UNITS. SOME OF THE OTHER DUTIES PERFORMED BY THE AGL PARTIES WERE:
A. KEEPING COMPANY COMMANDER INFORMED AS TO RESULTS OF AERIAL OBSERVATION MISSIONS WITHIN OUR OWN OR OTHER SECTORS.
B. MAINTAINING CLOSE LIAISON WITH ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE UNITS.
C. MAINTAINING LIAISON WITH FLANK UNITS AND KEEPING CLOSE WATCH ON ALL AIR STRIKE MISSIONS REQUESTED BY THESE UNITS TO SEE THAT NO MISSION WAS FLOWN THAT MIGHT ENDANGER OUR TROOPS.
D. THE FACT THAT ALL AGL PARTIES WERE ON THE SAME FREQUENCY ENABLED THEM TO KEEP THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS INFORMED AT ALL TIMES AS T0 FRONT LINES ALONG THE ENTIRE FRONT.
3. THE SAIPAN OPERATION WAS DEFINITELY NOT A GOOD OPERATION FOR CLOSE IN AlR SUPPORT. A FEW OF THE REASONS ARE LISTED BELOW.
A. IN THE INITIAL PHASES THE AVAILABILITY OF AIR CRAFT WAS VERY LIMITED.
B. AVAILABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF ARTILLERY WERE EXCELLENT.
C. TERRAIN WITHIN THE DlVlSION BOUNDARIES WAS VERY POOR FOR AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS.
D. FRONT LINES WERE SO IRREGULAR DUE TO TYPE OF TERRAIN THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE IN MANY CASES TO EVEN ATTEMPT TO COORDINATE AN AIR MISSION.
E. ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN REQUEST AND DELIVERY OF MISSIONS WAS TOO LONG AND TOO VARIED IN LENGTH TO ALLOW PROPER COORDINATION AMONG INFANTRY TROOPS, ARTILLERY, NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND A/C I.E. THE 105 RCT AGL OFFICER REPORTED AN AVERAGE TIME LAG FOR ALL OF HIS MISSIONS AS 61 2/3 MINUTES WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED THE AVERAGE.
F. OBSERVATION PLANES WERE SELDOM ABLE TO SPOT THE SOURCE OF KNOWN GUNFIRE, MORTAR FIRE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES.
G. RESULTS OF OBSERVATION MISSIONS, WHEN POSITIVE, WERE REPORTED SO LATE OR POORLY OR BOTH, THAT THE VALUE WAS OFTEN NEGLIGIBLE.
4. AlR SUPP0RT RENDERED THlS DIVlSION WAS NOT DEPENDABLE AND LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED BOTH BY THE AGL PARTIES AND THE UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER. IT IS FELT THAT THIS 0PERATION DID MORE HARM FOR AIR GROUND SUPPORT THAN lT DID GOOD, SINCE IN MANY CASES, IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT UNIT COMMANDERS HAD A CHANCE TO EXERCISE THE AIR ARM. A BREAK DOWN OF ALL MISSlON REQUESTS BY THE AIR GROUND LIAISON SECTl0N REVEALS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
[ There follows a long list of missions requested and disposition of requests. These missions are not reproduced here. The missions are found in the preceding Report.]
IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE RATIO BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND BOMB, BOMB AND STRAFE, MISSIONS IN THIS OPERATION BEING APPROXIMATELY EVEN, IS NOT A TRUE FIGURE FOR A NORMAL OPERATION. THE PRINCIPLE REASON BEING THAT THE AGL OFFICER KEEPING ABREAST OF THE A/C AVAILABILITY WOULD NOT REQUEST A BOMB MISSION IF HE KNEW THAT PLANES WERE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME. THERE WERE VERY FEW TIMES WHEN AN OBSERVATION PLANE WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR A MISSION.
5. THE GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. CLOSE AlR SUPPORT I S OF UNCERTAIN VALUE AFTER ARTILLERY HAS BEEN LANDED. A/C CANNOT GUARANTEE THE CONTROL, RELIABILITY OR ACCURACY AS CAN ARTILLERY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE,
B. A/C WHEN USED MUST BE AVAILABLE IN SUCH QUANTITIES THAT ANY UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER MAY RELY UPON DELIVERY OF MISSIONS WITHIN TWENTY MINUTES AFTER INITIAL REQUEST.
C, AIR COMMANDERS MUST REALIZE THAT GROUND COMMANDERS CAN NEITHER FORESEE THEIR NEEDS, NOR AFFORD DELAY IN RECEIVING AIR SUPPORT WHEN THAT NEED ARISES. AVAILABILITY, TO BE OF A RELIABLE VALUE, MUST BE CONTINUOUS AND IMMEDIATE THROUGHOUT THE DAY LIGHT HOURS.
D, WHEN THE GROUND COMMANDER DECIDES TO USE AIR SUPPORT AND IN TURN STOPS ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE HE SHOULD BE GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY AND CONSIDERATION. IF FOR ANY REASON THE MISSION CANNOT DEFINITELY BE FLOWN IMMEDIATELY, THE GROUND COMMANDER MUST BE NOTIFIED AT ONCE SO THAT THE ARTILLERY MAY COMMENCE FIRING.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS SECTION ARE:
A. THAT AIR SUPPORT BE CONSIDERED AS A WEAPON FOR USE PRIOR TO THE LANDING OF ARTILLERY.
B. WHEN ARTILLERY HAS LANDED AND IS PROPERLY SET UP, THAT ALL BLT AGL PARTIES REVERT BACK TO JASCO CONTROL. THIS WOULD LEAVE THE RCT AND DIVISION AGL PARTIES TO HANDLE THE AIR SUPPORT.
C. THAT A SECONDARY NET BE SET UP WITH AUXILIARY RADIOS FOR ADMINISTRATION USE OF BLT, RCT AND DlVISION AGL PARTIES, THIS NET WOULD BE USED TO SET UP AIR MISSIONS PRIOR TO THEIR ACTUAL REQUEST.
D. SCR 542 SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE 1/4 TON AGL VEHICLE AND AN SCR 300 BE ISSUED AS A STANDARD ITEM OF EQUIPMENT FOR AGL PARTIES. PAST OPERATIONS AND THE PRESENT DOCTRINE OF AIR SUPPORT SHOW THAT AT NO TIME WILL THE AGL PARTIES BE ALLOWED TO CONTACT THE PLANE DIRECTLY. THIS WAS THE ONLY REASON ORIGINALLY FOR MOUNTlNG THE SCR 542 IN THE VEHICLE. THEREFORE THE SCR 542 IS AN EXPENSIVE, HEAVY, USELESS PIECE OF EQUIPMENT IN THE AGL VEHICLE. TOO MUCH STRESS CAN NOT BE PLACED UPON THE NEED OF AN AUXILIARY NET WITHIN THE BLT, RCT AND DIVISION AGL PARTIES.
E. THAT DURING PERIODS BETWEEN COMBAT STRIKES, AGL OFFICERS AND RADIO OPERATORS BE ATTACHED TO TACTICAL AIR CORPS SQUADRONS OR GROUPS IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY KEEP ABREAST OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN A/C, ARMAMENT AND OTHER MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE AIR.
WILLIAM B. AGLER
CAPTAIN, AIR CORPS
The following is a Record Of Events from 19 October 1944 to 13 March 1945
RECORD OF EVENTS
19 Oct 44 Unit arrived Bougainville Solomon Islands 1100. Debarked from USS Cape
Entrucked for camp area and arrived 1530.
21 Oct 44 Unit reld fr atchmt 27th Inf Div & atchd to XIV Corps 19 Oct 44. Company
time spent in
construction of camp area.
30 Oct 44 Company time mainly spent in construction of camp area.
10 Nov 44 Company fired on range from 8 thru 10 Nov 44.
21 Nov 44 Company time devoted to inspection and repair of organizational property, clothing and equipment.
30 Nov 44 Co alerted for movement.
10 Dec 44 Personnel Embarking.
11 Dec 44 Organization entrucked and departed company area 1030; arrived Beach No. 4 Bougainville, Solomon Islands 1130; embarked aboard USS Lamar 1230.
15 Dec 44 Time spent mainly drilling aboard ship. Troops were given actual debarkation instructions.
16 Dec 44 USS Lamar sailed from Bougainville , Solomon Islands 0845.
18 Dec 44 USS Lamar arrived Lae, New Guinea and dropped anchor. Troops took part in debarkation drills.
19 Dec 44 Sailed from, Lae New Guinea 1430.
21 Ded 44 USS Lamar arrived and anchored off Manus, Admiralty Islands 1600.
31 Ded 44 USS Lamar sailed from Manus, Admiralty Islands 0800.
5 Jan 45 Sailed through Mindanao Sea.
9 Jan 45 Arrived Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Philippine Islands 0330. Assault forces landed 0930.
10 Jan 45 Debarked and landed Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Philippine Islands 1030.
20 Jan 45 Company time spent in setting up bivouac area and perimeter defense.
22 Jan 45 Organization relieved from attachment to XIV Corps and attached to ASCON, Sixth Army.
26 Jan 45 Unit reld asgmt XIV Corps and asgd to Sixth Army 20 Nov 44. Unit atchd to XIV Corps 20 Nov 44.
27 Jan 45 Unit performing Military Police duties in Port Sual, San Fabian sectors.
4 Feb 45 Tec 3 Elvino Grua, 36479565, awarded the Purple Heart (Oak-Leaf Cluster) per
Section II, General.
Orders No. 1 Hq 27th Inf Div, dtd 15 Jan 45, for wounds received during capture of Saipan, Marianas
Islands, 7 July 1944.
4 Officers & 9 EM awarded the Purple Heart per Section III, General Orders No. 99 Hq 27th Inf Div, dtd
30 Nov 44, for wounds received during the capture of Saipan, Marianas Islands.
7 Feb 45 Unit entrucked & departed Binmaley, P.I. 1030. Arrived San Fabian, Luzon, P.I. 1200. Embarked on LSTs
22 & 757 & anchored in Lingayen Gulf.
8 Feb 45 Unit sailed from Lingayen Gulf, P.I. 1600.
10 Feb 45 Arrived Mindoro, Philippine Islands 1900. Debarked 2000.
12 Feb 45 Unit relieved asgmt Sixth Army & atchmt to ASCOM and asgd to Eight Army and attached to X Corps
10 Feb 45.
20 Feb 45 Camp area constructed. Organizational property & equipment being checked & repaired.
22 Feb 45 Unit atchd to 24th Inf Div 11 Feb 45.
23 Feb 45 Reld atchmt Tenth Corps & further atchmt 24th Inf Div & atchd to 41st Inf Div 22 Feb 45.
13 Mar 45 Reld atchmt 41st Inf Div & atchd to 24th Inf Div 7 Mar 45.
Go to top of page.
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL C0MPANY
APO 321 c/o PM SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
26 March 1944
HIST0RICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE M - 1 OPERATION
. 1. The plan called for an amphibious assault by major units on the shores of Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, P.I. The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company was attached for the operation to the 37th Infantry Division, to furnish necessary Shore Party, Shore Fire Control, and Air Ground Liaison communications.
a. The target beach extended from the mouth of the Dagupan River on the east to the mouth of the Calmay River on the west. The beach gradient was quite steep, generally about 2 fathoms at 100 yards from the water line. The terrain was flat, checkerboarded with fish ponds and rice paddies. The beach itself extended approximately 90 yards inland to the paddies. The entire area was honeycombed with rivers and swampland, a fact which presented some little trouble, as indicated in Section II of this report.
2. The Lingayen Gulf area was in the hands of the Japanese for approximately 3 years, and was considered to be consequently well fortified for defense. The nature of the terrain was well suited to defensive action and made offensive assault most difficult. The road net was such that our communications could be easily disrupted by a small number of enemy troops and our advance seriously delayed.
1. It was finally decided, after lengthy conferences and discussions within the unit and with higher headquarters, that the following elements of JASCO would be furnished:
a. With the XIV Corps Headquarters
(1) One Shore Fire Control Officer as Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison Oficer
b. With 37th Division Headquarters
(1) Commanding officer, Executive Officer and a party of three men to furnish overall JASCO liaison with Division Headquarters, through the Signal Officer and other Staff Officers.
( 2) One Officer of the Shore Fire Control Section as Division Naval Liaison Officer(3) One Air Ground Liaison party.
c. With each Assault Regimental Headquarters (2)
(1) One Shore Fire Control Party.
(2) One Air Ground Liaison Party.
d.With each Assault Battalion Headquarters (4)
(1) One Air Ground Liaison Party.
(2) One Shore Fire Control Party.
(3) One Shore Party Communications Team.
e. Aboard each APA and AKA
(1) One radio party of five men each. Composition of these parties was: one or two high speed radio operators and 3 message center men, wiremen or basics.
f. The remainder of the organization was divided into non-assault groups scheduled to land on S+1, S+4, and S+35. These were composed of headquarters personnel, i.e. cooks, mechanics, clerks, etc., with an officer in charge of each group, and Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison parties not in assault.
2. The assault elements joined their respective Division, Regiment, and Battalion Headquarters on 10 December 1944 and prepared to embark. All assault units boarded on 11 December 1944 and sailed l6 December 1944. During the voyage, classes were held for orientation of Infantry groups in Shore Party, Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison capabilities and functions. Instruction by team and party commanders was also given JASCO personnel in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientation. A series of dry runs were made at Manus Island, where the convoy anchored for ten days. On 31 December 1944, we started the final lap of our journey to Lingayen Gulf.
3. During the period 5 January 1945 to 9 January 1945, while the convoy was proceeding through the Leyte Gulf, Mindanao and Sulu Seas, it was the target of numerous enemy aircraft attacks by small but determined groups. Attacks consisted of bombing and suicide dives by fanatical pilots directly into ships of the convoy. The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company suffered no casualties as a result of this enemy action, nor any damage to, or loss of equipment
4. All JASCO elements supporting assault battalions and regiments landed on beaches crimson 1 and 2 and yellow 1 and 2 during,, Jig hour (0930-1030 Item time). No resistance was encountered during the landing, as the Japanese had evacuated the area a few days previously. This organization suffered one casualty as a result of friendly carbine fire (ricochet), aimed at a carabao which had gone berserk. The casualty was a hand wound, not serious, but the man was evacuated.
5. The Shore Party Communication teams quickly ran their lateral trunk and local lines, and established radio communication in all nets; ship to shore, lateral and inland. All communications except local lines were in within 30 minutes after teams landed.
6. The Shore Party Communications teams turned the systems over to the Engineer Shore Parties on S+3 and reported to JASCO Headquarters, .which had been established at the town of Binmaley.
7. The Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison parties accompanied their respective Infantry units inland against only the slightest opposition. The advance was delayed only by the restricted road net and low capacity bridges, some of which had been out of use before our landing.
8. Although few targets were available for Naval Gunfire (the 37th Division was covered on both flanks by other assault Divisions) the situation, if resistance had been encountered, would have demanded the utmost Naval Gunfire support, as mortar and artillery units had great difficulty in moving up pieces and ammunition. The Shore Fire Control Party with the 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry fired one mission and, save for control of LCIG fire by our party with 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, that was the extent of Shore Fire Control Section employment. The Shore Fire Control parties returned to JASCO control on S+4, the supported units being outside the range of Naval Gunfire.
9. Our Air Ground Liaison Parties landed in the assault waves with their infantry units and proceeded inland with them. They remained attached until January 18th, when they were returned to JASCO Headquarters. During their period with infantry they requested 30 reconnaissance missions, of which 26 were flown, and one strafing mission which was canceled. The supported units received much valuable information from our AGL parties, as a result of the reconnaissance flights and also information intercepted on the Support Air Observation net.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Shore Party Communications.
a. When an Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment is employed on an operation, there is little need for JASCO Shore Party teams, as the Engineer Regiments communications facilities are a11 but identical to ours. Recommend that JASCO Shore Party Team personnel be attached to the E B and S R only as required to augment that units communications personnel.
b. Vehicles should be loaded aboard ships carrying personnel who use the vehicle. Some vehicles were aboard ships not carrying our personnel, and some items were looted.
2. Shore Fire Control Section.
a. An additional net for administrative traffic is most desirable. Tactical nets cannot adequately handle administrative traffic.
b. Shore Fire Control Parties should be attached to all battalions, not just assault battalions. When a reserve battalion is put into action, many difficulties are encountered in switching the Shore Fire Control Party to the new battalion.
c. The SCR 694 is much more desirable than SCR 284, due in most part to its greater portability and quiet generator. Vehicular mountings for SCR 694 radios should be provided.
d. When distance to the firing ships is greater than 15,000 yards, the range of SCR 694s and SCR 284s is not sufficient to insure communication. Recommend that SCR 193 vehicular sets be furnished Divisional, Regimental Shore Fire Control Parties for relay in such circumstances.
e. Higher headquarters should effect distribution of plans and maps and disseminate information pertinent to the operation before the last few days. Early, complete information is essential.
3. Air Ground Liaison Section.
a. The personnel carrier, half track, M3Al, should be replaced by a 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, mounting the SCR 499 in HO 17. The half track remains at Division Headquarters during the operation, and the truck has sufficient terrain ability to keep up. Besides being a prime target at Division Headquarters, the halftrack rides too rough for the expensive, sensitive SCR 499 it carries.
b. An administrative net is required to parallel the present tactical
net. One additional frequency for administrative traffic among Shore Fire Control parties, Air Ground Liaison parties, and JASCO Headquarters should be enough to handle such traffic.
c. Air Ground Liaison party trucks ( 1/4 ton, 4x4) carry the critical A/NVRC-1 radio equipment and should not be landed until a dry landing can be made. Parties use portable equipment until these vehicles arrive and time is not too important. A landing even as late as S+2 for these vehicles should be planned, rather than risking washing out or drowning out the equipment.
VINCENT W. FOX
Capt., Sig C
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JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 159 C/O P.M. SAN FRANCISCO CALF
9 May 1945
HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V3 - PALAWAN - OPERATION
1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 186th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, on the shores of Puerta Princessa, Palawan, P.I. Shore Fire Control Parties of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control communications.
a. The target beach was of coral, ending at a mangrove swamp. The terrain was densely wooded and had but one road, making progress difficult.
2. Palawan had been in the hands of the
Japanese for approximately
three years but the beach landing was unopposed.
1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would be furnished:
a. With the 186th ROT Headquarters,
One (l) Naval Liaison Team which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer and four enlisted personnel.
b. With each Assault Battalion Headquarters,
One (l) Shore Fire Control Party which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer, one Artillery Spotter, and ten enlisted personnel.
2. The elements joined their Regiment and Battalion Headquarters on 26 February 1945 and prepared to embark the same date. JASCO personnel were instructed by team officers in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientations.
3. The landing was made at 0845, 28 February 1945. The Regimental N.L.O. station wee set up on the beach by lOOO; shortly thereafter the Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties checked in. Communication was good.
4. No firing was called for by JASCO parties except one request for a mission which was denied. All JASCO teams were relieved attachment 1 March 1945 and embarked same day for return to organization.
5. No casualties were incurred during the operation.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The type map used 1/50000, gunfire maps could and should have been replaced with 1/25000 photo maps which were available.
2. Essential materials for Naval Gunfire Control on this operation were either of inferior quality or non-existent due to difficulty in contacting Navy. No gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available for our officers.
3. The rapid advance of the troops, due to absence of enemy opposition, placed a burden on the radio carrying team and also resulted in poor reception on the SCR 694 due to its limited range.
4. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads over long distance, rough terrain, and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons.
5. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters as enclosures.
VINCENT W. FOX
Captain, Sig C
ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 295TH JASCO, PARTICIPATING IN V-3 PALAWAN OPERATION
|1st Lt Robert L. Burge, 0416381, FA.
1st Lt Walter H. Jensen, 01175756, FA.
Lieut Benjamin D. Mathon, 171137, USNR.
Lt (jg) George W. Boyce, 224255, USNR.
Lt. (jg) Warren B. Woods, 270441, USNR.
Consolidated Report on PALAWAN Operation, 2/25 - 3/2
This operation was marked by the decidedly poor preparation relative to liaison with the infantry unit supported and distribution of maps and data.
Assignments to units were made at such a late date as to allow practically no time for discussions with commanding and subordinate officers on the capabilities of naval gunfire. Since several of the unit commanders had previously suffered unfortunate losses from our own fire, it was more necessary than ever to win back their confidence in our supporting weapon. Last minute pressures and preparations prevented us from fulfilling this initial phase of our naval gunfire liaison duty. What liaison was attempted was in the hands of an officer independent of our organization knowing little of our methods, and apparently desirous of handling the whole problem alone.
Essential materials for naval Gunfire control on this operation were either of inferior quality or nonexistent. Due to difficult liaison with the Navy contact officer, no gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available for our officers. Much valuable information ordinarily carried in such an annex was absent from the verbal summary which we received shortly before loadinq. The other essential, good maps, was likewise neglected when we received small scale, 1/50,000 gunfire maps despite the availability of excellent photomaps a 1/25,000 r.f. for the field artillery. The type map used in the LUZON operation was ideal with its r.f. of 1/36,000. Either this type or artillery photomaps should be sought for future landings.
2. THE LANDING.
After an intensive gunfire and rocket preparation we landed on an undefended beach at 0845, February 28. The Rgt. N.L.O. station was set up on the beach by 1000; shortly thereafter the Battalion teams began to check in. Communi- cation was good.
With no enemy opposition our troops advanced quite rapidly and continuously, placing a great burden on our radio-carrying team members and in the case of the F.O. teams bringinq them to the point of utter exhaustion. In addition this swift progress of our forward teams increased the distance between them and the Rgt. station, thus creating a new problem of poor reception by our SCR 694 radios. When distances were more that three or four miles between sets of this type, we found that they were incapable of efficient communication with each other. Messages between these stations were either relayed via the firing or control ships on sent through the Battalion SCR 284s.
All officers who participated in this operation have agreed that unles the terrain is absolutely impassable to vehicular traffic, jeeps with mounted SCR 284s are essential to the proper fulfillment of our duties.
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295th JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 717 % PM, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
9 August 1945
HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295th JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V-5 OPERATION
1. The plan called for an Amphibious landing by the 24th Division, with the 31st Division and elements of the 41st Division in reserve, on beaches in the Malabang - Parang Area 17 April, 1945..Twelve ( 12) Air Liaison Parties, twelve (12) Shore Fire Control Parties, four (4) Signal radio operators and three (3) wire teams from the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to the 24th Division for the operation, with the provision three (3) Air Liaison Parties be detached on or about R+ 5 days for duty with the 31st Division. In addition, one ( 1) Shore Fire Control Party and one Officer and one ( 1) EM landed at Parang with the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, prepared to give Naval Gunfire Support and Aircraft Support to that unit.
a. The target beaches located in the Malabang - Parang Area were characterized by a relatively slight gradient, while steep slopes arose just behind the waters edge. The road paralleling the beach was in poor condition.
2. Although the Malabang - Parang Area had been n under theoretical Japanese control for more than three years, garrisons were reported to be small and long stretches of beach already secured by Filipino Guerrilla forces.
1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would be furnished:
a.. With 24th Division Headquarters.
(1)One Shore Fire Control Officer
(2) One Air Ground Liaison Officer I
b. With 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
(1) One Shore Fire Control Party
(2) One Officer and one (1) EM to provide Air Support during initial phase.
c. With each Regimental Headquarters
(1) One Air Liaison Party
(2) One Naval Gunfire Party
d. With each Battalion Headquarters (except the 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry.
(1) One Air Liaison Panty
(2) One Naval Gunfire Party
e. The remainder of the organization was scheduled to land on D+10. This group was composed of headquarter personnel, i.e. cooks, mechanics, clerks, etc. and Signal personnel not committed for the operation.
2. The assault elements joined their respective Division, Regimental and Battalion Headquarters on Mindoro Island 8 April 1945 and prepared to embark. During the voyage, classes were held for the orientation of Infantry groups in Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison capabilities and functions. Instruction by team and party commanders was also provided for Jasco personnel in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientation.
3. The voyage from Mindoro to the Malabang - Parang Area was made without enemy opposition.
4. The assault landing was made on three beaches in the Malabang -Parang Area. These beaches were designated Red, White, and Blue from North to South. All Jasco elements supporting assault battalions landed with their respective units during "How" Hour on "Roger" Day. No organized resistance was encountered during the landing. One battalion of the 21st RCT landed on White Beach for the purpose of securing Malabang Town and the air field area. Two battalions of the 21st RCT and the 19th RCT landed on Blue Beach with the mission of proceeding southeast along the coast and capturing Parang, and opening Polloe Harbor to amphibious shipping. The 34th RCT held in reserve and landed on friendly shores in the Parang Area on R+2. No organized resistance was encountered during any of the landings. The 2nd Battalion of 21st RCT left Parang the night of Roger Day by LCMS and secured Cotabato Town early on R+1.
5. Three wire teams from the Signal Section assisted the 99th Signal Battalion in running trunks and locals in Corps Area, while an Officer and 12 EM reported to the 116 AAA Group at Malabang to operate a message center at that headquarters and to operate a radio in a Corps net. Six radio operators reported to the 24th Signal Company to assist that unit, and on 25 April six additional radio operators reported to 116 AAA Group to operate a radio for Marine Air Group 24.
6. Between 17 April and 10 May three wire teams attached to the 24th Signal Company laid 450 miles of W-110 wire. One of their vehicles was damaged by a Japanese convoy during a raid on their convoy near Santa Cruz. There were no casualties.
7. Shore Fire Control Parties landed with their respective infantry battalions. Since the initial resistance was negligible and the ensuing action was a pursuit, there were no remumerative targets for Navy Gunfire.
8. Other than the pre-assault bombardment, two missions were fired, an illumination mission for the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, when a retiring force of enemy approached an established road block, and a preparation on the town of Calobato by fire from the main batteries of the cruiser Cleveland. The observation aircraft carried by the cruiser division affected numerous reconnaissance missions, and the Naval gunfire communications channels carried a considerable quantity of command traffic for the Army. The action passed out of Naval gunfire range on 19 April, and teams were relieved.
9. Air Ground Liaison Parties attached to units of the 19th Infantry and 21st Infantry landed with assault waves in the Malabang - Parang Area 17 April. The first air strikes of' the operation were run in the Cotabato Area. Parties attached to units of the 34th Infantry landed with their battalions upon secured beach heads, passed through the 19th and 21st RCT'S, and proceeded up the Mindanao River in LCMS. From Fort Pickett, battalions of the 34th Infantry pushed through to Dyas, meeting minor resistance on several occasions. This march received air cover throughout most of the daylight hours, and several tons of bombs were dropped on installations near Dyas.
10. Three Air Liaison Parties were released by the 24th Division 25 April and attached to the 31st Division for the remainder of' the campaign.
11. One Air Liaison Party was attached 30 May to the 3rd Battalion, 162nd Infantry to support that unit's landing at Luayon, Balut Island, and Cape San Agustine. Subsequently this unit supported the 152nd Infantry in the Talomo River sector.
12. Close air support was utilized to the fullest possible extent in the Davao and central Miindanao sectors. Strikes were directed against entrenchments, reinforced concrete pill boxes, coastal guns, supply depots, rocket installations and other key targets. Between 17 April and 22 June Air liaison parties supporting the 24th Division and elements of the 31st and 41st Divisions ran a total of 384 missions, firing 16 rockets and dropping 793 tons of bombs and 15,267 gallons of Napalm
13. A total of four officers and sixteen enlisted men of the organization received Bronze Star award during this operation
14. Per General Order No. 82 Hg. X Corps, the 295 Joint Assault Signal Company was cited, the provisions of Executive Order Number 9396 (Section 1, Bulletin 22, War Department, 1943) and Section IV, Circular Number 333, War Department, 22 December, 1943, for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Minadano, Philippine Islands, from 17 April to 1 July 1945..
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Shore Party Communications
Since Shore Party Communications teams were not assigned to the work for which they were organized, they learned little which would help them in future operations as Shore Party Teams. However the duties they performed were greatly beneficial to them in overall signal work.
It is suggested that DR-5's be substituted for DR-4's in as much as the latter are inconvenient for large scale wire laying.
2. Shore Fire Control
The SCR 694 again proved to be the best equipment used to date for the communications required by battalion teams. Its superior portability undoubtedly meant the difference between failure and success for parties whose actions was never assisted by vehicular transportation. Its range is apparently equal to an SCR 264 with hand generator.
An SCR193 should be obtained for the division team at least. In this operation ships were appropriately stationed for the sole purpose of acting as a relay for radio sets that did not give adequate out put for existing circumstances. In a stiffly contested landing, ships could not have been used for this purpose, and the burden of relaying could not have been handled adequately by the command ship because of the increased volume of command traffic. This same situation was met by an SCR 193 on the M-1 operation.
Net discipline and operational standards were satisfactory. In view of the man power shortage it may be timely to investigate the possibilities of F. M. nets and SCR 600 radios.
Administrative arrangements for the care of JASCO parties was entirely satisfactory.
On this operation there was need of a clear, concise gunfire annex.
The numbering plan for SFC Parties should follow strictly the numerical designation of regiments and battalions from high to low in order to avoid dangerous communication confusion during the initial phases of an operation.
Gridden gunfire charts proved unsatisfactory. It would have been better to have issued only the more detailed Army maps, thus lightening the map load, improving front line reports, and preventing possible fatal error in target designation.
Each Battalion N.L.O. should be supplied with at least five men and driver if the jeep is to arrive by the end of the first day, or with six men if no vehicle is to be available for several days
. 3. Air Liaison Section
Throughout the operation, most teams had direct communication with the Air Craft through the SCR 542. This close liaison between ground and air yielded exceptionally fine results. Any mission that threatened the safety of our own troops could thus be called off immediately. A substantial number of American lives were saved in this manner..
By the same token it was possible to guide the pilot to his target with a maximum of accuracy by giving him exact bearings and descriptions and by correcting on his first run.
It is therefore recommended without reservation that in all future operations Air Liaison teams be permitted to contact and direct support air craft.
THOMAS W. HART
Captain, Sig C
1. Roster of Officers
2. Certified true copy of orders
3. Unit Citation
ROSTER OF OFFICERS ON V5 OPERATION
Major Fox, Vincent W.
** Capt Agler, William 0415074 AC
* Capt Duling, Claude O. 01287325 Inf
* Capt Freeny, Samuel C. 01287334 Inf
Capt Herm, Abraham L. 0367043 FA
Capt Hire, Robert L. 0561280 AC
Capt Howell, Howard L. 01645680 Sig C
Capt Jensen, Walter H. 01175756 FA
Capt Lentz, James E. 01171644 FA
Capt North, Robert C. 0578735 AC
Capt Rofkar, Paul H. 0343414 FA
Capt Wentzel, Nicholas W. 0349217 FA
Capt Wick, Henry O. III 0315152 FA
Capt Blake, Benjamin S. Jr 0415648 FA
1st Lt Amick, James M. 0574735 AC
1st Lt Bernardo, Dominic 0449655 AC(Inf)
1st Lt Burge, Robert L. 0416381 FA
1st Lt Cash, Clayton R. 01640841 Sig C
1st Lt Eldridge, Manning A. 01645549 Sig C
1st Lt Granton, John 01634818 Sig C
1st Lt Hawley, Wayne E. 01636327 Sig C
* 1st Lt Hilz, John F. 0577922 AC
1st Lt Kinsaul, James R. 01175767 FA
1st Lt Kruidenier, Edward D. 01298248 Inf
1st Lt Lovorn, Richard T. 01645772 Sig C
1st Lt Porter, Jesse L. 01294189 Inf
1st Lt Repp, Roy W. 01645940 Sig C
1st Lt Sawyer, Robert P. 0404488 FA
1st Lt Vanderpool, Henry N. 01307593 Inf
2nd Lt Jenks, James E. 02023331 AC
Blank, Charles J.
Lieut Mathon, Benjamin D. 171137 USNR
Lt(jg) Boyce, George W. 224255 USNR
Lt(jg) Detwiler, John T. 269568 USNR
Lt(jg) Jeter, Harry R. 224347 USNR
Lt(jg) Redfern, George A. 224418 USNR
Lt(jg) Shanower, Robert L. 270212 USNR
Lt(jg) Woods, Warren B. 270441 USNR
** Awarder Bronze Star Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)
* Awarder Bronze Star Medal
JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL OPERATIONS
The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company performed the missions of furnishing communication and direction of Naval gunfire support and close air support. It also assisted in normal communication functions for X Corps.
Shore Fire Control Parties and Air Liaison Parties were assigned to each infantry battalion and regimental headquarters of the 24th Division for the landing operations at Parang and Malabang.
Fire Control Parties remained with these units until they moved out of range of Naval gunfire support. Thereafter, these units assumed the role of Field Artillery Forward Observation Parties, and remained with the 24th Infantry Division during its rapid advance across Midanao. Upon reaching the Davao Gulf, their function reverted to that of Shore Fire Control Parties and they directed supporting Naval gunfire during the advance north to Davao. When the Division began its advance west toward Hintal and passed out of range of Naval support, the teams again served as Forward Artillery Observers and assisted in the direction of supporting artillery fire for the duration of the Operation.
Air Liaison Parties remained with the units to which initially attached during the assault phase and furnished valuable service in the direction of close support strikes. Then the 31st Division began its advance north from Kabakan along the Sayre Highway, five Air Liaison Parties were attached, performing a similar mission.
The communications personnel, other than those in the Fire Control and Air Liaison Parties, functioned directly under the Corps Signal Officer in assisting the 99th Signal Battalion. A complete radio and message center team was furnished the Malabang Area Command. In addition, teams were furnished for installing and operating switchboards and telephones for numerous service units. then the X Corps Rear Echelon moved from Parang to Del Monte, wire construction and maintenance teams were formed and the 295th JASCO assumed responsibility for the construction and maintenance of all wire lines in the Malabang, Parang, and Cotabato areas.
The varied and outstanding services performed by the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company contributed greatly to the successful outcome of the Mindanao Operation. The unit was awarded the Theatre Citation for heroism and bravery in action against the enemy for the services rendered.
History of X Corps on Mindanao
30 June 45
pages 77 - 78
OPERATIONS REPORT V-5 OPERATION
26 April 1945.
1. Shore Fire Control Parties landed with their respective infantry battalions in the Malabang-Parang area 17 April. The landing was effected against negligible resistance. The ensuing action was a pursuit. Since the enemy rear guard had no weapons heavier than those capable of being carried by hand, there were no remunerative targets for navy gunfire.
2. Other than the pre-assault bombardment, two missions were fired. An illumination mission for 3rd Bn, 19th Inf, when a retiring force of enemy approached an established road block, and a preparation on the town of Catabato by fire from the main batteries of the cruiser Cleveland. The observation aircraft carried by the cruiser division carried out numerous reconnaissance missions, and the navy gunfire communication channels carried a considerable quantity of command traffic for the army. Units supported were 19th and 21st Infantrys and 24th Div Recon. Troop. The action passed out of navy gunfire range on D+2 and all parties obtained formal release at 0835 D+3. Command net was closed by C13 acting as N.C.S. at 1500, D+3.
1. The SCR 694 again proved itself as being the best equipment used to date for the required communications in bn teams. Its superior portability undoubtedly meant the difference between failure and success for parties whose action was never assisted by vehicular transportation. Its range is apparently equal to a 284 with hand generator.
2. An SCR 193 should be obtained for division team as a minimum. In this instance ships were appropriately stationed solely to act as a relay for radio sets that did not give adequate output for their then existing special circumstances. In a stiffly resisted action, ships could not be used for this purpose and the burden of relaying could not be handled adequately by the command ship because of the increased volume of command traffic. Hence an SCR 193 should be obtained for division team. This same situation was met adequately by an SCR 193 on the Lingayen Gulf operation. Net discipline and operation standards were satisfactory. In view of the manpower shortage it may be timely to investigate the possibilities of F.M. nets and SCR 600 radios.
1. Again the method of obtaining adequate personnel left much to be desired. This has been fully discussed in previous reports.
1. Administrative arrangements for recovery and care of JASCO parties was entirely satisfactory. See also attached individual reports.
PAUL H. ROFKAR
295th Joint Assault Signal Co.
REPORT OF PARANG OPERATION
25 April 1945
1. The planning aspects of this operation do not speak well for the naval command which failed to prepare a clear, concise, gunfire annex and to present one requiring no last minute, confusing changes.
2. Notably poor was the scheme for the designation of Shore Fire Control Parties in descriptive rather than numerical terms. My own battalion, initially designated as the reserve unit, was subsequently ordered into the assault on the right half of the beachhead, which change would have resulted in a complete reversal of call signs, as it were, in midstream. The numbering plan for SFC Parties should follow strictly the procession of Regiments and Battalions, low to high, to avoid dangerous communication confusion during the initial phases of the operation. The last minute change, though praiseworthy in intention, met the same difficulties that all such changes will inevitably occasion -- many parties, including my own, did not "get the word".
3. Another phase of the planning, the maps, was improperly handled. There was no excuse for the distribution of and implied suggestion for reliance on as poor maps as the naval gridded gunfire charts subsequently proved to be. It would have been far better to issue out only the more detailed Army maps thus lightening the map load, improving front line reports, and preventing possibly fatal errors in target designation. Both this matter and the one discussed in the paragraph above should be brought to the attention of the naval authorities.
4. Our experience in the post-landing phases of the operation proved beyond doubt that the shore fire control team must be enlarged to enable it to carry forward sufficient clothing, food, and radio equipment to keep up with the infantry advance and maintain proper and sustained radio communications. With a four man team and a jeep held up by unbridged rivers, it was a back breaking job for us to pack the 284 and 536 radios, and at that we were travelling light with no clothing or personal gear outside of ponchos and the meagerest of rations. Had we been required to control naval gunfire for any extended period of time, we would have been faced by the pressing problem of ration and battery shortages plus the missing benefits of sound powered communications.
5. It is therefore requested that each battalion N.L.O. be supplied with at least five men and driver if the jeep will arrive by end of first day or six men if no vehicle will be made available for several days. The distribution of the load would be as follows:
1st man (Team Chief) - Two 536s plus part of his personal requirement to fill the rubber bag; 2nd man - 284 radio; 3rd man - generator, extra batteries for 284 & 536s and some food; 4th man - antenna bag plus pack containing his personal items and food; 5th man - spare parts, sound powered telephones plus personal items to fill bag; 6th man - remaining personal items and rations plus reel of telephone wire.
6. The 284 set used by my team worked satisfactorily with no failure of any type during the entire three days of its use. Reception and transmissions to the ships were perfect, as may not have been the case with the weaker 694s. However, if existing bugs can be removed from the 694, battalion teams should be provided with this set exclusively. The regiment unit, on the other hand, moving less swiftly, must carry a 284 to complement the 694 and relay if necessary.
7. A final note on personal clothing. We found that all infantry units have been provided with a woolen undershirt-sweater that served admirably in damp weather. Every effort should be made to procure this valuable piece of clothing for our personnel.
BENJAMIN D. MATHON
295th Joint Assault Signal Co
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
14 May 1945
ACTIVITIES OF 295 JASCO FOR PERIOD
17 APRIL 1945 (R Day) THROUGH 13 MAY 1945
1. Twelve (12) Air-Liaison parties, 12 Shore Fire Control parties landed with 24thInfantry Division elements at Parang-Malabang area. In addition one Shore FireControlparty and the Company Commander and one EM landed Parang with 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, prepared to provide naval gunfire support and aircraft support for that unit. SCR 499 and 4 radio operators on duty with 24th Division Signal Company (Corps Auxiliary Net). Three wire teams also assisting 24th Signal Company.
23-29 APRIL 1945
23 April, one wire team assisting 99th Sig Bn in running trunks and locals in Corps Area. Shore Fire Control Parties now with JASCO Hq, awaiting further call. On 24 April one officer and 12 EM of Shore Party Communications Section reported to 116 AAA Group at Malabang to operate message center at that headquarters and operate radio in Corps net. Six radio operators reported 24th Signal Company to assist that unit. On 25 April six additional EM (radio operators) also reported 116 AAA Group, to operate radio for MAG 24. Air-Liaison parties #7, 9, and 13 relieved attachment 24th Infantry Division and attached 124 RCT, 31st Inf Division. Five Shore Fire Control parties on 24 hour alert for movement to X Corps Artillery. 26 April, four switchboard operators sent to operate switching central at Cotabato Junction (Simuay Switch). 27 April, JASCO Hq moved to Sugui Junction. 29 April, 5 Shore Fire Control parties departed in convoy for 24th Division Headquarters. Division approaching Davao Gulf and Naval Gunfire may be employed. JASCO Rear Echelon to remain at APO 321 per order Hq Eighth Army. Was due here R + 10 with bulk cargo, cots, tents, footlockers, B Bags, etc.
30 APRIL - 6 MAY 1945
All attachments noted in foregoing reports in status quo. Established threeoutpostsduring hours of darkness, as area quite isolated. Set up headquarters defense system.Six radio operators returned from attachment 24th Signal Company -- not further required. X Corps Provost Marshal requested our headquarters help enforce "Off Limits" in Sugui Village. Complying. On 5 May, three radio operators returned from attachment 116 AAA Group. Wire teams with 24th Signal very busy. Division moving rapidly and difficult to keep wire in.
7 MAY - 13 MAY 1945
SCR 499 and four operators returned from 24th Signal Company. Showdown inspection for unauthorized arms resulted in confiscation of two automatic pistols and one M-1 rifle, which were turned into X Corps Provost Marshal. Air Liaison Party #7 vehicle returned for vehicular and radio repair on 9 May. Repairs effected and vehicle returned 31st Division, 10 May.
10 May --Three wire teams (total 2 officers 24 EM) returned from 24th Signal Company. Officer in charge reports they laid 450 miles W-110 while attached. One of their vehicles damaged by Japanese grenade during raid on our convoy, vicinity of Santa Cruz. No casualties. 11 May, completed damming Tibatan River, providing a swimming pool and bathing place that noticeably improved already excellent morale of troops present.
VINCENT W. FOX
Captain, Sig C
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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
4 August 1945
HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V4 - ZAMBOANGA - OPERATION
1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 41st Infantry Division on the shores of Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands. Elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to the 41st Infantry Division to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison Communication. Attachment orders per Authority, Commanding General, Eight Army, dated 23 February 1945.
2. Zamboanga had been in the hands of the Japanese for approximately three years and the landing on the shore was lightly opposed by mortar and artillery located on the high ground some distance from the beach.
1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company be furnished:
a. With the 41st Infantry Division Headquarters.
One (1) Naval Liaison Team consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer and five (5) enlisted Men.
b. With the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams Headquarters.
One (1) Naval Liaison Team consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer and five (5) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men.
One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men
c. With each assualt battalion of the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams less 2nd Bn, 163rd.
One (1) Shore Fire Control Party consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer, one (1) Artillery Spotter, one (1) Signal Corps Officer as student observer for artillery spotting, and ten (10) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men..
d. With the 2nd Bn of the 163rd Regimental Combat Team
One (1) Shore Fire Control Party consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer, one (1) Artillery Spotter, and ten (10) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer, and five (5) enlisted men.
e. With the reserve battalions of the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams.
One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer, and five (5) enlisted men.
2. The elements joined their respective headquarters prior to embarkation. Jasco personnel were instructed by team officer in SOI, Field Orders, and General Orientations.
3. All teams with the exception of the Division Naval Liaison Team landed on the enemy held shore several minutes after H-hour and advanced inland rapidly against light opposition although there was considerable artillery and mortar fire falling from enemy positions on the high ground inland. With exception of Division Naval Liaison Officer station, all Naval Gunfire communications were quickly established and Naval Gunfire commenced against enemy batteries on the left and center of the Division Sector. Division Naval Liaison Officer, aboard LCI with elements of Division Artillery, was delayed in landing until H plus 150 minutes by intense artillery and mortar fire falling on and in front of landing beaches. All Naval Gunfire Communications were in by H plus three hours. The gunfire was being employed very effectively against enemy batteries and OP's on the left and enemy personnel on the right. On the right flank, the advance of the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry was greatly expedited by the employment of a floating O.P. (LVT) requested by the Naval Gunfire Spotter, as his observation ashore was seriously hampered by dense growth and special terrain features. Considerable air-spot was used in all sectors upon request of Shore Fire Control Parties and proved highly effective.
Shore Fire Control Parties were released and recalled to their respective Regimental CPs by D + 4, at which time the main fire support group was released from the area. Fire support ship from the screening force remained available in case of emergency (especially for night illumination). Arrangements were made by Division Naval Liaison Officer with Division Artillery S-3 for emergency call fires through Artillery F.O's. No such fires were called however.
On D plus 6, one Shore Fire Control Spotter Team was assigned the mission of furnishing Naval Gunfire Support to Basilan Island Task Force. In conjunction with this, two spotters were requested to furnish air-spot from artillery cub planes. Communications on this assignment was excellent and several preparation missions were fired from Air and Ground Observation. In addition to original Basilan landing same Shore Fire Control Team accompanied elements of Task Force on two separate landings on west coast of island.
On the whole, the use of Naval Gunfire Support during the initial phases of the operation, especially, was highly effective and was instrumental to a large degree in silencing enemy mortar and artillery positions
4. Air Ground Liaison Activities. The Air Liaison Parties were not requested to call missions until the Marine Air Groups 12 and 32 were in a position to support the ground troops. The Air Liaison Parties of the two regiments conducted sixteen (16) air strikes. Strikes were conducted in which one Air Liaison Officer was Air-borne over the target in an artillery plane, registered artillery smoke and directed the planes to the target. Some difficulty was encountered with this set-up in that artillery plane used a frequency modulated set and the attacking planes used amplitude modulated sets making direct contact between planes impossible. This was remedied by the air-borne Air Liaison Officer contacting the forward Air Liaison Officer on the ground on the frequency modulated set who in turn relayed the message to the attacking planes.
Napalm, 500 pound bombs, and strafing were used to good advantage. The cooperation between the Marine Air Groups and the Air Liaison Parties was excellent
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
1. Naval Gunfire:
a. Naval Gunfire Maps were too large a scale for accurate work. Small scale maps would be much more beneficial. It would be desirable if Infantry Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support operate from a common map system.
b. Air-spot for Naval Gunfire is extremely desirable and it is recommended that arrangements for cooperation with the Division Artillery Air Observation Section be made on all operations in which availability of cruiser and battleship planes is uncertain. Difference in spotting procedure could be corrected by Division Naval Liaison Officer. Communications to be arranged by having the Division Naval Liaison Officer's second set check in a firing ship net, and receiving commands at Division Artillery Fire Director Center. This would allow efficient handling of a limited activity.
c. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads over long distances, rough terrain and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons.
2. Air Ground Liaison. The idea of the Air Liaison Officer directing attacking planes from an artillery plane is very good. On numerous occasions visibility is hampered by terrain features or some other objects and the use of the plane to rise above these would result in calls for accurate strikes which heretofore would be almost an impossibility. The difference in the radio sets necessitated a relay station. Similar sets in the spotting and attacking planes would speed the strikes by having direct contact between them.
3. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters as enclosures.
THOMAS W. HART
Captain, Sig C
A certified True Extract Copy of Attachment Orders.
Roster of Officers
Roster of Officers, 295th JASCO, Participating in V-4 Zamboanga Operation.
Capt William B. Agler
Capt Benjamin S. Blake, Jr 0415648 FA
Capt Robert L. Hire 0561280 AC
Capt Abraham L. Herm 0367043 FA
Capt Robert C. North 0578735 AC
Capt Paul H. Rofkar 0343414 FA
Capt Nicholas W. Wentzel 0349217 FA
Capt Henry C. Wick III 0315152 FA
1st Lt James M. Amick 0574735 AC
1st Lt Dominic B. Bernardo 0449655 Inf
1st Lt Manning A. Eldridge 01645549 Sig C
1st Lt Wayne E. Hawley 01636327 Sig C
1st Lt Edward D. Kruidenier 01298248 Inf
1st Lt Thomas B. Gillespie 0438986 Inf
1st Lt Richard T. Lovorn 01645772 Sig C
1st Lt Roy W. Repp 01645940 Sig C
1st Lt Henry N. Vanderpool 01307593 Inf
Lt Charles J.
Lt(jg) John T. Detwiler USNR 269568
Lt(jg) Harry R. Jeter USNR 224347
Lt(jg) George A. Redfern USNR 224418
SHORE FIRE CONTROL SECTION
295th JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
1 April 1945
SUBJECT: V-4 Operational Report.
TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Co, APO 321.
1. Shore Fire Control Detachment attached to 41st Inf Division as follows:
a) 1 Division N.L.O. Team
b) 1 Regimental N.L.O. Team to each of 162nd and163Inf Regimental Hq.
c) 1 S.F.C. Party with each assault Bn.i.e. 2nd and 3rd Bns 162nd Inf Regt 1st and 2nd Bns 163rd Inf Regt
2. All teams of both Regts were ashore several minutes after H-hour, and advanced inland rapidly against light opposition, although there was considerable artillery and mortar fire falling from enemy positions on the high ground inland. With exception of Division N.L.O. station, complete communications were quickly established and N.G.F. commenced against enemy batteries on the left and center of Division Sector. Division N.L.O. aboard LCI with elements of Division Artillery was delayed in landing until H plus 150 minutes by intense artillery and mortar fire falling on and in front of landing beaches. All communications in by H plus 3 hours, at which time N.G.F. being very effectively employed against enemy batteries and OPs on the left and enemy personnel on the right.
3. On the special mission of Fox Co., 162nd Inf, which consisted of a rapid advance along the beach to the left toward Caldera Point, considerable delay in the close support to be furnished by Fire Support Group Three (LCI(G)s, LCI(M)s and LCI(R)s) was incurred by lack of proper coordination in communications. An SCR 610 radio was assigned to the infantry company with a special SFC frequency, but neither the operator or company Commander had been aware of its purpose and not until D plus two was the original plan of communications established. However satisfactory results were obtained by using the regular Bn S.F.C. Frequency with SCR 694.
4. On the right flank, the advance of the 1st Bn, 163rd Inf, was greatly expedited by the employment of a floating O.P. (LVT) requested by the N.G.F. Spotter, as his observation ashore was seriously hampered by dense growth and special terrain features.
5. Considerable air-spot was used in all sectors upon request of S.F.C. Parties and was highly effective.
6. All S.F.C. Parties were released and recalled to their respective Regimental C.P.s, by D plus 4 day, at which time the main fire support group was released from the area. Fire support ships from the screening force remained available in case of emergency(especially for night illumination). Arrangements were made by Division N.L.O. with Division Artillery S-3 for emergency call fires through Artillery F.O.s. No such fires were called however.
7. On D plus 6 day, one S.F.C. Spotter Team (Capt. Herm as spotter ) was assigned the mission of furnishing N.G.F. Support to Basilan Island Task Force. In conjunction with this two spotters, ( Capt. Blake and Lt.(jg) Detwiler ) were requested to furnish air-spot from artillery cub planes. Using planes SCR 610 with DDs 610s ( or equivalent ) set on Artillery frequencies, communications were excellent throughout and severed preparation missions were fired from Air and Ground Observation. In addition to original Basilan landing S.F.C. Team accompanied elements of Task Force on two separate landings on West coast of island.
8. On the whole, the use of Naval Gunfire Support during the initial phases of the operation, especially, was highly effective and was instrumental to a large degree in silencing enemy mortar and artillery positions. Upon the recall of S.F.C. parties, Division G-3 informed Division N.L.O. that he had been instructed by C.G. 41st Inf Div to draw up a commendation for the JASCO detachment in appreciation of the fine cooperation and excellent performance of all Naval Gunfire Support personnel. Likewise for the Air Ground Liaison personnel for their work as covered by their operational report.
9. Personal observations and recommendations by Div N.L.O.:
a) Initial liaison between this organization and 41st Inf Div led to misunderstanding as to time of release of S.F.C. Detachment from operation. As a result, S.F.C. personnel of this organization left prepared for not more than ten days, although it was expected by C.G. 41st Div that they would remain attached for duty throughout the V-4 Operation-- a period of from 8 to 10 weeks.
b) No Naval Gunfire Control maps were provided for Division Artillery initially, ( later obtained from Rocky Mount ). No such maps were ever available to supported Infantry units. This results in considerable confusion and delay ( especially in close support firing ). Past experience has shown that it is extremely important that Infantry, Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support operate from a common map system. Early Central Pacific Operations showed the importance of this.
c) Naval Gunfire Control maps were not only inaccurate topographically, but were too large a scale for accurate work. In many cases the Target area maps were at quite a variance with the photo maps used by the Infantry and Artillery units.
d) From past experience it should have been obvious that S.F.C. Parties be provided with at least some of their organic transportation. However for V-4 , this again was not done and had detrimental effects on N.G.F. Support. Proper communications is especially affected by this, as only a limited number of radio sets can be hand-carried.
e) Assigning S.F.C. Parties to assault units only, remains unsatisfactory as invariably the supported units demand the reallocation of parties from units going into reserve, to relieving units. This obviously puts too great a burden on the teams whose work is equally as difficult as Artillery F.O. and Liaison teams.
f) Air-spot for N.G.F. is extremely desirable and it is recommended that arrangements for cooperation with the Division Artillery Air Observation Section be made on all operations in which availability of cruiser and battleships planes is uncertain. Differences in spotting procedure could be corrected by Div N.L.O.. Communications to be arranged by having the Division N.L.O.s second set check in a firing ship net, and receiving commands at Div Artillery Fire Director Center. This would allow efficient handling of only a limited activity. Additional sets would improve the arrangement, but experience to date does not warrent a recommendation for additional equipment.
g) Again the arrangements for augmenting the T/O strength of the Shore Fire Control Section left much to be desired.
(1) Rapidly changing membership of teams eliminates the advantage of the usual "team training phase" of training. This is twelve weeks in F.A.U.T.P.. Accordingly these personnel can be used only for mechanical operation of equipment and not for receiving and processing traffic
(2) The employment of a large number of personnel with whom a team Officer has had no combat contact, introduces an unnecessary element of risk, resulting from not knowing what to expect of personnel or how they will react to pressure.
(3) For a full Division operation, there are 22 separate operating Parties of 5 men each,and two vehicles. The currently assigned strength of 44 men does not allow sufficient experienced men in each location.
It is recommended that at least the T/O strength be permanently assigned and available to S.F.C. Section, based on:
per Bn 1 Chief of Section
2 Radio Operators
1 Radio Operator, WT man
per Regt 1 Chief of Section
1 Radio Operator
per Div 1 Chief of Section
T/O and total 65
Benjamin S. Blake
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HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
Office of the Commanding
APO 310 GENERAL ORDERS 11 July 1945 NUMBER 82
Under the provisions of Executive Order Number 9396 (Section I, Bulletin 22, War Department, 1943) and Section IV, Circular Number 333, War Department, 22 December 1943, the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, from 17 April 1945 to 1 July 1945.
The Shore Fire Control Section of this unit accompanied initial assault elements in the landing operations on MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, and directed Supporting Naval gunfire in a highly effective manner. During the advance inland beyond the range of supporting Naval gunfire, the Shore Fire Control Parties were converted to Field Artillery Forward Observers Parties, and in this capacity, beyond the call of duty, accompanied the Infantry units in the rapid movement across the island. They reverted to Shore Fire Control Parties for the direction of Naval gunfire in the neutralization of enemy coastal defense batteries and the destruction of other important enemy installations in the Davao Gulf area. At the conclusion of these missions they again assumed the duties of Field Artillery Forward Observers, and assisted in the direction of fire of Corps Artillery for the duration of the operation.
The Air Liaison Parties of this organization landed with the assault infantry elements on MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, and directed air bombardment of beaches and initial objectives. They remained continuously with front line infantry battalions of two Infantry Divisions for the duration of the MINDANAO campaign furnishing invaluable aid to tactical units by accurate observation and direction of air bombardment and low level attack in the destruction of many enemy positions and installations at times when artillery support was not available.
The Communications Section of this organization performed highly valuable services throughout the operation by assisting in the installation and maintenance of communications to forward combat elements and operation and maintenance of communications in rear areas, thus greatly assisting in furnishing the excellent communications which characterized this campaign despite almost unparalleled difficulties of transportation. Communications Sections were organized and equipped by the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company in order to furnish Message Center, Wire and Radio personnel to units of a Corps who were not authorized organic communications personnel although their need therefor was great.
The duties thus assumed by the organization were far beyond the call of duty and the manner of performance of these duties is an example of the cooperative spirit, general efficiency and individual bravery that was evident throughout the conunand. The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company has contributed greatly to the successful outcome of the MINDANAO campaign, reflecting great credit upon the personnel of that organization. The services rendered are in line with the highest traditions of the military service.
F. C. SIBERT
Maj Gen, USA
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The following are Genaral Orders relating to 295 Jasco. If you have any General Orders or Oficial Documents relating to the Unit please forward them to me at the above address.
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
4 August 1945
1. In compliance with Circular No. 1, War Department, 1943, as changed by Section II, Par 3b (2) Circular 307, War Depatment, 1943 Private First Clas David W. Lahman, 18148022, having completed thirty consecutive days in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater, is authorized the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, and is awarded the service ribbon in lieu thereof.
2. FIRST LIEUTENANT WAYNE E. HAWLEY, 01636327, is appointed Acting Executive Officer, in addition to his other duties.
3. Under the provisions of AR 615-5, the following promotions are announced:
TO BE TECHNICAL SERGENT (TEMPORARY)
Technician Third Grade Robert C. Phillips, 20112904
TO BE STAFF SERGENT (TEMPORARY)
TO BE SERGENT (TEMPORARY)
Technician Fifth Grade Roy V. Cornwall, 12139541
TO BE CORPORAL (TEMPORARY)
Private First Class Frederick Chambliss, 34802782
TO BE TECHNICIAL FIFTH GRADE (TEMPORARY)
TO BE PRIVATE FIRST CLASS
By order of Captain Hart:
James E. Jenks
2nd Lt., AC
(Signature James E. Jenks)
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
24 March 1944
NO 21 )
1. Under the provisions of P 3 AR 35-320, 1941, First Lieutenant John F. Hilz, 0-577922, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company, APO 957, is detailed Class "A" Agent Finance Officer to L. (?) Graham, Lt. Col. F.D. Finance Officer 27 Inf Div APO 957, for purposes of making payment of regular, supplementary, and partial pay-rolls for the month of March 1944. Attention is invited to 5 AR 35-320 which prohibits officers designated as agent officers for making payments of pay-rolls to act as witnessing officer to such payment.
2.The following named enlisted men who were attached to the Seventh Infantry Division during the Marshall Island operation are entitled to wear a bronze star on the Asiatic-Pacific Theater Service Ribbon: (Auth) Section V, GO #17, WD, dtd 26 February 1944.
|Tec 4||Birks, Raymond G.||35313076||Pvt||McClellan, Harry A.||13145433|
|Pvt||Brennan, Raymond P.||13127089||S SG||Mc Dougal, Hugh B.||37341185|
|Tec 4||Burke, John F, Jr.||31208158||Pvt||Nation, Roy (NMI)||35573656|
|Pvt||Carpenter, Richard E.||16008233||Tec 3||Abdoler, Leonard J.||37231498|
|Sg||Cooper, John W.||33578764||Tec 5||Brunswick, Eugene E.||15357870|
|Sg||Cottle, John (NMI)||36632966||Tec 5||Cornwall, Roy V.||12139541|
|S SG||Ferreira, Herman (NMI)||31223398||M SG||Davis, Edward L.||7025324|
|S SG||Gersbach, Paul A.||13153720||Tec 5||Gordon, Paul R.||31185184|
|Pfc||Iannotti, Herman J.||32293611||Tec 5||Gross, Albert||32435582|
|Tec 5||Keadle, William R.||13119298||S Sg||Hall, Marcell V.||18170180|
|Pvt||Kendrick, Thomas H.||34686125||Pvt||Keller, Henry H.||7020961|
|Pfc||Killian, Nolen C.||34596164||S SG||Kovalcson, Laurance P.||20114794|
|Pvt||Lanham, Cecil C.||35741883||Pvt||Levine, Louis (NMI)||12090400|
|Pfc||Mazo, James A.||34587745||Tec 5||McMillen, Voris D.||35313084|
|T SG||Newman, Edward (NMI)||15013981||Pfc||Miller, Hilliard J.||35524362|
|S Sg||Pugh, Lesler L.||33527134||SG||Nall, John C. Jr.||34596506|
|Pvt||Rapol, Donald M.||35600933||S SG||Nelson, Reider G.||36706445|
|Tec 4||Rand, Wesley E.||20112905||Pfc||Pittinato, Mathew J.||36545447|
|Tec 5||Rider, Thomas F. Jr.||12211594||Pfc||Samper, Alfred (NMI)||15359642|
|Pfc||Varjensky, Vincent M.||11072045||Pfc||Smith, Douglas (NMI)||36802512|
|Tec 5||Velasco, Edward A.||39097481||Tec 5||Smth, Foster W.||35597960|
|Tec 5||Aubrey, Wilfred H.||12173502||SG||Smith,Richard L.||35618842|
|Tec 3||Chapandy, Anthony F.||35385789||Pfc||Spinicelli, Joseph L.||12151321|
|Pvt||Dubik, Michael (NMI)||12202828||Pvt||Vincent, Clarence E.||35747708|
|T SG||Fiske, Robert E.||11020932||Pfc||Gantt, John G.||33378463|
|Pfc||Grimes, William F.||32963073||Tec 5||Bourguignon, Wesley A.||32614658|
|Tec 5||Nubile, Anthony (NMI)||12129336||Tec 5||Costello, John M.||36273606|
|Pvt||Parker,Clyde (NMI)||34596076||Pfc||Barnes, Clifford F.||34649045|
|Tec 3||Popovich, Steve G.||36701465||Pvt||Cain, Virgil D.||35745334|
|Pvt||Reynante, Osmundo Jr.||33452694||Pvt||Chambliss, Frederick (NMI)||3480????|
|Tec 5||Rosenberg, Frederick W.||35538584||Pvt||Greco, John A.||3456????|
|Tec 5||Silvia, Edward P.||31223273||Cpl||Guzman, William (NMI)||3656????|
|Pvt||Sleeper, Norman D.||31339183||Pfc||Harrington,Arthur (NMI)||3678????|
|SG||Smith, Carroll A.||13137571||S Sg||Herritt, Keneth L.||36??????|
|Tec 5||Spencer, Abraham (NMI)||32340351||Cpl||La Croix, Sam H.||3???7???|
|SG||Strassman, Solomon E.||32341433||SG||Rattie, Theodor E.||19193139|
|Tec 5||Walsh, John R.||36402388||Sg||Stenrud, Ingvald J.||36275195|
|Pfc||White, Chester W.||38449704||S SG||Stratten, Hubet W.||18045367|
|SG||Masters, James L.||34517132||Cpl||Topercer, Albert (NMI)||36355258|
Irving Obenchain, Jr
Major, Signal Corps
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
11 August 1945
TO : All personnel
- Whether a TDY quota will be given us due to the circumstances, is not known. Any personnel wishing to apply may fill out his request. Those who have applied previously will have to submit a new request. The statement regarding the eight months to remain overseas is rescinded. Requests may be submitted in long hand.
- In the event the War Department announces the end of the war, common sense must be kept utmost in the minds of all men. The firing of weapons is strictly prohibited. Too many persons have lost their lives or limbs because of some "character" discharging a weapon. I do not wish for this to be construed as a warning but any violator of the above will most assuredly miss the boat as far as the rest of the unit is concerned.
Remember one thing please. There are many miles between us and home. There may be many days between us and home, but we definitely want to get home. I ask the members of this outfit to stick behind me as much as possible. The more cooperation the sooner the possibility of us returning home alive in 45 (Fingers Crossed).
Captain Sig C
295 TH Joint Assault Signal Company
24 September 1944
- UndertheprovisionsAR615-5,thefollowingpromotionsare announced:
- FirstLieutenant JOHNGRANTON,01634818, 295thJointAssaultSignalCompany,isreldasgmtfrHqPlatoonandprimarydyasMessO,andasgd totheShorePartyCommunicationSection.
- FirstLieutenant JOHNGRANTON,01634818,295thJointAssaultSignalCompanyisaptdMessOinadditiontohis otherduties.
- UndertheprovisionsofAR615-5 TechnicianFifthGradeCharlesL.Pankiewicz,12171973isreducedtothegradeofPrivateformisconduct.
By order of Major Obenchain,
Wayne E. Hawley1st Lt., Sig C
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
29 August 1945
SPECIAL ORDERS )
NO . . . . . . . . . . . 92)
1. Under the provisions of the War Dept. Circular #465, dated 9 December 1944, and Ltr. Hq. Eighth Army, AG 200.6 (D), dated 8 August 1945, the following officers and EM are authorized to wear the Bronze Service Arrowhead for participating in the Amphibious Assault on enemy-held Eniwetok, Marshall Islands.
RANK ASN Wentzel, Nicholas Capt 0349217 Wick, Henry C. III Capt 0315152 Gilliam, Charles G. 1st Lt 01643587 Repp, Roy W. 1st Lt 01645940 Hiltz, John F. 1st Lt 0577922 Aubrey, Wilfred H. S/Sgt 12173502 Birks, Raymond G. Tec 3 35313076 Burke, John F., Jr. Pfc 31208158 Cain, Virgil D. Pfc 35745334 Chapandy, Anthony F. Tec 3 35385759 Cole, Reuben D. Tec 5 31268027 Cooper, John W. Sgt 33378764 Cottle, John Sgt 36632966 Dobson, Gerald Tec 5 36810564 Dubik, Michael Pfc 12202828 Ferreira, Herman M/Sgt 31223398 Gersbach, Paul A. S/Sgt 13153720 Gossman, Milton O. Tec 5 36583232 Greco, John A. Pfc 36436948 Grieme, William F. Tec 5 32963073 Harman, Robert F. Pfc 33618511 Harrington, Arthur S/Sgt 36718997 Hatch, Henry O. Pfc 36582976 Higgins, Lurton L. Sgt 36741173 Iannotti, Herman J. Tec 5 32293611 Johnson, Ralph L. Tec 4 36649361 Keadle, William Tec 4 13119298 Kendrick, Thomas H. Pfc 34686125 LaCroix, Sam H. Cpl 38387669 Lanham, Cecil C. Cpl 35741883 Lich, Robert F. Tec 4 36478556 Masters, James L. Tec 4 34517132 Maze, James A. Tec 5 34587745 McClellan, Harry A. Tec 5 13145433 McDougal, Hugh E. S/Sgt 37341185 Nation, Roy Pfc 35573656 Nilsen, Kenneth B. Tec 5 36650708 Nugent, Alfred J. Tec 5 32773505 Orr, Warren J. S/Sgt 36478364 Parker, Clyde Tec 5 34596076 Popovich, Steve G. S/Sgt 36701465 Pugh, Lester L. T/Sgt 33327134 Rider, Thomas F., Jr. Pfc 12211594 Rosenberg, Frederick W. Sgt 35558584 Shanahan, Harold L. Sgt 36478540 Silvia, Edward P. Tec 4 31223273 Sleeper, Norman D. Tec 5 31339183 Smith, Carroll A. T/Sgt 13137371 Spencer, Abraham Sgt 32340351 Stenrud, Ingvald J. T/Sgt 36275195 Strasser, Raymond C. Tec 4 32753587 Strassman, Solomon E. Tec 4 32341433 Thornton, Robert L. Sgt 36478554 Topercer, Albert Cpl 36355258 Varjensky, Vincent M. Tec 4 11072045 Velasco, Edward A. Tec 4 39097481 Walsh, John R. Tec 5 36402388 2. Under the provisions of War Dept Circular #465, dated 9 December 1944, and Ltr. Hq. Eight Army, AG 200.6 (D), dated 8 August 1945, the following Officers and EM are authorized to wear the Bronze Service Arrowhead for participation in the Amphibious Assault on enemy-held Saipan, Marianas Islands.
RANK ASN Blake, Benjamin S., Jr. Capt 0415648 Duling, Claude C. Capt 01287325 Freeny, Samuel C. Capt 01287334 Hart, Thomas W. Capt 01643648 Herm, Abraham L. Capt 0367043 Hire, Robert L. Capt 0561280 Jensen, Walter H. Capt 01175756 Lentz, James E. Capt 01171644 SO 92
Bronze Service Arrowhead, Hq 295th JASCO, contd.
RANK ASN North, Robert C. Capt 0578735 Rofkar, Paul H. Capt 0343414 Amick, James H. 1st Lt 0574735 Bernardo, Dominic B. 1st Lt 0449655 Burge, Robert L. 1st Lt 0416381 Cash, Clayton R. 1st Lt 01640841 Eldridge, Manning A. 1st Lt 01645549 Gillespie, Thomas B. 1st Lt 0438986 Hawley, Wayne E. 1st Lt 01636327 Kinsaul, James R. 1st Lt 01175767 Kruidenier, Edward D. 1st Lt 01298248 Lovorn, Richard T. 1st Lt 01645772 Porter, Jesco L. 1st Lt 01294189 Tremper, Claude S. 1st Lt 01647389 Vanderpool, Henry N. 1st Lt 01307593 Jenks, James E. 2nd Lt 02023331 Fox, Vincent W. Major 01643552 Mathon, Benjamin D. Lieut. USNR 171137 Detwiler, John T. Lieut. (jg) USNR 269568 Abdoler, Leonard J. Tec 3 37251498 Adams, Charlie W. Tec 5 38099246 Addison, Julius O. Pfc 34649345 Admaski, Stanley J. S/Sgt 37543160 Albrektson, Evald J. T/Sgt 31056515 Allen, Ivan G. Pvt 36808834 Allen, William E. S/Sgt 36445008 Alonzo, Anthony Tec 3 15523516 Anderson, Lloyd M. S/Sgt 36717077 Bakes, Joseph E. Pfc 13126747 Barnes, Clifford F. Tec 5 34649045 Barnhart, Henry J. Tec 5 32377323 Barnott, Raymond L. Cpl 38542770 Beech, Leon Pfc 34612173 Bergman, Carl Tec 3 12180496 Bergmann, George N. Pfc 32697048 Bledsoe, Will T. Tec 5 34588387 Boeninghaus, Robert Tec 4 32691850 Boisvert, Marcel J. M/Sgt 31185221 Brandes, Elliot Tec 5 32803312 Broten, Edward L. S/Sgt 36255901 Brown, Carroll M. Tec 3 33680442 Brunswick, Eugene E. Tec 5 15337870 Burdick, Norman L. Tec 5 32475091 Burrell, Willis C. Pfc 34680378 Burt, Henry C. Pvt 34702961 Bussacco, Salvatore A. Pfc 32606873 Byrd, Norman R. Tec 4 34347653 Byrne, James W. T/Sgt 12180894 Caputo, John C. M/Sgt 32533694 Carlo, Arcangolo N. Pfc 32599129 Carlson, Carl B. S/Sgt 36741742 Carnohan, Lester C. S/Sgt 35126347 Carroll, Alex Pfc 34118094 Case, Lewis B. Pfc 34596019 Christakos, John Tec 4 36478471 Cianci, Rudolph Pvt 31291383 Clint, Bernard P. Tec 5 35064793 Cobb, Joe H. Sgt 34681325 Colatutto, Nicholas R. Tec 4 32819247 Colletti, LeRoy J. Pfc 36739734 Collier, Paul M. Pfc 33530968 Cook, James J. Tec 4 32648516 Corbitt, Hubert Tec 3 34058724 Costello, John M. Tec 4 36275606 Crim, Henry L. Tec 4 35128259 Croamer, John M. Pvt 31357592 Csuti, Arthur Tec 5 35516918 Dalton, Robert J. Pfc 32553071 Davis, Henry E. Pfc 34230008 Davis, Henry E. Pfc 34230008 Davis, Paul Sgt 13044382 Davis, Robert F. Tec 5 34612266 DeCosta, John J. Tec 4 31208480 DeVinney, Heston C. Tec 4 33496119 Diffley, John T. Tec 4 12156297 Draper, James Jr. Tec 5 36291929 Drew, Ted Pfc 35671517 Dunphey, Terrance N. Tec 4 32484137 Earnhardt, Jacob A. Tec 5 34596536 Eaton, Charles S. Tec 4 31223573 Edwards, Ernest Pfc 6851759 Ely, Bradley D. Tec 3 12180283 Factor, Robert O. Tec 4 35539981 Feasel, Chester E. T/Sgt 35539966 Fischer, Carl M. Tec 4 12180161 Fleming, Joseph G. T/Sgt 32566743 Foshay, Glenn E. S/Sgt 36478932 Fossum, Harold L. S/Sgt 16155230 Francis, Everett T. Pvt 31182612 Frederick, Oscar C. S/Sgt 34587862 Funk, Carl L. Tec 4 36741916 Gantt, John G. Pfc 33378463 Garcia, Helvio Tec 5 12159038 Gauvin, Paul A. Pfc 51315851 Giorato, Manuel Tec 5 31185227 Goodman, Rex Sgt 36478895 Goodrich, Stuart L. Pfc 31339895 Goodwin, Joseph R. S/Sgt 32625761 Gordon, Joe H. Pfc 38394658 Gordon, Paul E. Tec 5 31185184 Greenspahn, Irwin Pfc 36650917 Gregory, Eugene E. Tec 4 13326185 Grosser, Eugene D. Tec 4 13067435 Grua, Elvino Tec 3 36479565 Guzman, William S/Sgt 39562636 Hall, Marcell V. T/Sgt 18170180 Harpar, Arthur F. Tec 4 34010375 Harris, Hubert H. Tec 5 34588016 Havard, Leon W. Sgt 34612268 Henderson, Woodrow Tec 5 15273755 Henkel, Paul A. Tec 4 33391903 Holway, Frank A. T/Sgt 110544605 Hood, Gordon D. T/Sgt 19148263 Hopkins, Thomas S. Sgt 32269417 Hostert, Robert D. S/Sgt 16145449 Howell, Lottie H. Sgt 34588026 Johnson, Harry K. M/Sgt 35230165 Kamuf, Leo J. Tec 5 35516337 Kasperski, Edwin C. Pfc 32732588 Keith, Victor D., Jr. Pfc 33049042 Kuehne, Benedict Tec 4 32771775 Lamb, Kenneth A. M/Sgt 17078693 LeBlanc, Albert G. Tec 4 33509014 Lee, Sam J. Tec 5 34686076 Levy, Harold S/Sgt 110533353 Lilly, Philip A. Pfc 31368209 Loar, John F. Sgt 33405752 Love, Cecil K. Pfc 38508109 Lowing, Howard L. S/Sgt 36649990 MacFarlane, Dalton R. Tec 5 36810834 Malafronte, Crescienzo Tec 4 51182622 Marcio, Nick V. Pfc 33404512 Martin, William J., Jr. Pvt 14181245 Martindale, Molvin R. Tec 5 34594003 Matheny, Clifford C. Pfc 35641516 Matreso, Salvedor P. Pfc 33461656 Matuseski, David A. Tec 4 37567312 Maxwell, Harry W. Tec 4 36477072 McCasland, Norman A. Pfc 36478450 McCollum, Edmon R. Tec 5 39333067 McCrickard, Willie I. S/Sgt 33637131 McDermott, Wilbur J. Pfc 36584394 McLemore, Ralph Pfc 35675467 McMillen, Voris D. T/Sgt 35313084 McMurry, Palmer Jr. S/Sgt 34396063 Mediavilla, Mariano Pfc 35534107 Micklo, Charley F. Tec 4 34704307 Miller, Hilliard J. Pfc 35524362 Miller, John S. T/Sgt 13080142 Morrow, Robert H. Tec 5 12035508 Nall, John O., Jr. Sgt 34596506 Nelson, Reider G. Tec 4 36706445 Nelson, Thomas J. Tec 5 37378964 Newcomer, Donald Pfc 13089738 Nielsen, Milo W. Pfc 17040708 Nikos, Robert F. S/Sgt 36706128 Nolan, James H. Tec 5 37384301 Nourse, Bernard D. S/Sgt 35449112 Palling, Charles H. Sgt 36740255 Pankiewicz, Charles L. Cpl 12171973 Pante, Germano H. Tec 5 33579457 Payne, Walter W. Tec 5 54580878 Peterson, Arthur R. Pfc 39017186 Phillips, James G. Tec 5 11088548 Pisano, Paul P. T/Sgt 32364962 Pittinato, Mathew J. Pfc 56543447 Polifroni, Nicholas J. Pfc 32773458 Qualtors, Martin J. Tec 4 36351520 Rapol, Donald N. Pfc 35600933 Rattie, Theodore E. S/Sgt 19193159 Roberts, William R. Tec 4 34890191 Ross, Gene L. Tec 4 37511862 Ross, Patrick J. Tec 5 42041475 Rumph, Fred L. Sgt 54510040 Russell, Willard A. Sgt 15529310 Sacks, Seymour Tec 4 12180075 Sacks, Seymour Tec 4 12180075 Sallack, Theodore Tec 4 12160250 Samper, Alfred Tec 4 15559642 Sarratt, J.L. Pfc 34595881 Schaefer, John G., Jr. S/Sgt 12094573 Schuetz, Charles E. M/Sgt 16097483 Sekely, Robert P. Pfc 15170639 Serafin, Joseph B. Tec 5 35740254 Sexton, Donald Tec 5 35448158 Sirignano, Thomas O. S/Sgt 12153102 Skinner, James R. Tec 5 12158307 Smith, Foster W. Tec 5 35597960 Smith, Richard L. Sgt. 35618842 Sodlmeir, Louis F. Pfc 42015180 Somers, Willard E. Pvt 37441038 Spinicelli, Joseph L. Tec 5 12151521 Standlee, Joe B. Sgt 38133634 Stanton, Lee R. Tec 5 15157523 Stark, Edward C. S/Sgt 16095862 Stephenson, Raymond T. Sgt 11110755 Stratton, Hubert W. Pvt 18045367 Tarquino, John E. Sgt 12166064 Tesch, Richard M. T/Sgt 31167783 Thomas, Clayton L. Pvt 13093698 Thompson, Harold A. T/Sgt 37500744 Totaro, Vincent D. Tec 4 32506727 Trimble, Samuel M. Pvt 32349699 Valdez, Refugio C. Tec 5 39247591 Valint, John Sgt 32683098 Vincent, Clarence E. Pfc 35747708 Wallace, Neil A., Jr. Pfc 11023892 Watters, William J. S/Sgt 33438112 Wendel, Herbert L. Pfc 33554402 Wernick, Gary J. Tec 5 12161737 Withers, Donald S. Pfc 31216245 Wojciehowski, Edward A. Sgt 35582762
By order of Captain HART:
JAMES E. JENKS
2nd Lt., AC
JAMES E. JENKS
2nd Lt., AC
Off Concerned (2) EM Conccrnod (1) BB (1) File (1)
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Aug. 10, 1993
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
1 ALEXANDER, AUSTIN A. 18005622 521 PFC
1 ALONZO, ANTHONY 14323516
766 TEC 3
1 ANDERSON, LLOYD M, 36717077 595 S/SGT
1 BAK, EDWARD J. 31204591 650 TEC 5
1 BEECH, LEON 34612173 641 PFC
1 BLEDSOE, WILL T. 34588387 641 TEC 5
1 BRANDES, ELLIOTT 33803312 650 TEC 5
1 BRIGGS, CLYDE E. 350180g7 766 M/SGT
1 BURT, HENRY C. 34702961 675 PVT
1 CSUTI, ARTHUR 35516918 766 TEC 5
1 FOSSUM, HAROLD L. 15155230 674 S/SGT
1 FRANCIS, EVERETT T. 31182612 766 PVT
1 KAMUF, LEO J. 35316337 650 PFC
1 KEITH, VICTOR D., JR. 35049042 776 PVT
1 LeBLANC, ALBERT G. 33509014 595 TEC 5
1 LOAR JOHN F. 33405752 667 SGT
1 MALAFRONTE, CRESCIENZO 31182622 766 TEC 4
1 PISANO PAUL P. 32364962 766 S/SGT
1 SARRETT J.L 34595881 641 PFC
1 SEDLMEIR, LOUIS F. (D) 42013180 521 PFC
1 VALINT, JOHN 32683098 595 SGT
10 BOISVERT, MARCEL J. 31185221 766 M/SGT
10 BROWN, CARROLL M. 33680442 766 TEC 3
10 CARROLL, ALEX 34118094 641 PFC
10 CLINT BERNARD P. 35064793 766 TEC 5
10 CREAMER, JOHN M. 31357592 650 PVT
10 FISCHER, CARL M 12180161 766 TEC 4
l0 GROSSER EUGENE D 1306,435 595 TEC 5
10 HOLWAY, FRANK A. 11054605 574 S/SGT
10 HOWELL, LOTTIE H.7 34588026 641 TEC 5
10 JOHNSON HARRY K 35230163 595 S/SGT
10 McCOLLUM, EDMON R. 39333067 766 TEC 5
10 McMURRY, PALMER, JR. 34596063 675 SGT
10 NELEN, JAMES H. 37384501 766 TEC 5
10 NELSON, THOMAS J. 37578964 650 PFC
10 PETEPSON, ARTHUR R. 39017186 521 PFC
10 ROSS, PATGRICK J. 42041475 521 PFC
10 SIRIGNANO, THOMAS C. 12153iO2 766 S/SGT
10 STANDLEE, JOE B. 38133634 674 SGT
10 WENDEL, HEPBERT L. 33554402 667 PVT
2 ADAMS, CHARLIE W. 2.8099246 521 PVT
2 ALBPEKTSON, EVALD J. 31056515 766 TEC 3
2 BARNHART, HENRY J. 32377523 766 TEC 5
2 BOSNINGHAUS, ROBERT 326gl850 69Q TEC 5
2 PUSSACCO, SALVATORE A. 33606873 521 PVT
2 CARLO, ARCANGELO N. 32599l2g 650 PVT
2 DREW, GTED 35671517 675 PFC
2 FEASEL CHESTER E. 3553g966 595 S/SGT
2 GARCIA, HELVIO C. 12159038 7S66 TEC 5
2 HARDCASTLE, ALBERT W. 38053200 766 S/SGT
2 LONG, CLIFFORD W. 121S8810 641 PFC
2 MICHAELS, ERNEST J. 7001571 595 T/SGT
2 PAYNE, WALTER W. 34380878 641 TEC 5
2 OUALTERS, MARTIN J. 36351520 667 TEC 5
Aug. 10, 1993
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
2 RAPOL, DONALD M. 35600933 521 PFC
2 SCHAEFER, JOHN G. 12094573 674 SGT
2 SEKELY, ROBERT P. 13170639 641 PFC
2 SKINNER, JAMES R. 12158307 766 PVT
2 STARK, EDWARD E. (D) 16095862 595 SGT
2 THOMPSON, HAROLD A. 37500744 674 S/SGT
2 WILLIAMS, ROBERT B. 36705230 766 TEC 4
2. CASS, LEWIS B. 34596019 641 PFC
3 BRIGHAM, ERNEST P. 20106830 766 TEC 3
3 DAVIS, ROBERT F. 34612266 641 TEC 5
3 DIFFLEY, JOHN T. 12156297 766 TEC 4
3 EARNHARDT, JACOB A. 3459636 641 TEC 5
3 FORTIER, EDWARD A. 11023701 650 PFC
3 GIORATO, MANUEL 31185227 766 TEC 5
3 GOODRICH, STUART L. 31339895 521 PFC
3 HA AFD, LEON W. 34612268 595 SGT
3 HOOPER, ROBERT W. 39713260 641 PFC
3 LAMB, KENNETH A. 17078693 766 T/SGT
3 LANHAM, CECIL C. 35741883 776 PFC
3 LEVY, HAROLD (D) 11053353 674 S/SGT
3 LOVE, CECIL X. 38508199 521 PFC
3 MARTIN, WILLIAM J., JR. 14131245 675 PFC
3 McWILLIAMS, FLOYD W. 7013534 595 S/SGT
3 MIKOS, ROBERT F. 36706128 766 S/SGT
3 PHILLIPS, JAMES G. 11088548 667 PVT
3 STEPHENSON, RAYMOND T. 11110735 766 TEC 5
3 TARQUINO, JOHN E. 1216 674 SGT
4 ALLEN WILLIAM E. 36445008 674 S/SGT
4 BAKES, JOSEPH E. 13125747 650 PFC
4 BERGMAN, CARL 12180496 766 TEC 3
4 BURRELL, WILLIS C. 34680378 641 PVT
4 CARROLL, RICHARD A. 16132651 776 PFC
4 COSTELLO, JOHN M. 36273605 766 TEC 5
4 EATON CHARLES S. 31223573 766 TEC 5
4 FREDERICKS, OSCAR C. 34587862 595 S/SGT
4 GREENSPAHN, IRWIN 36650917 766 PVT
4 HENDERSON, WOODROW W. 15375755 667 TEC 5
4 HNOSTERT, ROBERT L. 16145449 766 S/SGT
4 MATHEN7, CLIFFORD O. 35641516 641 PFC
4 MoCRICKARD, WILLIE I. 33637137 595 SGT
4 SCHUETS, CHARLES E. 16097483 595 T/SGT
4 SEXTON, DONALD 55448158 641 TEC 5
4 VALDEZ, REFUGIO C. 39247591 766 TEC 5
4 WARREN, LYNN J. 3S046555 595 M/SGT
4 WOJCIEHOWSKI, EDWARD A. 35582762 674 SGT
5 BALL, HARRY J. 42102863 667 PFC
5 BURDICK, NORMAN L. 32475091 674 PFC
5 COBB, JOE H 34681325 595 SGT
5 COHEN, LEONARD H. ? ? ?
5 COOKE, JAMES J. 3264S516 650 TEC 5
5 CORBITT, HUBERT 34058724 766 TEC 3
5 CRIM HENRY L. 3512B259 766 TEC 4
5 DeCOSTA, JOHN J. 31208480 766 TEC 5
5 DeVINNEY HORACE P. (D) 3349606U 541 PFC
Aug. 10, 1993
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
5 DeVINNEY, HESTON C. (D@) 33496119 641 TEC 5
5 ELY, BRADLEY D. 12180285 766 S/SGT
5 ESTES, CLIFFORD B. SR. 34879969 667 PFC
5 GAMACHE, JOSEPH F. 20114144 674 S/SGT
5 GAUVIN, PAUL A. 31313851 667 PFC
5 GROSS, ALBERT A. 32435582 766 PVT
5 HENKEL, PAUL A. 33391903 641 TEC 5
5 HOOD, GORDON(D) 19148263 595 S/SGT
5 HULL, HAROLD (D) 6895682 766 M/SGT
5 LEE, SAM J. 34686076 641 PFC
5 McLEMORE, RALPH 35675467 521 PVT
5 MEDIAVILLA, MARIANO 35534107 675 PFC
5 RUMPH, FRED L. 34510040 674 SGT
6 ADAMSKI, STANLEY J. 37545180 667 SGT
6 BISHOP, CHARLES G. 42092626 650 PFC
6 BONAR, LEON P. 19025865 641 PVT
6 BYRNE, JAMES W (D) 12180894 766 T/SGT
6 CAPUTO, JOHN C. 32533694 766 S/SGT
6 DRAPER, JAMES JR. 36291929 650 PFC
6 DUNPHEY, TERRENCE N. 32484137 650 TEC 5
6 FLEMING, JOSEPH G. 32566743 674 S/SGT
6 HARPER, ARTHUR F. 34010375 766 TEC 4
6 HARRIS, HUBERT H. 34568016 641 TEC 5
6 HOPKINS, THOMAS S. 32Q69417 595 SGT
6 JACOBSEN, VIVIAN G. 19216084 776 PFC
6 KIL3RETH, J.M. 36726432 674 TEC 5
6 MARTINDALE, MELVIN R. 34594003 641 PFC
6 PANTO, GERMANO M. 33579457 675 TEC 5
6 PHILLIPS, ROBERT C. 20112904 766 TEC 3
6 SACKS, SEYMOUR 12180075 766 TEC 5
6 SERAFIN, JOSEPH B. 35740254 766 TEC 5
6 TOLLEY, EDMOND R. 6998813 595 S/SGT
6 WALLACE, NEIL A., JR. 11023892 674 PFC
6 WITHERS, DONALD E. 31216245 641 PFC
7 ABDOLER, LEONARD J. 37231498 766 TEC 3
7 ANDERSON, DEAN A. 37581682 650 PFC
7 BRUNSWICK, EUGENE E. 15337870 766 TEC 5
7 CORNWALL, ROY B. (D) 12139541 650 TEC 5
7 DAVIS, EDWARD L 7025324 595 M/SGT
7 DOWLER, WAYNE (D) 37462180 667 PFC
7 GANTT, JOHN G.(D) 33378463 667 PFC
7 GORDON, PAUL R. 31185184 766 TEC T
7 HALL, MARCELL V. (D) 18170180 595 S/SGT
7 KELLER, HENRY H. 7020961 650 PVT
7 KOVALOSON, LAURENCE P.(D) 20114794 674 S/SGT
7 McMILLEN, VORIS D.(D) 35313084 766 S/SGT
7 MILLER, HILLIARD J. (D) 35524362 641 PFC
7 NALL, JOHN C. JR. 34596506 641 SGT
7 NELSON, REDDAR G. (D) 36706445 766 TEC 5
7 PITTINATO, MATTHEW J. 36545447 641 PFC
7 SAMPER, ALFRED 15359642 595 TEC 5
7 SMITH, FOSTER W. 33597960 641 TEC 5
7 SMITH, RICHARD L. 45618842 674 SGT
7 SPINICELLI, JOSEPH L. 12151321 766 TEC 5
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
Aug. 10, 1993 Page 4
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
8 AUBREY, WILFRED,H, 12173502 766 TEC 4
8 CARDIFF, ROBERT L. (D) 36950716 641 PFC
8 CHAPANDY, ANTHONY F. 35385789 766 TEC 3
8 DUBIK. MICHAEL 12202828 521 PFC
8 DUNFIELD, WILLIAM B. 397263g7 641 PFC
8 FISKE. ROBERT E. 11020932 674 T/SGT
8 GRIEME, WILIAM F. 32963073 766 TEC 5
8 JACKSON, PAUL 18132323 776 TEC 5
8 KASPERSKI, EDWIN C. 32732588 521 PFC
8 MASTERS, JAMES L. 34517132 641 PFC
8 McDOUGAL, HUGH B. (D) 37341185 674 S/SGT
8 NATION, ROY (D) 35573656 641 PFC
8 POPOVICH, STEVE G. 36701465 766 S/SGT
8 ROSENBERG, FREDERICK W. 35538584 641 SGT
8 SILVIA, EDWARD P. 31223273 766 TEC 5
8 SLEEPER, NORMAN D. 31339183 675 PFC
8 SMITH, CARROLL A. 13137571 595 S/SGT
8 SPENSER, ABRAHAM 32340351 674 SGT
8 STRASSMAN, SOLOMON E. 32341422 667 TEC 5
8 VINCENT, CLARENCE E. 35747708 641 PFC
8 WALSH, JOHN R. 36402388 650 TEC 5
9 BARNETT, RAYMON8D L. 38542770 521 PFC
9 BERGMANN, GEORGE W. 32697048 650 PFC
9 BIRKS, RAYMOND G. 35313076 766 TEC 3
9 BURKE, JOHN F., JR. 31208158 766 PVT
9 COOPER, JOHN W. 33578764 667 SGT
9 COTTLE, JOHN 36632966 641 SGT
9 DALTON, ROBERT J (D) 32533071 766 TEC 5
9 FERREIRA, HERMAN 31223398 766 S/SGT
9 GEP~SBSACH, PAUL A. 13153720 674 S/SGT
GILLISPIE, JOHN L. 35642278 521 PVT
9 JACKSON, LEE A. 380858Q8 521 PFC
9 KEADLE, WILLIAM R. 13119298 674 TEC 5
9 MAZE, JAMES A. 34587745 641 TEC 5
9 NEWMAN, EDWARD 15013981 595 T/SGT
9 PARKER, CLYDE 34596076 650 PFC
9 PUGH, LESTER L. 3352S7134 595 S/SGT
9 RAND, WESLEY E. 20112905 766 TEC 4
9 RIDER, THOMAS F., JR. 12211594 650 PFC
9 SHUR3EN, FRANK A. 385898Q3 521 PFC
9 VARJENSKY, VINCENT M. 11072045 595 TEC 5
9 VELASCO, EDWARD A. 39097481 766 TEC 5
AGL TOPERCER, ALBERT 36355258 648 CPL
AGL 1 ADDISON, JULIUS C. 34649345 345 PFC
AGL 1 FRANCIS, BILLIE R. 38626452 776 PFC
AGL 1 NIELSEN, MILO W. 17040708 245 PFC
AGL 1 RATTIE, THEODORE E. 19193159 755 S/SGT
AGL 10ANDERSON, WALTER T. 1715,462 776 PFC
AGL 10GRECO, JOHN A. (D) 34636948 345 PFC
AGL 10STENRUD, INGVALD J. 36275195 755 S/SGT
AGL 11CARNOHAN, LESTER G. 33126347 755 S/SGT
AGL 11TOTARO, VINCENT D 325067~7 756 GPL
AGL 12PANKIEWICZ, CHARLES L. 12171973 648 CPL
AGL 12SOMERS, WILLARD E. 37441038 345 PFC
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
Aug. 10, 1993 Page 5
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
AGL 12THOMAS, CLAYTON L. 13093698 345 PFC
AGL 13HOLSTROM, HOLLAND L. 37003669 345 PFC
AGL 13STINEMIRE, ALVIN H. 42016070 755 CPL
AGL 13TRIMBLE, SAMUEL M., JR. 32749899 756 S/SGT
AGL 2 BARNES, CLIFFORD F. 34649045 345 PFC
AGL 2 DUNN, THOMAS F. 32222779 759 S/SGT
AGL 2 GUZMAN, WILIAM 39562636 756 SGT
AGL 3 CAIN, VIRGIL D. 35745334 345 PFC
AGL 3 HARRINGTON, ARTHUR 36718997 756 CPL
AGL 3 STRATTON, HUBERT W. 18045367 755 S/SGT
AGL 4 BADEKER, HEINZ M 39045786 245 PFC
AGL 4 CHAMBLISS, FREDERICK 84802782 345 PFC
AGL 4 DAVIS PAUL 13044382 756 CPL
AGL 4 MERRITT, KENNETH L. 6880931 755 S/SGT
AGL 5 BAUGH, JAY G. 17175703 776 PFC
AGL 5 COLLIER, PAUL M. 33530968 345 PFC
AGL 5 TOOCH, RICHARD M. 3 755 S/SGT
AGL 6 BAGGAN, THOMAS C. 32695042 667 PVT
AGL 6 LaCROIX, SAM H. 38387669 756 CPL
AGL 6 WATTERS, WILLIAM 33418112 766 S/SGT
AGL 7 DAVIS, HENRY E. 34230008 345 PFC
AGL 7 MILLER, JOHN S. 13080142 756 S/SGT
AGL 8 LILLY, PHILIP A. 31368209 345 PFC
AGL 8 NEURSE, BERNARD B. 35449112 755 S/SGT
AGL 8 RUSSELL, MILLARD A. (D) 15329310 756 CPL
AGL 9 BLUNT, ROBERT F. 1716,2286 776 PFC
AGL 9 GORDON, JOE H. 38394658 345 PFC
HQ CARPENTER, RICHARD E. 16008233 641 PFC
HO CHAIT, HAROLD 6973961 766 M/SGT
HO CHEANEY, RUSSELL E. 35485996 521 PVT
HQ CHRISTENSON, DALMAR (D) 171066S1 648 TEC 5
HQ COSGROVE, EDWARD J. (D) 6944842 585 1ST SGT
HQ DONOVAN, TIMOTHY J. 11054239 821 S/SGT
HQ FACTOR, ROBERT C. 35539981 060 TEC 5
HQ FELIX, JAMES M. 16126096 648 S/SGT
HQ GARNER, JAMES A. 35535920 521 PFC
HQ GOULD, ELTON S. 12090895 648 TEC 4
HQ GRANT, JOSEPH R. 15372668 766 PFC
HQ GREENBERG, HAROLD A. 13096018 405 TEC 5
HQ GREGORY, EUGENE H. 15396185 097 TEC 4
HQ IANNOTTI, HERMAN J. 32293611 641 PFC
HQ KEITH, GEORGE W. 6152033 014 TEC 5
HQ KENDRICK, THOMAS H. 34686125 675 PVT
HQ KOCH, WILLIAM R. 20820623 521 PVT
HQ MAHER, MARTIN H. 31223800 014 TEC 5
HQ MATRESE, SALVADOR P. 33461656 050 PFC
HQ MATUSESKI, DAVID A. 37567312 345 TEC 5
HQ MENCONI, LAWRENCE J. 36726922 014 SGT
HQ MICKLE, CHARLEY F. 34704307 641 PVT
HQ MORROW ROBERT H. 12085508 521 PFC
HQ MOYER, EDGBERT A. 32553362 060 TEC 4
HQ NEWCOMER, DONALD R. 13089738 766 PVT
HQ NOYES, EDWARD A. 11085557 835 TEC 5
HQ O'KEEFE, JOHN F. 32532999 014 TEC 4
Aug. 10, 1993
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
HQ OVERSKEI, GRAYDON J. 37547242 511 TEC 4
HQ PETERS, FRANK 6939074 014 TEC 4
HQ POLLOCK, CHARLES J. 35207898 014 TEC 4
HQ POPERNICK, RUDOLPH 16071110 060 TEC 5
HQ POVIAC, STEVE J. 35026773 060 TEC 4
HQ ROSSETTI, VICTOR A. (D) 35615021 014 TEC 4
HQ SALLACK, THEODORE 12160~50 766 TEC 4
HQ SANDERS, CHARLES A., JR. 33412940 060 TEC 5
HQ SANDROCK, ELLSWORTH S. 33177766 521 PVT
HQ SAUNDERS, DAVID R. 20367256 060 PVT
HQ SHREVE, CLIFFORD 35259511 060 TEC 5
HQ SHUTT, WILLIAM B. 33012558 821 T/SGT
HQ SMITH,TED 38158341 870 SGT
HQ STANCIL, KARL E. 6968030 824 S/SGT
HQ TVERDOSI, JOHSN A. 35301138 521 PVT
HQ VENTURELLA, SALVATORE V. 13110419 055 TEC 3
HQ VOSS, FREDERICK W. 32823467 075 TEC 4
HQ WEBER, JOSEPH 37413178 835 TEC 5
HQ WERNICK, GARY J. 12161737 667 PFC
HO WITHAM, OWEN S. 312216511 521 PFC
SFC BROTEN, EDWARD L. 36255901 766 TEC 4
SFC DICKERSON, WADE D 11080119 641 TEC 5
SFC EDWARDS, ERNEST 68517759 521 PFC
SFC McCLELLAN, HARRY A. 13145433 641 PFC
SFC 1 BAILEY, MARSHALL B. 6738987 641 TEC 4
SFC 1 GRUA, ELVINO 36479565 776 TEC 3
SFC 1 MARSHALL, JOHN R. 17078616 345 PVT
SFC 1 THORNTON, ROBERT L. (D) 36478554 775 TEC 4
SFC 1 WUEST, BRYAN J. 36477653 641 PVT
SFC 2 CIANCI, RUDOLPH 31291353 641 PVT
SFC 2 HARMAN, ROBERT F. 33618511 641 PVT
SFC 2 HATCH, HENRY O. 26582976 761 PFC
SFC 2 LICH, ROBERT F. 36478556 766 TEC 5
SFC 2 ORR, WARREN J. 36478364 776 SGT
SFC 3 GOSSMAN, MILTON C. 36583232 641 TEC 5
SFC 3 JOHNSON, RALPH L. 36649381 761 TEC 4
SFC 3 POLIFRONI, NICHOLAS J. 32773458 641 PFC
SFC 3 SHANAHAN, HAROLD L. 36478540 766 SGT
SFC 3 SILVER, JOSEPH 338025~3 776 PVT
SFC 3 STOFKO, JOHN J., SR. 35143985 776 TEC 4
SFC 4 FUNK, CARL L. 36741916 766 TEC 5
SFC 4 GOODWIN, JOSEPH R. 32825761 761 SGT
SFC 4 MARCIC, NICK V. 33404512 650 PVT
SFC 4 McCASLAND, NORMAN A. (D) 36478450 641 PVT
SFC 4 ROSS, GENE L. 3751186~ 776 TEC 4
SFC 5 BYRD, NORMAN R. 34547653 761 TEC 4
SFC 5 CHRISTAKOS, JOHN 36478471 776 TEC 5
SFC 5 COLLETTI, LeROY J. 36739734 641 PFC
SFC 5 FOSHAY, GLENN E. 36478g32 776 SGT
SFC 6 BAUR, KENNETH C. 34612173 641 PFC
SFC 6 GOODMAN, REX 36478895 776 SGT
SFC 6 KUEHNE, BENEDICT 32771775 776 TEC 5
SFC 6 MacFARLANE, DALTON H. 36810834 641 PVT
SFC 6 McOERMOTT, WILBUR J. (D) 36584394 641 PFC
Aug. 10 9 1993
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE
SFC 6 VOLLENWEIDER, JOHN A. 32773210 761 SGT
SFC 7 ALLEN, IVAN G. 36808834 641 PVT
SFC 7 BOGGS, WILLIAM D. 39338624 776 PFC
SFC 7 COLE, REUBEN D. 31266027 641 TEC 5
SFC 7 LOWING, HOWARD L. 36649990 776 SGT
SFC 7 MARTIN, ANTHONY 20015255 761 SGT
SFC 7 ROBERTS, WILLIAM R. 34890191 641 PFC
SFC 8 BROWN, ELLIS C. 17151869 766 TEC 5
SFC 8 DOBSON, GERALD 3681S0364 641 TEC 5
SFC 8 HIGGINS, LURTON L. 36741175 776 SGT
SFC 8 MAXWELL, HARRY W. 36477072 766 TEC 4
SFC 8 NUGENT, ALFRED J. 32773305 641 TEC 5
SFC 8 STRASSER, RAYMOND C. 32753597 776 TEC 5
SFC 9 BALLING, CHARLES H. 36740235 761 TEC 4
SFC 9 CARLSON, CARL B. 356741742 776 SGT
SFC 9 COLATUTTO, NICOLAS R. ? 776 TEC 5
SFC 9 NIELSEN, KENNETH B. 36650708 641 TEC 5
OFFICERS 295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
BLAKE, BENJAMIN S., JR. 0415648 FA
DOLING, CLAUDE O. 01287325 AC (INF)
FOX, VINCENT W. 01643552 SC (COMDG)
FEENY, SAMUEL C. 01287334 AC (INF)
HART, THOMAS W. 01643648 SC
HERM, ABRAHAM L. 0367043 FA
HIRE, ROBERT L. 0561280 AC
HOWELL, HOWARD L. 01645680 SC (EXEC)
JENSEN, WALTER H. 01175756 FA
KORNBLUM, IRA 01170454 FA
LENTZ, JAMES E. 01171644 FA
NORTH, ROBERT C. 0578735 AC
ROFKAR, PAUL H. 0343414 FA
SIMON, LEROY S. 0416179 FA
WENTZEL, NICHOLAS W. 034g217 FA
WICK, HENRY C., III 0315152 FA
AMICK, JAMES M. 0574735 AC
BERNARDO, DOMINIC B. 0449655 AC (INF)
BROOKIE, FRANK S. 01178032 FA
BURGE, ROBERT L. 0416381 FA
CASH, CLAYTON R. 01640841 SC
CAUFIELD, JAMES H. 0549948 FA
ELDRIDGE MANNING A. 01645549 SC
GILLESPIE, THOMAS B. 0438986 AC (INF)
GILLIAM, CHARLES O. 01643587 SC
GRANTON, JOHN 01634818 SC
HAWLEY, WAYNE E. 01636327 SC
HILZ, JOHN F. 0577922 AC
KINSAUL, JAMES R. 01175767 FA
KRUIDENIER, EDWARD D. 01298248 AC (INF)
LOVORN, RICHARD T. 01645772 SC
PORTER, JESSE L. 01294189 AC (INF)
REPP, ROY W. 01645g40 SC
SAWYER, ROBERT P 01647389 SC
TREMPER, CLAUDE S. 01647389 SC
VANDERPOOL, HENRY N. 01307593 AC (INF)
JENKS, JAMES E. 02023331 AC
KOONTZ, HARRISON B. 01643767 SC
WARRANT OFFICER (JG)
SCHROEDER, GEORGE R. W2120854
GAVIN, CHESTER, JR. USNR 103807
MATHON, BENJAMIN D. USNR171137
MEYTHALER, VIRGIL W. USNR 162936
CHARLES, THOMAS E. USNR 188714
DANNING, CURTIS B. USNR 224768
DETWILER, JOHN T. USNR 269568
FURBEE, JAMES W. USNR 336811
HARRIS, MELVIN R. USNR 312152
HERRICK, ROBERT H. USNR 228649
KARNOPKY, SAMUEL USNR 228077
LARSON, HARVEY L. USNR 269895
McDIARMID, WILLIAM S. USNR 224697
WOOD, JOHN N. USNR 226302
WOODS, WARREN USNR 270441
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