295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
2 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations, Majuro Operation.

                  TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

             1. Attached units departed aboard the USS Cambria on 22 Jan 44.

             2. On 23 January 1944 destination was revealed and maps, photos, and orders issued, and information disseminated to enlisted men.

             3. Officers were required to stand compartment guard duty enroute.

             4. On D day, 31 January, the harbor of Majuro was entered and the approach to objective made, following the mine sweepers. Naval gunfire was being launched and aircraft on station for missions. Word from reconnaissance troops put ashore during the night caused gunfire and strafing to be ceased. At approximately noon the atoll was declared occupied and placed under the Military Governorship of C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, U.S.N. The C.O. and staff went ashore for reconnaissance and troops remained aboard until D plus 1 when a non-tactical move ashore was exercised. Attempts were made for release of attached units at this time, to no avail; the reason given was the expectancy and probability of another mission assignment for the BLT.

             5. From D plus 1 until D plus 22, a constant effort to obtain release was maintained. On D plus 22 attached JASCO personnel were detached to the Island Commander for disposition.

             6. Arrangements were made and troops embarked aboard AO 75 USS Saugatuck 230700 for return to Pearl.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. I recommend a thorough document describing JASCO in its entirety be prepared and distributed to all infantry units.

                              2. I strongly recommend a change in T/O for A.G.L. teams to be armed with the carbine except the driver                                 who should carry a TSMG.

                               3. It is urgent that A.G.L. teams be increased in enlisted strength to six (6) men involving an additional                                  radio operator, radio mechanic, and a basic.

                               4. Iron bound orders involving immediate release of personnel should accompany units being detached.

                               5. A.G.L. officers should contact the Commander Support Aircraft prior to sailing for briefing on                                  subsequent missions.

  WILSON H. DONKLE
Capt., A.C.
295th Joint Assault Sig Co

                                                                                                                                                5 March 1944

SUBJECT:  Report of Operations, SFC Team #5.

TO:  Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

       1. Naval Gunfire was not necessary on the Sundance Operation. Prearranged shore bombardment commenced as scheduled, but ceased upon receipt of reconnaisance reports.

       2. After the BLT had completed its landing operation and it was ascertained that no naval gunfire would be used, I contacted the Battalion Commander in reference to release of my team, and acting as officer in charge of J.A.S.Co. units as directed by Battalion Adjutant, I represented Signal and A.G.L. teams. I received no satisfaction and was told merely that no release could be given as yet.

      3. At different times during our stay on the island I inquired of the Battalion Commander about our release. I know that the other team commanders did likewise. Each and every answer I received was different from the previous one.

      4. Orders issued for our release by 295th were ignored. These orders were issued with CPA authority.

      5 . Duties not in accord with normal duties and functions of both officers and men were assigned to us. Attached orders will indicate that. The E.M. of the J.A.S.CO. were assigned such duties as road repair and care and guard duty which seemed to come quite often. Privates were standing guard every other night.

     6. Recommendations: I recommend that in future operations , orders assigning members of the J.A.S.CO to various units indicate that teams are assigned for special duty only (combat mission). Also I believe that separate orders for each team be made out for release so that when each team’s mission is complete it may be relieved as their combat efficiency is no longer present. Therefore, when Naval Gunfire ceases, the SFC team should be relieved.

JOHN J. COHEN
Capt., F.A.

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957

                                                                                                                                            14 March 1944.

SUBJECT:  Report on Sundance Operation.

TO :  Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

        On 22 January 1944 the team embarked upon the Cambria and sailed from Honolulu on the 23rd.

        Although bunks were allotted us, none were available and the men had to sleep and live on the deck. This situation was reported to the proper officers but nothing was done to rectify it.

        While enroute to Sundance Atoll, orientation classes were had daily. The information given the officers was transmitted to the men at the earliest convenience.

        On D-1 day the Marine Rcn unit attached to BLT-2 landed and found no opposition. The Navy was notified and immediately ceased fire.

        The Cambria and its escort sailed into the lagoon on D day with no opposition. A small reconnaissance party went ashore and when they returned the battalion commander decided to wait until D plus 1 to debark the troops.

        On D plus 1 the troops went ashore and prepared living quarters.

        The communication team set up a switchboard and had communication with Battalion Headquarters. Later on as dumps were established, we laid lines to them. This was the extent of our communication while supplies were being carried over the beach.

        On D plus 2 day we were detached from the Engineers and attached the Headquarters Company for duty. The men helped the battalion communication section in laying wire, standing radio watch, and operating the battalion headquarter’s switchboard. These same men were also called upon to do K.P., Guard Duty, and to help build roads. This additional duty was questioned by Captain Donkle and Captain Cohen, but it could not be helped.

        The Battalion Commander refused to release us until 23 February. Repeated efforts were made to obtain this release prior to this date because there was no assault phase and transportation was available at all times.

        On 23 February we boarded the tanker U.S.S. Saugatuck and proceeded to Pearl Harbor, reaching there 1 March. We then procured transportation and came directly to the Company Area.

        I recommend that future orders be so worded that release from combat units may be assured. Also that the new, modified, lightweight version of the BD-72,together with five miles of W-130 be used in the initial assault phase of the landing.

  MANNING A. ELDRIDGE
1st Lt., 295th JASCO

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