PALAWAN

                                  

                                HEADQUARTERS 
                        JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY 
                     APO 159 C/O P.M. SAN FRANCISCO CALF 

                                                                       9 May 1945

 

                     HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
         ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V3 - PALAWAN - OPERATION

                                   SECTION I.

                                 BACKGROUND

        1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 186th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, on
the shores of Puerta Princessa, Palawan, P.I. Shore Fire Control Parties of the 295th Joint Assault Signal
Company were attached to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control communications.

             a. The target beach was of coral, ending at a mangrove swamp. The terrain was densely wooded
and had but one road, making progress difficult.

        2. Palawan had been in the hands of the Japanese for approximately 
three years but the beach landing was unopposed.

                                   SECTION II. 

                                  OPERATIONS

        1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would be
furnished: 

             a. With the 186th ROT Headquarters,

                 One (l) Naval Liaison Team which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer and four enlisted
personnel.

              b. With each Assault Battalion Headquarters,

                  One (l) Shore Fire Control Party which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer, one Artillery
Spotter, and ten enlisted personnel.

        2. The elements joined their Regiment and Battalion Headquarters on 26 February 1945 and
prepared to embark the same date. JASCO personnel were instructed by team officers in SOI, Field
Orders, and general orientations.

        3. The landing was made at 0845, 28 February 1945. The Regimental N.L.O. station wee set up on
the beach by lOOO; shortly thereafter the Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties checked in.
Communication was good.

        4. No firing was called for by JASCO parties except one request for a mission which was denied.
All JASCO teams were relieved attachment 1 March 1945 and embarked same day for return to
organization. 

        5. No casualties were incurred during the operation.

                                   SECTION III

                   LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

        1. The type map used 1/50000, gunfire maps could and should have been replaced with 1/25000
photo maps which were available.

        2. Essential materials for Naval Gunfire Control on this operation were either of inferior quality or
non-existent due to difficulty in contacting Navy. No gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available
for our officers.

        3. The rapid advance of the troops, due to absence of enemy opposition, placed a burden on the
radio carrying team and also resulted in poor reception on the SCR 694 due to its limited range.

        4. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous
operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of
transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads
over long distance, rough terrain, and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons.

        5. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters
as enclosures.

                                                                 VINCENT W. FOX
                                                                     Captain, Sig C
                                                                      Commanding

1 Incl:
Roster Officers 

  ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 295TH JASCO, PARTICIPATING IN V-3 PALAWAN OPERATION

                       1st Lt Robert L. Burge, 0416381, FA.
                       1st Lt Walter H. Jensen, 01175756, FA.
                       Lieut Benjamin D. Mathon, 171137, USNR.
                       Lt (jg) George W. Boyce, 224255, USNR.
                       Lt. (jg) Warren B. Woods, 270441, USNR.


       *******************************************************************

                  Consolidated Report on PALAWAN Operation, 2/25 - 3/2

1. PREPARATION.

             This operation was marked by the decidedly poor preparation relative to liaison with the infantry
unit supported and distribution of maps and data.

             Assignments to units were made at such a late date as to allow practically no time for discussions
with commanding and subordinate officers on the capabilities of naval gunfire. Since several of the unit
commanders had previously suffered unfortunate losses from our own fire, it was more necessary than
ever to win back their confidence in our supporting weapon. Last minute pressures and preparations
prevented us from fulfilling this initial phase of our naval gunfire liaison duty. What liaison was attempted
was in the hands of an officer independent of our organization knowing little of our methods, and
apparently desirous of handling the whole problem alone.

             Essential materials for naval Gunfire control on this operation were either of inferior quality or
nonexistent. Due to difficult liaison with the Navy contact officer, no gunfire annexes to the operation plan
were available for our officers. Much valuable information ordinarily carried in such an annex was absent
from the verbal summary which we received shortly before loadinq. The other essential, good maps, was
likewise neglected when we received small scale, 1/50,000 gunfire maps despite the availability of
excellent photomaps a 1/25,000 r.f. for the field artillery. The type map used in the LUZON operation
was ideal with its r.f. of 1/36,000. Either this type or artillery photomaps should be sought for future
landings.

2. THE LANDING.

             After an intensive gunfire and rocket preparation we landed on an undefended beach at 0845,
February 28. The Rgt. N.L.O. station was set up on the beach by 1000; shortly thereafter the Battalion
teams began to check in. Communi- cation was good.

             With no enemy opposition our troops advanced quite rapidly and continuously, placing a great
burden on our radio-carrying team members and in the case of the F.O. teams bringinq them to the point
of utter exhaustion. In addition this swift progress of our forward teams increased the distance between
them and the Rgt. station, thus creating a new problem of poor reception by our SCR 694 radios. When
distances were more that three or four miles between sets of this type, we found that they were incapable
of efficient communication with each other. Messages between these stations were either relayed via the
firing or control ships on sent through the Battalion SCR 284s.

             All officers who participated in this operation have agreed that unles the terrain is absolutely
impassable to vehicular traffic, jeeps with mounted SCR 284s are essential to the proper fulfillment of our
duties.

                                                                     B.D. Mathon 
                                                                     Lieut. USNR 

                                





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KWAJALEIN

MAJURO

SAIPAN

LINGAYEN GULF

ENIWETOK

ZAMBOANGA

MALABANG PARANG

UNIT CITATION

GENERAL ORDERS

COMPANY ROSTER

295 JASCO HOMEPAGE


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