295th JASCO
ENIWETOK		LINGAYEN GULF
KWAJALEIN		PALAWAN
MAJURO		MALABANG-PARANG
SAIPAN		ZAMBOANGA

   This history is based on official War Department documents and personal accounts.  We are anxious to contact anyone who served in the 295 JASCO, or individuals in units to which we were attached.  We are in need of the following information:

    -Which teams went on which operations. Names, etc.
    -Elements to which we were attached, dates, etc.
    -Ship names and numbers.
    -Any official documents concerning our organization (copies).
    -KIA and WIA information.
    -Awards and Citations.
    -Navy, Air Corps and Artillery personnel, etc.
    -Anything you want to share with us.

Please contact us with information at:

Alfred Samper Ph.D.
1316 N. Cross Street
Wheaton, IL 60187
630-668-6044
Email: samper@cdnet.cod.edu

For Reunion information please contact:

Clifford & Mildred Long 
815 Tangerine Woods Blvd.
Englewood FL 34223-6027
941-474-5143

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Unit Citation

General Orders

Company Roster

A Brief History of 295th Jasco

    UNIT HISTORY OF THE
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

The 295th Signal Company (Special) was activated 3 April 1943 at Camp Bradford, Virginia in accordance with T/O & 2 11 517S, dated 9 September 1942.(l) The Commanding Officer at the time of activation was Capt. P. B. Whittemore Cadre of approximately 20 EM.

The mission of this organization was to furnish beach communications during the assault phase of an infantry division’s amphibious landing operation.

As the result of lessons learned in amphibious landings in North Africa and Sicily, the Joint chiefs of staff decided to reorganize companies of the above type in order that certain specialist personnel, particularly for the control of the supporting naval fire for these operations, be included.

At Camp Bradford, Va., the company participated in amphibious training and training in specialist communication subjects. Four officers and seventy-four enlisted men were placed on DS to Alliance,.Nebraska, in June 1943, to operate communications for umpires in airborne troop maneuvers.

1st Lt. I. R. Obenchain assumed command of the organization 15 June 1943. Unit departed Camp Bradford, Va., 3 August 1943 and arrived U.S. Naval Amphibious Training Base, Fort Pierce, Fla., 4 August 1943.

Company underwent amphibious training with Engineer Combat Group at Fort Pierce, Fla., and took specialist and unit training.

Communication teams of unit participated in amphibious landings in the Solomon Islands, Chesapeake Bay, Md., in September and October 1943.

Unit departed Fort Pierce, Fla., 8 October 1943 and arrived camp Pickett, Va., 10 October 1943.

The 295th Signal Company (Special) was reorganized as a Joint Assault Signal Company, hereafter referred to as JASCO, on 11 November 1943,. under T/O and T/E, 11 147 Signal, dated 21 October 1943, with all changes. The organization consisted, briefly, of the following:

a. Headquarters platoon with a commanding officer, executive officer, supply officer, sixty nine (69) Army enlisted men and five (5) Navy enlisted men.

b. Shore Fire Control Section with nine (9) Field Artillery officers in grade of captain; nine (9) Naval officers in grade of lieutenant (sg); forty five (45) Army enlisted men.

c. The Air Liaison Section with thirteen (13) Army Air officers in grade of captain; thirty nine (39) Army Air Force enlisted men.

d. Shore Party Communication, Section with ten (10) Signal Corps officers in grade of first lieutenant; one hundred ninety (190) enlisted men.

e. Strength of 34 O's, 1 WO, 343 EM, 9 Naval O's, and 115 Naval EM.

10 .naval officers and 115 Naval EM attached to unit per ltr orders FE 25.7, P16-3/00/MM Serial 2401 ATB Camp Bradford, Va., dated 18 November 1943.

Unit staged for overseas movement and company time devoted mainly to completion of all firing and training.

Departed Camp Pickett, Va., 5 December 1943 For Port of Embarkation; arrived Camp Stoneman, California, 11 December 1943; and sailed from San Francisco Port of Embarkation 27 December 1943.

Arrived Pearl Harbor, T.H., 6 January: 1944 and stationed at Schofield Barracks, T.H., 7 January 1944.

Elements of organization departed Schofield Barracks 23 January 1944 for Marshall Islands invasion. Unit participated in landings at Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Majuro in the Marshalls. (2) The return of the unit's detachments was completed 8 March 1943.

Remainder of company participated in simulated amphibious landings and specialized training.

115 Navy EM relieved from attachment and transferred to Fifth Amphibious Force, c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, per VO Fifth Amphibious Force (21 April 1944).

Between the 7th and 28th of April 1944, elements of the organization engaged in amphibious maneuvers with two regiments of the 27th Infantry Division.

On 18 May the tactical elements of the company accompanied the division on a final dress rehearsal, returning to Oahu 25th May.

This tactical echelon of the 295th JASCO had a strength of 42 Officers and 335 EM (including 82 EM attached from the 27th Infantry Division). Combat elements sailed from Pearl Harbor, between 28 ,May and 1 June 1944.(3) The company headquarters composed the rear echelon of 2 officers, 1 .WO and 43 EM. Awards, decorations, and casualty lists attached. (4&5)

Rear echelon moved from Schofield Barracks to Fort Kamehameka, T.H., 18 May 1944 and was attached to Rear Echelon, 27th Infantry Division.

Roar Echelon embarked and sailed from Honolulu, T.H., 28 July 1944, and arrived in Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides 8 August 1944 and erected camp site in preparation for the return of combat elements from Saipan, Mariannas Islands. Combat elements of JASCO sailed from Saipan on 22 August 1944 and arrived Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, 6 September 1944.

Attached EM from the 27th Infantry Division reverted back to their organization 6 August 1944.

Unit relieved assignment Central Pacific Base Command and assigned to South Pacific Base Command 8 August 1944.

Informal ceremony held 14 September 1944 for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. Troops commended for Saipan operation. Entire JASCO participated.

Company followed no set training schedule as time was to be spent in rest, recuperation, and repairing of equipment.

Company alerted for movement to staging area in preparation for Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, P.I., operation.

On 14 October 1944, 88 EM were attached to unit from 27th Infantry Division. 33 additional EM were assigned as replacements on the same date.

Company sailed from Espiritu Santo 15 October 1944 and arrived at Bougainville, Soloman Islands where unit was relieved from 27th Infantry Division and attached to XIV Corps 19 October 1944.

Company time mainly spent in construction of camp area; firing on range from 8 through 10 November 1944; inspection and repair of organizational property, clothing, and equipment. Off-duty hours were devoted to organized athletics.

Company alerted for movement 30 November 1944. Combat elements were attached to the 37th Infantry Division for the Luzonoperation. One officer and 6 EM comprised rear echelon at Bougainville.

Combat elements loaded between 10th and 15th December and sailed from Bougainville 16 December 1944. Arrived Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Unit Philippine Islands 9 January 1945 and assault forces landed at 0930.(6)

One EM attached from 27th Division suffered a gunshot wound in the arm. No other casualties.

Company time spent in setting up bivouac area, perimeter defense in Binmaley, and military police duties in Port Saul, San Fabian, and Binmaley.

Organization relieved from attachment to XIV Corps and attached to ASCOM, Sixth Army 22 January 1945.

Major Irving R. Obenchain, 024658, relieved from assignment and transferred to GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area. Captain Vincent W. Fox, 01643552, assumed command of organization on 6 February 1945.

Unit sailed from Lingayen Gulf, P.I., 8 February 1945 and arrived Mindoro, P.I., 10 February 1945.

Unit relieved from assignment Sixth Army and attachment to ASCOM and assigned to Eight Army and Attached to X Corps 10 February 1945. Unit attached to 24th Infantry Division 11 February 1945. Relieved from attachment to X Corps and further attachment 24th Infantry Division and attached to 41st Infantry Division 22 February 1945.

Rear Echelon from Bougainville, S.I., joined organization at Mindoro on 25 February 1945.

Two Army, officers, 3 Navy officers, and 24 EM attached to 186th RCT, 41st Inf Div on 26 February 1945 in preparation for Palawan, P.I., V 3 operation.(7) These men returned to Mindoro for duty with organization on 4 March 1945.

Eighteen (18) officers and 101 EM were dropped from the assigned strength of the organization and accounted for on separate morning, report of Detachment #;1, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) 6 March 1945 for the V-4, Zamboanga operation. D-Day was on 10 Marc1945.(8) Awards and decorations.

(9) Relieved from attachment with 41st Inf Div and attached to 24th Infantry, Division 7March 1945.

Detachment #1, 295th JASCO, accounted for on morning report of 295th Joint Assault Signal Company 30March 1945.

Attached EM from 27th Inf Div relieved attachment and transferred back to original units 15 March 1945.

Unit relieved attachment to ASCOM and attached to Eight Army for further attachment toX Corps 10 February 1945.

Unit alerted for V 5 (Mindanao) operation in early April 1945. Four officers, one warrant officer, and 102 EM composed the rear echelon of this organization at Mindoro, P.I., for the V-5 operation. Remainder of unit composed of approximately 30 officers and 223 EM, sailed from Mindoro, P.I., 14 April 1945; arrived Polloc Harbor,Parang, Mindanao, P.I., on 17 April 1945.(9)

Unit reorganized and equipped, effective 26 April 1945, under T/O and E11-147S(30 December 1944) pursuant to authority USAFFE letter, FEGC 322, dated 1° April 1945, Subject: Reorganization of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company Under Latest T/O and E, and General Order No 86 Hq Sixth Army, 26 April 1945.(10)

Wire teams operated and maintained communications in X Corps CP area.

Unit cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, from 17 April 1945 to 1 July 1945 per General Order No 82, Hq X Corps, 11 July 1945.(11)

Lt. (jg) Warren B. Woods, 270441, USNR, WIA Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 3 May 1945. 1st Lt. James M. Amick, 0574735, WIA Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 4 June 1945.

Two officer and 17 EM from rear echelon at Mindoro, P.I., joined the organization 4 June 1945 at Parang;, Mindanao.

Company headquarters sailed from Polloc Harbor, Mindanao, 5 June 1945 Arrived Bugo (Del Monte) Mindanao 7 June 1945 where combat elements returned to company headquarters between Both and 25th June 1945. Awards and decorations(4)

Twenty one officers and 170 EM departed for TDB Amphibious Training Group, Cubic Bay, Luzon, P.I., 1 July 1945.

Unit sailed from Bugo, Mindanao, 4 July 1945 and arrived Zamboanga, Mindanao, 5 July 1945. Remainder of rear echelon joined organization at Zamboanga 5 July 1945.

Unit relieved from attachment Eighth Army and further attachment to X Corps and reverted to duty under assignment to Sixth Army.

Time spent vainly in erection of camp area.

First contingent of 20 EM eligible for release under Readjustment Regulations departed for Disposition Center on 16 July 1945.

Officers and EM on TDB Amphibious Training Group, Cubic Bay, Luzon, P.I., returned to duty 24 July 1945.

Major Vincent W. Fox, 01643552, (Commanding Officer), duty and command to TDB United States 45 days on 1 August 1945. Captain Thomas W. Hart, 01643648, assumed command of company same date.

Twelve Air Liaison officers and 38 EM dropped from the assigned strength of organization morning report and accounted for on morning report of Air Liaison Section, 295th JASCO, initiated 8 August 1945.

Second contingent of 13 EM eligible for separation from the service departed for Disposition Center 16 August 1945.

Unit relieved from control of Sixth Army and passed to control of Army Forces Western Pacific effective 20 August 1945, and further assigned to HQ Southern Islands Area Command, APO 952, and attached to 368th RCT,. APO 717, effective 20 August 1945.

Seven remaining; Naval officers relieved assignment and assigned to COMSERVPAC, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 24 September 1945.

Captain Thomas W. Hart relieved of duty and command attached unassigned to 28th Replacement Depot, APO 318, 26 September 1945, for separation from the service under readjustment regulations.

Twenty officers relieved assignment and attached unassigned to 28th Replacement Depot, APO 318, 26 September 1945, for separation from the service under readjustment regulations.

Captain Leroy S. Simon, 0416179, FA, assumed command of the company.

Eight EM over 90 points relieved assignment and attached unassigned to Disposition Center, APO 318, effective 10 October 1945.

Six EM, 38 years of age or over, relieved assignment and attached unassigned to Disposition Center, APO 318, effective 10 October 1945.

Eight EM under 60 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th(EI) Rad Team, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 17 October 1945.

Eleven EM under 60 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th(DB) Msg Cen, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 17 October 1945.

Thirty Five EM 60 to 69 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th (DB) MC, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 20 October 1945.

One hundred and eighty five EM relieved assignment and assigned Hq 31st Infantry Division, APO 31, effective 17 October 1945.

Pursuant to authority contained in General Order 217, GHQ AFWESPAC, APO 707, dtd 10 October 1945, unit inactivated. No personnel assigned, attached unassigned or atchd from other organizations. Effective 10 October 1945.

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ENIWETOK

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

APO 957

18 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Report on Downside Operation

TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

        We left Pearl Harbor 23 January 1944 and sailed to Kwajalein Atoll. Here on 31 January and 1 February, 1944, the Army and Marines began their attack on Japs installed there. Our regiment, the 106th Inf was held in reserve to all operations within the atoll but as the operations went better than expected, we were not committed. However, we were constantly on the alert for an immediate movement to locations where reinforcements were necessary.

       After the Kwajalein Atoll was secured, we sailed on to Eniwetok for the Downside Operation. Here we were committed on 19 February 1944 on the island of Eniwetok. We were to go ashore in the fifth wave. The type of craft used were LVT’s or Alligators. To get into these craft we were transferred to an LST the night of 18 February and here set about loading our equipment into LVT’’s prior to the push in the morning.

      At 0745, 19 February, we roared out the front of the LST and joined other LVT's in our wave. There was only a very short rendezvous, not in circles but in about 100 yards advances toward the beach. At approximately 0945 our LVT first hit the coral and its bow reared up into the air, only to be struck by some sort of Jap shell in her bow. We shipped water very rapidly but due to the fact that we had touched the beach, it didn't sink. They took the LVT up out of the water and here on a beach, no more than 50' wide and 15 or so feet high, we unloaded. The greatest difficulty here was getting our equipment out of the LVT and onto dry land. The men were exposed about 12 feet above the beach as they put the equipment over the side of the LVT.

     We were originally ordered to land on beach Yellow II but were landed about 200 yards north of this location in very hostile territory. Here we met the 8th team completely set up and operating under all kinds of enemy fire. After a trip on two up and down the beach, I located the Shore Party Commander on his proper beach. We immediately moved all men and equipment of the 9th team to this location and set up our radio and switchboard.

      It had been planned by the Regiment Commanding Officer that we we would work one radio station in a three station net, consisting of one station at Yellow Beach I, one at Yellow Beach II, and one on board the AP40. It was approximately five minutes after we moved to our new location that our radio was set up and transmitting. There were several urgent messages awaiting transmission and as the battalion Signal section had been blown up while still in the water, we were practically the only means of communication from this beach to the transport.

      The transport did not have sufficient radio equipment nor personnel to man the frequency assigned to us so we received no answer. In fact we never did receive and answer for all of the four days that we were on the beach. However, we retuned our transmitter and receiver and sent the traffic to the AP40 over the regimental command net which was manned on the APA. We used this frequency and net throughout the operation. Wire was installed in short time and we had very little trouble on our local lines. However, the lateral line and the line to the inland battalion were constantly being removed from service by LVT's and bulldozers crossing the very narrow, steep beach. We ran many lines laterally before the area was secured to the extent of putting wire overhead. A great deal of trouble was encountered by foot troops on the island from hidden Jap snipers, so linemen were not ordered to climb and put wire overhead until the area had been secured and mopped up. Our 536 local net was useless as the frequency of the 536's were the same or very near to the SFC net and interference was terrific. The shore party commander did not desire the use of this net as all installations were so close together on our very limited beach, so we did not use them. We did not use all of our EE8A's on installation. On the third day ashore the inland battalion drew same from us for use inland. Shortly afterward we set up a signal dump on a bulldozer sled and issued equipment to the inland battalion as they needed it. Panels, our BD 71, extra wire, empty rubber bags,flags, batteries, signal lamp and other signal equipment salvaged from the beach were put in this dump. Our second 284 was given to the Commanding Officer of the inland battalion within about five hours of landing as his had all been destroyed.

      At night all men were dug in and blacked out and very little activity was in progress. Telephone operated all the time and radio very infrequently.

     From my observations of our activities and our surroundings, I would like to make the following suggestions for improvement of our operation toward fulfilling our mission:

     1. Our 284 radios are too large and bulky to get ashore as safely as could 610's which could be carried by less personnel and carried on the personnel at all times, therefore lessening the exposure to enemy fire during the period of unloading on the beach. We need our own personnel manning our radios on board ship to insure contact when it is most vital. 610's are voice radios which are used principally on landings and the range satisfactorily covers the distance between ship and shore stations. 130 assault wire is desired for its small bulk and ease in handling both in landing and setting up. In the whole four day operations we used less than 2 1/2 mile of wire and our lines were being replaced time after time all day long. A lighter type of switchboard would expedite unloading and make it much easier to dig in. The deep dry sand is quite difficult to maintain a deep hole in especially with huge explosions rocking the islands continually. No use of telegraph was made which eliminates the necessity of the repeater coils. Light wire and switchboards require less equipment to supplement them such as reel units.

     Our 03 rifles were issued for use with the grenade launcher but as we had no occasion to use this weapon, they could easily be omitted. Firing of grenades would have only resulted in killing our own troops in all directions inland and laterally. These weapons are clumsy for defense in a foxhole where our primary danger existed. Either carbines or TSMG's or .45 cal pistols would be more satisfactory, the ideal situation being nearly obtained if a11 weapons be alike for simplicity in obtaining ammunition. The above mentioned weapons can be fired rapidly and have a greater capacity than 03 rifle and are easier to use. Our waterproof covering were God-sends to us as sand and water were constantly jamming up unprotected weapons. On the trip from ship to shore, the LVT was flooded many times but our weapons and equipment were kept bone dry by our protective rubber bags and covers.

     In conclusion, I noted that throughout the invasion, it was not too difficult to accomplish our mission but with lighter, smaller equipment, we could have done a more efficient job not only as regards materials and supplies but in safeguarding the lives of our men.

                                                                                                                                                                                                Roy W. REPP
2nd Lt., 295th JASCO
Team 9

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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
18 March 1944

SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations Eniwetok Operation.

T0 : Commanding Officer, 295th JASCO.

        BLT 106-3 and attached units sailed from Pearl Harbor 23 Jan and arrived at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands on 29 Jan. After standing by as a floating reserve of this operation, a portion of the  task force, including BLT 106-3, acting on information captured from the Japs, sailed for Eniwetok Atoll. The captured information proved to be correct insofar as military installations were concerned but was not up to date as to the strength of the Jap garrison. Subsequent information revealed by natives on the captured island of Engebi, on Eniwetok Atoll, resulted in a complete revision of plan of attack on the island of Eniwetok as the Jap garrison was considerably larger than anticipated. All assault elements transferred from the transport to LST's on D-l day and on D-day personnel were boated in LVT’s located on the tank decks of the LST's and at 0730 headed for the rendezvous area. Due to the extremely narrow landing beach, waves were divided into small segments, so that each wave consisted of several small waves. Signal Detachment Team #8 was scheduled to land in the first segment of the third wave, but through error landed in the first segment of the first wave at approximately 0910.

        Since the beach was practically deserted, it was assumed initially that the inland battalion had departed inland and the hazards encountered previous to attaining the shelter of the Jap built, 15 foot high fire wall, caused no particular consternation. A large well built hole, dug in the side of the dune offered perfect protection and concealment for the large and bulky switchboards but the project was abandoned when it was determined that the hole contained several homicidally inclined Japs. All the installations were then dug in closer to the water's edge, all of which spots were later found to be directly under the muzzles of a Jap 70 MM Howitzer battery. At approximately H hour plus 30 minutes the 9th Signal Team landed on this same beach and departed south where other elements of their battalion were then landing. Shortly afterward the third battalion shore party landed about 200 yards north of the original beach and established themselves there. It was then decided to move installations closer to the Shore Party and the movement was effected swiftly. The swiftness was probably occasioned by mortar fire to the left, mortar fire to the rear, and hostile small arms fire to the right (inland). Upon reaching the shore party area mortar shells commenced falling like hail stones. The Japs were attempting to hit a large number of DUKW’s which were landing a battalion of Field Artillery and as the shells were falling somewhat short,the shore party was receiving most of the fire.The DUKW’s were driven off about the time the mortar shells were falling approximately 3 or 4 feet from the ditch in which lay most of the Shore Party. After the installations were dug in this time, very little further trouble was encountered except from snipers and marauding Japs who infiltrated at night.

       No difficulty was experienced in getting any message to its destination although it was necessary several times to use nets other than those assigned. Snipers made it impossible to string wire overhead and the tracked vehicles constantly cut the lateral and inland telephone lines. Radio was the only dependable means of communication for the first 2 days and there was no failure of this medium. However the U.S.S. Custer failed to respond on the Army Ship-Shore net and after 3 days, this radio was turned over to the battalion to replace one of theirs which had burned out a generator. The Custer responded properly on the Navy Ship-Shore net. The erstwhile lateral net radio was tuned to the frequency of the Regimental Command Net and some traffic was sent out over this net. Most of the traffic was received and sent over the Inland radio which was an SCR 195 furnished by the Infantry. On about the third day wire was placed overhead and no further repairs were necessary. There was no delay of any kind in delivering messages to destinations as all were clear text and sent vocally. Encoding or CW would have occasioned some delay and virtually all messages were urgent in the assault phase.
        On the fifth day all equipment was turned over to the Regimental  Communication Officer and attached Assault Units sailed for Pearl Harbor.

RECOMMENDATIONS

        1. The B0-71 and/or BO-72 should be replaced by the special assault switchboard weighing only a few pounds. The weight and bulk of the normal switchboard make it extremely unmanageable for assault work under fire.

        2. The regular Inland, and Navy Ship Shore Nets should be retained but the Lateral Net should have its own PERSONNEL & RADIO ABOARD SHIP as the ships are generally unreliable.

        3. The SCR 284 should be supplanted by some small, compact, battery ' "-I. The Sea 284-should be supplanted by some small, compact, battery , operated set which can be unloaded easily and set up quickly, such as the SCR 610. Lack of versatility would be offset by the above mentioned shipboard installation which would have all nets available.

        4. W130-B should be issued in lieu of W110-B as the latter is too bulky and heavy for temporary assault installation. The prime consideration, however, is for the safety of the men who have to unload all this bulk under enemy fire.

        5. The Thompson Sub Machine Gun appears to be far superior to the Carbine for use by Signal men. It is much less susceptible to stoppage from sand and is much easier to handle from a fox hole. The '03 rifle is useless as its grenade launcher cannot be used successfully except by assault infantry. Highly recommend men be armed with pistol in addition to Tommy Guns.

        6. Each man should have at least twenty dollars in order that he may purchase items from the ship’s store, and buy chits for use in the ship's barber shop, and the ship's soda fountain - mostly the latter as it is a long, hot, trip.

        7. Men should have locks for Duffle bags as there is considerable pilfering, but there was no case of a locked Duffle bag being slit and robbed.

        8. CHAP-STICKS should be an item of issue. Most men suffered from lack of this or similar preparation.

CHARLES C. GILLIAM
1st Lt., Sig C

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HEADQUARTERS 27th INFANTRY DIVISION
A.P.O. #957

c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA                                                                                                                                           19 March 1944

S E C R E T

Subject: Report on Use of Air Support, Eniwetok Island, 19-21 February 1944

To:  Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, APO 958,
           c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. (THRU: Channels)

       1. A total of eighteen (18) air strikes were performed in close support of the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, at ENIWETOK Island on 19-21 February 1944. All these missions were flown in response to requests from the Battalion Commander through his Air Liaison Officer. It is believed that this is the most extensive use of close air support at the call of a single battalion for a comparable period of time on record in this theater.

       Air bombardment was conducted in areas in front of the infantry to blast enemy positions. Frequently, these target areas were selected in advance of artillery or naval gunfire, thereby alleviating the necessity for ceasing that supporting fire to permit air strikes. The target charts were carefully studied by the Battalion Commander and Air Liaison Officer and those areas in advance of the troops that appeared most suited for defensive positions were placed under air bombardment.

        Strafing attacks were performed in preparation for an infantry advance and were conducted as close to friendly front lines as was necessary. All strafing and bombing strikes were accurate, timely, and performed in good order. There were no casualties among friendly troops as a result of our air support in missions called for this battalion. While it was difficult to determine the actual effects of this support because of the complete devastation, it is felt that the strafing and bombing was both destructive and neutralizing, and materially aided the infantry in the accomplishment of its mission.

        Examples:

          (a) Bombs finally silenced enemy mortar fire that had been quite harassing.
          (b) Strafing tended to cause the Japs to run out of the brush to the beaches where they were killed by our troop
          (c) Many bodies were found with large holes in them that very likely were caused by .50 caliber fire.
          (d) Strafing from a dive angle of 45° -60° penetrated the underground installations that were lightly covered and inflicted casualties in them.
          (e) A near-miss uncovered an installation which was observed by the pilot who immediately requested permission to attack. It required not over three (3) minutes to obtain clearance for the attack. This attack was successful in helping to neutralize this area.

      2. APPREHENSION AMONG FRIENDLY TROOPS. Despite the fact that strafing and bombing were extremely accurate, an undue amount of apprehension existed among them as indicated by the following:

         (a) In a strafing attack on 20th of February in support of an advance, a tank commander repeatedly charged that VF fire was hitting his tanks. This was not so, since the Air Liaison Officer was in the front line and observed that the fire was falling sufficiently in front of the tanks. Empty brass was falling among them. Although this was pointed out, the Battalion Commander was finally compelled to order the attack to cease.
         (b) At another instance, troops thinking an air attack was coming beat a hasty retreat some fifty (50) feet as an added safety precaution. This was not necessary and such action is a "dead give-away" to the enemy of what is about to happen.
         (c) In a strafing mission on 21st of February, VF were laying a continuous preparation fire across the battalion front. The Battalion Commander and this officer were in the front lines observing the effects of the attack. Again apprehension was felt by the troops although the fire was definitely observed falling in the area requested. It was necessary for the Air Liaison Officer to persuade the troop commander not to call off the mission, Later, at the commander’s request, the VF were ordered to strafe areas further in advance of the troops. This was accomplished immediately. In this instance, control of aircraft already engaged in a mission was exceptionally well-effected.
          (d) Later, after troops had been accustomed to close support, they gained confidence and moved forward closely behind their supporting air attacks.

           Recommendations. More air ground exercises wherein aircraft bomb and fire in front of the infantry must be conducted prior to an operation. Ground troops should also have an indoctrination course in bomb effects and air support tactics.

           Air Liaison Officers should maintain a position as far forward as practical in order to observe the results of air strikes and to be able to take immediate action in the event of inaccurate bombing or strafing, and also to give CSA any necessary corrections to improve the effect.

      3. COMMUNICATIONS. Radio communication was excellent. The Air Liaison Officer remained forward with the troop commander during all air attacks and communicated with his radio station at the CP by means of SCR 536 radio. In several instances, more effective communication and orientation would have resulted had he been able to talk directly with the Air Coordinator. It was not possible to bring his SCR 193 that far forward.

                      Front line panels were not always displayed. In attacks that were delivered several hundred yards in advance of the line, it was not thought necessary to put them out. They were displayed, however, whenever requested by the air, and whenever close strafing was expected.

       4. COOPERATION. The cooperation of the Battalion Commander was excellent. Missions were suggested by the Air Liaison Officer as frequently as he deemed advisable. These were always accepted by the Battalion Commander with an open mind. From the experience gained in this operation, it is felt that unless the Air Liaison Officer is accepted as an advisor to the Battalion Commander and remains close to him during the operation, many opportunities to use air support effectively will be neglected. Usually a troop commander is busy with his other responsibilities and can not be alert for every opportunity to use air support advantageously. The Air Liaison Officer must constantly suggest the use of air whenever its need is indicated. To do this, the Air Liaison Officer must have prestige in the eyes of the troop commander and his officers and men. One good means of obtaining such prestige is to be well informed on all phases of the air plan, on the capabilities and limitations of aircraft and bombs, on current air support tactics, on the ground plan of operation. He should have his own plan of operation well thought out and make absolutely clear what he can and cannot do, and exactly what assistance and cooperation he must have from the infantry.
                 This officer conducted orientation classes on use of air support while enroute to the objective. He kept himself posted at all times (thru CSA) as to what aircraft were available for missions, weight and number of bombs to be used on each strike, number of aircraft to be employed, when every "pass" in a strike was about to start. He further kept himself posted constantly on the location of the front lines (thru Air Observer) and was able to advise, and sometimes correct, the troop commander. He was always advised when the strike had been completed and passed this information to the troop commander immediately.

         5. PROCEDURE. When q mission was decided upon, the time aircraft would be available was obtained from CSA. The location of the front line was given as accurately as possible. The Battalion Commander would pass the word along to his front line elements to stop and take cover at a certain time, usually about ten (10) minutes before the attack was to commence; panel were displayed in as conspicuous location as possible, i.e., on rear upper level of tanks, in clearings, on beaches, etc. Naval gunfire, tank fire, artillery and mortar fire were stopped if necessary. As soon as the air attack was completed, CSA notified the Air Liaison Officer who was alongside the Battalion Commander and the troops moved forward immediately. This did not hold up the advance of the line unduly in the last strafing mission, troops were moving forward within five minutes after the attack was completed.

          6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

              (a) In strafing, after the effective firing has ceased, a section should make another pass firing a safe distance ahead of the advancing troops for the purpose of deceiving the enemy and keeping him uncertain and pinned down. The Japs were fairly quick t resume their positions on cessation of fire.
               (b) Strafing should be used as close to our front lines as safety permits, but bombing should not be conducted closer than 200 yards to our troops except for extreme cases. One bomb in the wrong place would cause a lack of confidence among all ground troops and tend to nullify the advantage of close support.
               (c) Troop commander must be impressed with the necessity for keeping his line under control if he wishes to use air. Tanks also must be held up or brought back into the line.
               (d) Flotation gear should be provided for AGL equipment. This should include carbon-dioxide inflatable space incorporated into waterproof bags of portable radio equipment.
               (e) Small maps of the area to be attacked, such as the air target and gunnery charts, should be supplied to troop officers. They were constantly using the Air Liaison Officer’s maps rather than their own which were not as easily handled.

            7. The Naval Air personnel who supported this operation should be commended on the organization of their attacks, the dispatch with which they responded to a call for support, and the marksmanship and accuracy with which they executed their missions. The commander of TF 106-3 should be commended upon the manner in which he personally controlled his troops and upon the cooperation with which he received and put into effect the suggestions and requests of the Air Liaison Party.

THOMAS W. HEFFERAN, JR.,
Captain, Air Corps,
Air Liason Officer, TF 106-3

[Identical Document addressed to Regimental and Battalion Commanders over signature of HAROLD F. GREIR
Lt. Colonel, AGD, Adjutant Genera is not reproduced here.]l

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KWAJALEIN

Report of Flint Lock Operation as Observed by Lt. Howell
  17 February 1944

       I embarked aboard APA 55 D-9 days for the flint lock operations. I was attached to BLT 17-3 as a Signal Observer. The following is a report of my observations as they occurred. The conclusion of this report will contain recommendations which I feel will be beneficial in future operations.

      Shortly after the convoy had sailed a conference was held of all Troop Officers and attached Officers by the Battalion Commander and a complete briefing of the ensuing operation was had. The complete operation was described and discussed. The missions of all units concerned were described and opened for discussion. The orders and maps were made available for study. The mission of BLT 17-3 was primarily that of support for BLT 17-1 and 17-2. However alternate plans were also in readiness in case of situation changes. A ship board Training Schedule and areas for training were announced by the Battalion S-3. This schedule included Orientation Periods for Troops by Battalion Staff Officers and members of the JICPOA Team aboard, Physical Training and Training in the use of explosives.

      I observed the Training of the Shore Party Communication team during the trip to the Transport rendezvous area. Other than the Periods of Physical Training time was spent in map study, S.O.I. drills and mission of the team upon landing. The training aboard ship was sufficient to enable the team to set up a beach in a minimum of time. Radio operators were very familiar with call signs and frequencies, wire men were well up on what work would be required of them and message center personnel were drilled in the use of Shackler code and the AWC.

      Prior to D-day hand carried equipment was taken from the small closet which the Shore Party Signal Officer was able to arrange for to store Team equipment in and given to the men assigned to carrying same in. This closet or locker was on the main deck and enabled the team to get to their equipment on short notice. However small pieces of equipment were kept by the troops in their compartments.

      Reveille on D-day was at 0-300 with breakfast at 0330. Small boats were lowered into the water rapidly and circled off the transport waiting for call to their nets. Some of the small boats were davit loaded and the balance net loaded. H-Hour for the assault on Carlos and Carlson Islands was set for 0-930. BLT 17-3 was to be a floating reserve waiting on call from BLT 17-1 and BLT 17-2. All Landing Teams were in the water during the Naval shelling of these two Islands. After the Assault Battalions had landed it was decided that BLT 17-3 would land on Carlos Island. No support being required on either Island.

      Upon landing on Carlos Island in the afternoon of D-day I found that the Shore Party Communication Team attached to BLT 17-1 had set up the necessary beach communication. One Radio (TBX) being operated in the Ship to Shore net. One Radio (SCR 610) operating in the Traffic Boat Control net. And one Radio (SCR 284) maintaining a listening watch in the Rgt Command net. No lateral communicaitons were in operation as there were no adjacent beaches. Communication with the Shore Party Communication team attached to BLT 17-2 on Carlson Island could be had through the Rgt Comd net if necessary. Wire communications with the SPC -Bn Headquarters and O.P. 2 was installed.

      BLT 17-3 was moved toward the southern end of the Island (Island was completely secured at this time) and bivouaced for the night. A beach on the lagoon side fo the Island was found more suitable for landing supplies. The SP Communication Team with BLT 17-3 and Co Commander of the 50th Engr Bn proceeded to set up and make this beach ready for operation. The transport Division had moved into the lagoon at this time. A green light was erected for the right flank marker and a white light was used to mark the left flank. The Naval Section of the beach party proceeded to order the small boats in to shore. First boat load of suppplies moved across this beach at approximately 2130. The SP Comm. Team had in the meantime placed a TBX Radio in the Ship to Shore net, a SCR 284 in the Rgt Comd net maintaining a listening watch only, and a SCR 610 in the Boat Control net. Wire communication was established with the beach operated by BLT 17-1 Shore Party on the Ocean side of the Island and with the SPC Comm BLT 17-3 - Bn Hq BLT 17-3 and the outposts set up for security of the Beach Party. Assault Wire (W 130) was used for this purpose. No local net (SCR 536) was necessary on this beach as the length of the beach would not exceed fifty yards. Message center was set up in the center of the beach along the dune line. However SCR 536’s were available for the purpose. The switchboard used for the purpose of wire communication was ABD 72. Security for the beach was furnished by the Co C 50th Engrs and consisted of 3 .30 Cal. water cooled machine guns. The Naval Section used Visual signalling to guide the smaller boats in. Supplies were unloaded across this beach for approximately 4 hours. And then only after several boats had become beached was it decided to suspend unloading until daylight.

      D and 1 found the beach on the lagoon side of the Carlos Island again in operation. Engineers were repairing the pier which had been damaged by shelling but could with minor repairs be used for handling supplies. Msg Center was moved down nearer the foot of the pier as this was the most convenient location when supplies were started across the pier. I checked the fox holes and camouflage of the shore party installations and found them excellent. Upon checking the wire installations I found them too low but upon talking with one of the Shore Party Wire men and found that the lines were being policed and raised at the time. A wire line had been added to Rgt Hq. This enabled the SP to communicate with any installation on the Island. Radio communication remained the same as before (TBX in ship to shore, SCR 610 in Boat Control net and SCR 284 maintaining a listening watch in the Rgt Comd net). There were sufficient Naval Signal men to maintain communication with all small boats and a PA system had been added for additional control of incoming boats. Additional wire lines were being added to the SP switchboard as requested and the SP wire team started to repair the W 130 used in the assault phase with W 110. A complete log was being kept in Message Center of all incoming and outgoing traffic. This log contained time filed, time cleared and a description of the text. Up to the late evening all traffic had been handled in the clear with the exception of one message which had be encoded in the AWC. Radios were operating on voice having handled only one message in C.W. During the night of D plus 1 all radios stood by on a listening watch and Message Center was operated all night. Incoming supplies were stopped shortly after dark.

      D plus 2 BLT 17-3 was ordered to embark aboard APA 55 for the night preparatory to supporting an assault on Burton Island by BLT 17-1. The Shore Party Comm Team was to remain behind on Carlos Island and only the SP Comm Team attached to BLT 17-1 was to accompany. I arranged to accompany a detachment of the 50th Engrs on this operation in order to observe communications on this operation. Aboard the APA 55 briefing by the Co Comdrs and Detachment Comdrs was conducted. Reveille on D plus 3 and immediately after breakfast troops and Detachments of BLT 17-3 were embarked in small boats as a floating reserve for BLT 17-1. H-Hour was at 0930 and landing was to be effected on Orange Beach 4 which was at the southernmost tip of this island. Air and Naval bombardment preceded the initial landing and the reserve was across the same beach. Troops were transferred from LCUs to gators prior to landing. I landed with the 50th Engr Detachment and we were met by M.P.s who guided us to an area selected for bivouacing. Fighting was still in progress upon landing. Machine gun fire was aimed at the gators as they crossed the beach. The machine gun was out of range and no damage was done. Only about 400 yards of the island had been completely secured, at this time. I found that visual flank markers had been set up and a SCR 610 was in the beach control net. Signalmen were in fox holes on the beach available for contact with small boats. TBX was in the ship to shore net and a SCR 284 was maintaining a listening watch in the Rgtl. Comd. net. Wire communication included BLT 17-1, BLT 17-3 - SPC Message Center, Beach Master Radio Stations and the outposts. Message Center was well dug in beach not camouflaged. The Message Center log showed time and description of the messages. All traffic had been handled by voice and in the clear. Approximately 30 messages were handled in the first day of this operation. A concise log was being maintained by the Message Center Chief. However Message Center had encountered some difficulty in having all outgoing traffic pass thru this agency, several attempts having been made by officers to give outgoing messages directly to radio operators. Immediately after dark a Japanese ack-ack gun opened fire on this end of the island causing all beach personnel to remain closely in their foxholes. This fire continued up until approximately 0300 D plus 4 days. A mortar battery set up a short distance back of the dune lines was attempting to knock out this gun. I went over to the comabat point for this battery and found the six mortars in the battery were controlled by telephone from the control point. EE8 telephones and W-130 wire was being used for this purpose. I found that their communication was being continually interrupted by the Cannon Co’s tanks moving in. Their wire lines had not been placed at sufficient height to protect them from being broken by the tanks.

      At daylight on D plus 4 I went out to Orange Beach and checked with the SPC. I found that only supplies as were actually necessary for this operation were being brought in and that these supplies were being requested as needed. Prisoners and casualties were being evacuated across this beach also. Activity on the beach was light and the personnel on this beach were staying well under cover. Small amounts of supplies crossed the beach all morning but the work was so light that a detail from the shore party was put to work collecting and burying enemy dead. All resistance ceased and the island was declared completely secured shorty after noon hour. The balance of the day was spent in general policing and picking up of equipment. At approximately 2030 the shore party communication was ordered secured and prepared for embarkation. I embarked aboard LST 226 at 2300 and attended a briefing of the following days operation.

      D plus 5 I landed with the assault troops on Beverly Island in the second wave. No shore party troops were landed on this operation as very little resistance was met and the assault troops were only ashore approximately 2 hours. However, I did observe that a SCR 536 carried by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer failed to function at first but was finally got into operation. Contact could be maintained by the Liaison Officer and the front lines by the Bn Radio (SCR 300). So no confusion resulted. Upon securing this island the troops embarked for Carlos Island where we bivouaced for the night. Upon arriving back at Carlos Island I found that in the absence of Division wire personnel they had been called upon to install a wire system on the island. I found approximately 18 telephones working out of a telephone central located near the Supply Beach. SP Message Center was still in operation.

      D plus 6 the Bn were ordered to prepare for embarkation aboard the APA’s for the journey back to our base. I boarded the APA 11 approximately 1530 this day.

      D plus 8 we sailed from the Lagoon. A meeting was called of officers and a training schedule and training areas were announced. The remainder of the trip back was uneventfull.

      In view of the observations I was able to make, is respectfully submitted the following recommendations and the reasons for same:

      1. That each SPC communication team be allowed to carry a 1/4 ton truck and trailer to assist in getting its equipment ashore.

      2. Each team be required to carry at least 4 Dr 8’s with W-130 wire. This wire can be carried by two men and wire can be laid in four division echelons at once.

      3. That at least 8 lance poles be landed in the assault phase. Not all beaches will have trees available for overheading wire and it is imperative that wire be overhead immediately.

      4. That personnel be given additional training in the value of camouflage. Also training in camouflage methods.

      5. That a conference be held between the SPC, SPC Sig Officer, and B.M. prior to operation for the purpose of coordination and mutual understanding.

      6. That personnel be thoroughly instructed in the danger of Booby Traps and Duds - personnel was found to be extremely lax on this item.

      7. That a 3-day supply of batteries be carried ashore in the initial phase for all battery operated equipment. On two instances SCR 610’s were out of service due to lack of fresh batteries

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OBSERVATIONS AT BURLESQUE AND CAMOUFLAGE (ROI ISLAND)
KWAJALEIN ATOLL, M. I., FEBRUARY1944.

        The Naval gunfire and bombing was so heavy and devastating that it was hard for this observer to believe any living thing could have survived until D-day. All machine-gun emplacements, pillboxes and block-houses were located and completely neutralized, except for one two-story block-house on camouflage which subsequently proved to be an ammunition storage depot.

        Bombers effectively neutralized all air strips on camouflage; wrecked and burned the two hangars, and destroyed approximately eighty planes of all types on the ground. Only three planes tried to take the air and these were shot down.

        The defenders evidently expected the attack to come from sea ward where their heaviest fortifications and installations
were located. However the landing was effected from inside the lagoon where most of the reef dangers were eliminated and the beaches better adapted to amphibious operations. Landings were effected under a naval barrage and our casualties were small. The Japanese resistance was not severe, though their casualties were very heavy. It is estimated that their losses were between 25 and 30 to 1 as compared to ours. It is this observers belief that most of the Japanese casualties occurred before our forces landed. in covering both islands thoroughly, I do not believe you could find a spot where a circle could be drawn with a 12 foot radius that would not contain a shell hole or bomb crater.

         Japanese small arms ammunition and aerial incendiary bombs were scattered all over both islands. From the thousands of beer bottles I saw in the pill-boxes and trenches I would say that the Japs were allowed some of the better things of life. Many were cultivating small vegetable gardens closely adjacent to their dugouts.

        The pill-boxes and block-houses were built of reinforced steel and concrete and all interior partitions wore of the same construction. The entire shore line was studded with pill-boxes at intervals of 1 to 200 feet. Their large gun positions were all knocked out as were their radar and radio stations. Their radar equipment seemed crude.

FEBRUARY 4

        AS I left the Island this afternoon there were still an undetermined few of the enemy scattered about Camouflage. They hide in tunnels and underbrush during the day and forage for food at night. They have accounted for 20-odd Marine casualties during the past two days. Prisoners, as usual, were few and included among them were some women who had no visible means of support other than their native attractiveness.

        The "dead disposal squads" , who are all volunteers, have had a busy four days. I saw three trenches each approximately 50 yards long, 15 feet wide, and 8 feet deep half filled with dead Japs, and two others that had been covered over with a sign "279 JAPS BURIED HERE." I saw one water filled bomb crater and counted 15 Japs and 1 pig floating in the bloody water. I saw small fragments of dead bodies being swept from the floor of 1 block-house which the Navy was making ready for headquarters site. The stench of death pervades both islands.

        The communications men were busy stringing wire everywhere along the beaches and the bulldozers and trucks were tearing the hell out of it. The beaches were lined with LCT'S, V'S, M'S, LST'S, Alligators and Ducks. The ensign who manned the control boat seemed completely bewildered and hoped somebody would come along-side who knew which beach he was supposed to land on. But in spite of the control boat and the lack of lifting gear ashore, the cargo boats are plying from ship to shore all day and all night and the strategic materials and supplies are hitting the beach in tremendous volume. The large C-2 type ships are being completely discharged in 4 days. The assault troops are beginning to move out and the garrison forces and operating units are moving in.

FEBRUARY 5

        The electric lights are burning brightly over Burlesque and Camouflage tonight. One air strip is already fit for service and both islands are well secured with numerous AA batteries.

I further observed that there were enough K rations scattered around to have fed me well for months. The Marines tell me they are short on cigarettes and I think lots of the K ration boxes are opened Just to obtain the cigarettes and the food then cast aside. It is definitely recommended that a bountiful supply of cigarettes be sent in as soon after the first wave lands as possible.

The assault troops hit the beaches travelling light, carrying only their rifles, knives, spare ammunition and canteens.  Their packs were sent in later.

FEBRUARY 7

        Last night three unidentified planes were located twelve miles away. We stood G.Q. for 1 hour and 15 minutes. No raid, but during the alert all ships sent out their small boats with smoke pots. The smoke screen set up was very effective.

FROM USS MARYLAND -- NEWS BULLETIN, FEB 9

        Vice-Admiral Terou Akiyma killed at Camouflage.

         Japanese losses outnumbered those of the attacking Americans by approximately 30 to 1.

        Admiral Nimitz announced that the Japanese suffered losses of 8122 killed, 264 captured for a total of 8386. Losses of American soldiers, sailors, and marines were 286 killed, 82 missing, 1148 wounded for a total of 1516.

        The conquest of the KwaJalein Atoll was accomplished at a cost far less than the Gilbert Islands battle in November, in which Americans lost 1092 killed and 2680 wounded in a far smaller operation. This was due in large part because the Yanks were able to put to good use the lessons learned in the Gilberts and the surface ship and plane bombardments that preceded the landings on Kwajalein were probably the greatest in the history of warfare.

        There was no evidence of mines either outside or inside the lagoon. Marine assault troops report that they found no land or personnel mines or booby traps.

        A Jap transport, sunk in the initial bombardment, lies about 1200 yards due south of Camouflage in the lagoon.

FEBRUARY 8

        No alerts for the past two nights. More cargo ships have moved into the lagoon. The islands are brilliantly lighted tonight as work goes on 24 hours per day. All cargo ships are using sufficient lights to discharge.

        Three battleships and two cruisers left the lagoon this morning. The SARATOGA and two AA Cruisers departed this afternoon. We have seen various task groups leave and return in from 48 to 72 hours, indicating that they are carrying out other bombardment missions close by.

        We received 100 marines from the assault forces this afternoon. They report that 15 more Japs were killed last night. It seems that Camouflage was literally covered with underground tunnels.

        We expect about 1500 marines aboard tomorrow. They present a miserable spectacle, with a week's growth of beard, and fatigue uniforms torn and dirty.

FEBRUARY 9

        Last night at 2030 we were alerted for unidentified planes. All ships set up a smoke screen. Planes approached within 15 miles and then disappeared.

        Today we completed discharging and took 1400 marine assault troops aboard. These marines are a part of the 4th Marine Division, and came assault loaded direct from San Diego. Some came all the way in LST’S.

        We are ready to get under way now, but must await the reloading of the other ships in our task Group. The Commodore has made me Officer Guard Mail messenger. Each morning I make a trip to the MARYLAND to pick up Guard Mail for task Group 51.6 and take messages to the Chief of Staff, Task Force 53 for the Commodore.

FEBRUARY 11

        At 1300 today the Navy took over the islands from the Marines. The Island Base Commander is Captain Gwen, USN. The Garrison Group is composed of Acorn 21, the 109th CB Battalion, the Marine Guard, and the Harbor Control Group. There are about 4500 men in this Garrison Group.

        Among the group we are transporting back to the Maui Base is Lt. Col. Carlson of the Carlson's Raiders fame.

        So many marines complain that their carbines were not effective after getting wet and clogged with sand. There was some complaint of the .45's, but no complaint of the M-1 and Browning. Bazookas were used in this operation also.

FEBRUARY 12

        Well, Tojo reaped his revenge upon us this morning. Quoted below is the Navy Intelligence Officer's report of the air raid:"0200--By radio from Island Base Commander of Roi Island. TG alerted for approaching enemy aircraft bearing 245 degrees, distance 51 miles; succeeding bearings and distances 295 degrees--45 miles; 285 degrees--45 miles; 325 degrees--45 miles. Number and types undetermined

         0209--Condition Red assumed--all hands called to G.Q.
         0215--Smoke pots on ships and small boats set off
.        0220-- four search lights on Roi Island searching skies
.        0229--AA firing on Roi Island and from 3 ships in the lagoon.
         0240-_Several large bombs were dropped on Roi Island and direct hits made on the fuel and munitions stores piled on the southern beach, setting off tremendous fires and explosions from the munitions and rolling flames and smoke from the fuel. Immediately after the first bomb struck a stick of about 8 small bombs were observed bursting in succession north of the southern beach of Roi. All AA fire ceased and searchlights went out when first bombs hit.
          0420--smoke pots secured by order of Island Base Commander.
          0440--All clear.
          0600--Ships of TG sent boats and medical officers and corpsmen and medical supplies to Roi and to SS TYPHOON--that ship having been designated to receive all casualties from Roi.
          0900--Fires on Roi Island still burning.

_ _ _ _ _ _

        At about 0240 a bomb struck the water about 1000 yards off our starboard quarter. We were well Covered by our smoke screen at this time, as were most of the ships in the lagoon; however, some ship abeam of us in the vicinity of the MARYLAND and the BALTIMORE opened up with AA fire. Fires started on the beach simultaneously, with direct hits made in our oil and ammunition dumps. As the oil drums exploded it sounded like heavy gunfire, and the tracers from the ammunition dumps looked like a mammoth 4th of July celebration. I counted 8 different fires at one time.

        At 0600 the Commodore ordered me to Yokohama Pier on Camouflage to dispatch the casualties in LCV'S to the SS TYPHOON. I dispatched 23 boats with a total number of 252 wounded to the TYPHOON BY 0930. Better than 65 percent of these men had head injuries, and 5 died enroute to the TYPHOON. After combing both islands and seeing that the stream of wounded was reduced to a mere trickle of walking cases I moved back out to the TYPHOON. We were not able to get all the wounded aboard until 1400. At about 1700 we saw the last fire extinguished on Burlesque. When I left the TYPHOON there were only 11 known dead, although we hadn't had any recent intelligence from the beach.

        At 1800 we departed along with the SS ROBIN WENTLEY bound for Maui with about 3100 marines aboard the two ships.

    C. W. HUSSEY

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MAJURO

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
2 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations, Majuro Operation.

                  TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

             1. Attached units departed aboard the USS Cambria on 22 Jan 44.

             2. On 23 January 1944 destination was revealed and maps, photos, and orders issued, and information disseminated to enlisted men.

             3. Officers were required to stand compartment guard duty enroute.

             4. On D day, 31 January, the harbor of Majuro was entered and the approach to objective made, following the mine sweepers. Naval gunfire was being launched and aircraft on station for missions. Word from reconnaissance troops put ashore during the night caused gunfire and strafing to be ceased. At approximately noon the atoll was declared occupied and placed under the Military Governorship of C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, U.S.N. The C.O. and staff went ashore for reconnaissance and troops remained aboard until D plus 1 when a non-tactical move ashore was exercised. Attempts were made for release of attached units at this time, to no avail; the reason given was the expectancy and probability of another mission assignment for the BLT.

             5. From D plus 1 until D plus 22, a constant effort to obtain release was maintained. On D plus 22 attached JASCO personnel were detached to the Island Commander for disposition.

             6. Arrangements were made and troops embarked aboard AO 75 USS Saugatuck 230700 for return to Pearl.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. I recommend a thorough document describing JASCO in its entirety be prepared and distributed to all infantry units.

                              2. I strongly recommend a change in T/O for A.G.L. teams to be armed with the carbine except the driver                                 who should carry a TSMG.

                               3. It is urgent that A.G.L. teams be increased in enlisted strength to six (6) men involving an additional                                  radio operator, radio mechanic, and a basic.

                               4. Iron bound orders involving immediate release of personnel should accompany units being detached.

                               5. A.G.L. officers should contact the Commander Support Aircraft prior to sailing for briefing on                                  subsequent missions.

  WILSON H. DONKLE
Capt., A.C.
295th Joint Assault Sig Co

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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
SFC SECTION

                                                                                                                                                5 March 1944

SUBJECT:  Report of Operations, SFC Team #5.

TO:  Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

       1. Naval Gunfire was not necessary on the Sundance Operation. Prearranged shore bombardment commenced as scheduled, but ceased upon receipt of reconnaisance reports.

       2. After the BLT had completed its landing operation and it was ascertained that no naval gunfire would be used, I contacted the Battalion Commander in reference to release of my team, and acting as officer in charge of J.A.S.Co. units as directed by Battalion Adjutant, I represented Signal and A.G.L. teams. I received no satisfaction and was told merely that no release could be given as yet.

      3. At different times during our stay on the island I inquired of the Battalion Commander about our release. I know that the other team commanders did likewise. Each and every answer I received was different from the previous one.

      4. Orders issued for our release by 295th were ignored. These orders were issued with CPA authority.

      5 . Duties not in accord with normal duties and functions of both officers and men were assigned to us. Attached orders will indicate that. The E.M. of the J.A.S.CO. were assigned such duties as road repair and care and guard duty which seemed to come quite often. Privates were standing guard every other night.

     6. Recommendations: I recommend that in future operations , orders assigning members of the J.A.S.CO to various units indicate that teams are assigned for special duty only (combat mission). Also I believe that separate orders for each team be made out for release so that when each team’s mission is complete it may be relieved as their combat efficiency is no longer present. Therefore, when Naval Gunfire ceases, the SFC team should be relieved.

JOHN J. COHEN
Capt., F.A.

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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957

                                                                                                                                            14 March 1944.

SUBJECT:  Report on Sundance Operation.

TO :  Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

        On 22 January 1944 the team embarked upon the Cambria and sailed from Honolulu on the 23rd.

        Although bunks were allotted us, none were available and the men had to sleep and live on the deck. This situation was reported to the proper officers but nothing was done to rectify it.

        While enroute to Sundance Atoll, orientation classes were had daily. The information given the officers was transmitted to the men at the earliest convenience.

        On D-1 day the Marine Rcn unit attached to BLT-2 landed and found no opposition. The Navy was notified and immediately ceased fire.

        The Cambria and its escort sailed into the lagoon on D day with no opposition. A small reconnaissance party went ashore and when they returned the battalion commander decided to wait until D plus 1 to debark the troops.

        On D plus 1 the troops went ashore and prepared living quarters.

        The communication team set up a switchboard and had communication with Battalion Headquarters. Later on as dumps were established, we laid lines to them. This was the extent of our communication while supplies were being carried over the beach.

        On D plus 2 day we were detached from the Engineers and attached the Headquarters Company for duty. The men helped the battalion communication section in laying wire, standing radio watch, and operating the battalion headquarter’s switchboard. These same men were also called upon to do K.P., Guard Duty, and to help build roads. This additional duty was questioned by Captain Donkle and Captain Cohen, but it could not be helped.

        The Battalion Commander refused to release us until 23 February. Repeated efforts were made to obtain this release prior to this date because there was no assault phase and transportation was available at all times.

        On 23 February we boarded the tanker U.S.S. Saugatuck and proceeded to Pearl Harbor, reaching there 1 March. We then procured transportation and came directly to the Company Area.

        I recommend that future orders be so worded that release from combat units may be assured. Also that the new, modified, lightweight version of the BD-72,together with five miles of W-130 be used in the initial assault phase of the landing.

  MANNING A. ELDRIDGE
1st Lt., 295th JASCO

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