HEADQUARTERS 295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY APO 717 4 August 1945 HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V4 - ZAMBOANGA - OPERATION SECTION I Background 1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 41st Infantry Division on the shores of Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands. Elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to the 41st Infantry Division to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison Communication. Attachment orders per Authority, Commanding General, Eight Army, dated 23 February 1945. 2. Zamboanga had been in the hands of the Japanese for approximately three years and the landing on the shore was lightly opposed by mortar and artillery located on the high ground some distance from the beach. SECTION II Operations 1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company be furnished: a. With the 41st Infantry Division Headquarters. One (1) Naval Liaison Team consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer and five (5) enlisted Men. b. With the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams Headquarters. One (1) Naval Liaison Team consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer and five (5) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men c. With each assualt battalion of the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams less 2nd Bn, 163rd. One (1) Shore Fire Control Party consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer, one (1) Artillery Spotter, one (1) Signal Corps Officer as student observer for artillery spotting, and ten (10) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men.. d. With the 2nd Bn of the 163rd Regimental Combat Team One (1) Shore Fire Control Party consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer, one (1) Artillery Spotter, and ten (10) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer, and five (5) enlisted men. e. With the reserve battalions of the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer, and five (5) enlisted men. 2. The elements joined their respective headquarters prior to embarkation. Jasco personnel were instructed by team officer in SOI, Field Orders, and General Orientations. 3. All teams with the exception of the Division Naval Liaison Team landed on the enemy held shore several minutes after H-hour and advanced inland rapidly against light opposition although there was considerable artillery and mortar fire falling from enemy positions on the high ground inland. With exception of Division Naval Liaison Officer station, all Naval Gunfire communications were quickly established and Naval Gunfire commenced against enemy batteries on the left and center of the Division Sector. Division Naval Liaison Officer, aboard LCI with elements of Division Artillery, was delayed in landing until H plus 150 minutes by intense artillery and mortar fire falling on and in front of landing beaches. All Naval Gunfire Communications were in by H plus three hours. The gunfire was being employed very effectively against enemy batteries and OP's on the left and enemy personnel on the right. On the right flank, the advance of the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry was greatly expedited by the employment of a floating O.P. (LVT) requested by the Naval Gunfire Spotter, as his observation ashore was seriously hampered by dense growth and special terrain features. Considerable air-spot was used in all sectors upon request of Shore Fire Control Parties and proved highly effective. Shore Fire Control Parties were released and recalled to their respective Regimental CP’s by D + 4, at which time the main fire support group was released from the area. Fire support ship from the screening force remained available in case of emergency (especially for night illumination). Arrangements were made by Division Naval Liaison Officer with Division Artillery S-3 for emergency call fires through Artillery F.O's. No such fires were called however. On D plus 6, one Shore Fire Control Spotter Team was assigned the mission of furnishing Naval Gunfire Support to Basilan Island Task Force. In conjunction with this, two spotters were requested to furnish air-spot from artillery cub planes. Communications on this assignment was excellent and several preparation missions were fired from Air and Ground Observation. In addition to original Basilan landing same Shore Fire Control Team accompanied elements of Task Force on two separate landings on west coast of island. On the whole, the use of Naval Gunfire Support during the initial phases of the operation, especially, was highly effective and was instrumental to a large degree in silencing enemy mortar and artillery positions 4. Air Ground Liaison Activities. The Air Liaison Parties were not requested to call missions until the Marine Air Groups 12 and 32 were in a position to support the ground troops. The Air Liaison Parties of the two regiments conducted sixteen (16) air strikes. Strikes were conducted in which one Air Liaison Officer was Air-borne over the target in an artillery plane, registered artillery smoke and directed the planes to the target. Some difficulty was encountered with this set-up in that artillery plane used a frequency modulated set and the attacking planes used amplitude modulated sets making direct contact between planes impossible. This was remedied by the air-borne Air Liaison Officer contacting the forward Air Liaison Officer on the ground on the frequency modulated set who in turn relayed the message to the attacking planes. Napalm, 500 pound bombs, and strafing were used to good advantage. The cooperation between the Marine Air Groups and the Air Liaison Parties was excellent SECTION III. Lessons Learned and Recommendations 1. Naval Gunfire: a. Naval Gunfire Maps were too large a scale for accurate work. Small scale maps would be much more beneficial. It would be desirable if Infantry Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support operate from a common map system. b. Air-spot for Naval Gunfire is extremely desirable and it is recommended that arrangements for cooperation with the Division Artillery Air Observation Section be made on all operations in which availability of cruiser and battleship planes is uncertain. Difference in spotting procedure could be corrected by Division Naval Liaison Officer. Communications to be arranged by having the Division Naval Liaison Officer's second set check in a firing ship net, and receiving commands at Division Artillery Fire Director Center. This would allow efficient handling of a limited activity. c. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads over long distances, rough terrain and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons. 2. Air Ground Liaison. The idea of the Air Liaison Officer directing attacking planes from an artillery plane is very good. On numerous occasions visibility is hampered by terrain features or some other objects and the use of the plane to rise above these would result in calls for accurate strikes which heretofore would be almost an impossibility. The difference in the radio sets necessitated a relay station. Similar sets in the spotting and attacking planes would speed the strikes by having direct contact between them. 3. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters as enclosures. THOMAS W. HART Captain, Sig C Commanding 2 Incls: A certified True Extract Copy of Attachment Orders. Roster of Officers ******************************************************************* Roster of Officers, 295th JASCO, Participating in V-4 Zamboanga Operation. Capt William B. Agler 0415074 AC Capt Benjamin S. Blake, Jr 0415648 FA Capt Robert L. Hire 0561280 AC Capt Abraham L. Herm 0367043 FA Capt Robert C. North 0578735 AC Capt Paul H. Rofkar 0343414 FA Capt Nicholas W. Wentzel 0349217 FA Capt Henry C. Wick III 0315152 FA 1st Lt James M. Amick 0574735 AC 1st Lt Dominic B. Bernardo 0449655 Inf 1st Lt Manning A. Eldridge 01645549 Sig C 1st Lt Wayne E. Hawley 01636327 Sig C 1st Lt Edward D. Kruidenier 01298248 Inf 1st Lt Thomas B. Gillespie 0438986 Inf 1st Lt Richard T. Lovorn 01645772 Sig C 1st Lt Roy W. Repp 01645940 Sig C 1st Lt Henry N. Vanderpool 01307593 Inf Lt Charles J. Blank USNR 160816 Lt(jg) John T. Detwiler USNR 269568 Lt(jg) Harry R. Jeter USNR 224347 Lt(jg) George A. Redfern USNR 224418 ****************************************************************************
SHORE FIRE CONTROL SECTION 295th JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY APO. 321 1 April 1945 SUBJECT: V-4 Operational Report. TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Co, APO 321. 1. Shore Fire Control Detachment attached to 41st Inf Division as follows: a) 1 Division N.L.O. Team b) 1 Regimental N.L.O. Team to each of 162nd and163Inf Regimental Hq. c) 1 S.F.C. Party with each assault Bn.i.e. 2nd and 3rd Bns 162nd Inf Regt 1st and 2nd Bns 163rd Inf Regt 2. All teams of both Regts were ashore several minutes after H-hour, and advanced inland rapidly against light opposition, although there was considerable artillery and mortar fire falling from enemy positions on the high ground inland. With exception of Division N.L.O. station, complete communications were quickly established and N.G.F. commenced against enemy batteries on the left and center of Division Sector. Division N.L.O. aboard LCI with elements of Division Artillery was delayed in landing until H plus 150 minutes by intense artillery and mortar fire falling on and in front of landing beaches. All communications in by H plus 3 hours, at which time N.G.F. being very effectively employed against enemy batteries and OPs on the left and enemy personnel on the right. 3. On the special mission of Fox Co., 162nd Inf, which consisted of a rapid advance along the beach to the left toward Caldera Point, considerable delay in the close support to be furnished by Fire Support Group Three (LCI(G)s, LCI(M)s and LCI(R)s) was incurred by lack of proper coordination in communications. An SCR 610 radio was assigned to the infantry company with a special SFC frequency, but neither the operator or company Commander had been aware of its purpose and not until D plus two was the original plan of communications established. However satisfactory results were obtained by using the regular Bn S.F.C. Frequency with SCR 694. 4. On the right flank, the advance of the 1st Bn, 163rd Inf, was greatly expedited by the employment of a floating O.P. (LVT) requested by the N.G.F. Spotter, as his observation ashore was seriously hampered by dense growth and special terrain features. 5. Considerable air-spot was used in all sectors upon request of S.F.C. Parties and was highly effective. 6. All S.F.C. Parties were released and recalled to their respective Regimental C.P.s, by D plus 4 day, at which time the main fire support group was released from the area. Fire support ships from the screening force remained available in case of emergency(especially for night illumination). Arrangements were made by Division N.L.O. with Division Artillery S-3 for emergency call fires through Artillery F.O.s. No such fires were called however. 7. On D plus 6 day, one S.F.C. Spotter Team (Capt. Herm as spotter ) was assigned the mission of furnishing N.G.F. Support to Basilan Island Task Force. In conjunction with this two spotters, ( Capt. Blake and Lt.(jg) Detwiler ) were requested to furnish air-spot from artillery cub planes. Using planes SCR 610 with DDs 610s ( or equivalent ) set on Artillery frequencies, communications were excellent throughout and severed preparation missions were fired from Air and Ground Observation. In addition to original Basilan landing S.F.C. Team accompanied elements of Task Force on two separate landings on West coast of island. 8. On the whole, the use of Naval Gunfire Support during the initial phases of the operation, especially, was highly effective and was instrumental to a large degree in silencing enemy mortar and artillery positions. Upon the recall of S.F.C. parties, Division G-3 informed Division N.L.O. that he had been instructed by C.G. 41st Inf Div to draw up a commendation for the JASCO detachment in appreciation of the fine cooperation and excellent performance of all Naval Gunfire Support personnel. Likewise for the Air Ground Liaison personnel for their work as covered by their operational report. 9. Personal observations and recommendations by Div N.L.O.: a) Initial liaison between this organization and 41st Inf Div led to misunderstanding as to time of release of S.F.C. Detachment from operation. As a result, S.F.C. personnel of this organization left prepared for not more than ten days, although it was expected by C.G. 41st Div that they would remain attached for duty throughout the V-4 Operation-- a period of from 8 to 10 weeks. b) No Naval Gunfire Control maps were provided for Division Artillery initially, ( later obtained from Rocky Mount ). No such maps were ever available to supported Infantry units. This results in considerable confusion and delay ( especially in close support firing ). Past experience has shown that it is extremely important that Infantry, Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support operate from a common map system. Early Central Pacific Operations showed the importance of this. c) Naval Gunfire Control maps were not only inaccurate topographically, but were too large a scale for accurate work. In many cases the Target area maps were at quite a variance with the photo maps used by the Infantry and Artillery units. d) From past experience it should have been obvious that S.F.C. Parties be provided with at least some of their organic transportation. However for V-4 , this again was not done and had detrimental effects on N.G.F. Support. Proper communications is especially affected by this, as only a limited number of radio sets can be hand-carried. e) Assigning S.F.C. Parties to assault units only, remains unsatisfactory as invariably the supported units demand the reallocation of parties from units going into reserve, to relieving units. This obviously puts too great a burden on the teams whose work is equally as difficult as Artillery F.O. and Liaison teams. f) Air-spot for N.G.F. is extremely desirable and it is recommended that arrangements for cooperation with the Division Artillery Air Observation Section be made on all operations in which availability of cruiser and battleships planes is uncertain. Differences in spotting procedure could be corrected by Div N.L.O.. Communications to be arranged by having the Division N.L.O.s second set check in a firing ship net, and receiving commands at Div Artillery Fire Director Center. This would allow efficient handling of only a limited activity. Additional sets would improve the arrangement, but experience to date does not warrent a recommendation for additional equipment. g) Again the arrangements for augmenting the T/O strength of the Shore Fire Control Section left much to be desired. (1) Rapidly changing membership of teams eliminates the advantage of the usual "team training phase" of training. This is twelve weeks in F.A.U.T.P.. Accordingly these personnel can be used only for mechanical operation of equipment and not for receiving and processing traffic (2) The employment of a large number of personnel with whom a team Officer has had no combat contact, introduces an unnecessary element of risk, resulting from not knowing what to expect of personnel or how they will react to pressure. (3) For a full Division operation, there are 22 separate operating Parties of 5 men each,and two vehicles. The currently assigned strength of 44 men does not allow sufficient experienced men in each location. It is recommended that at least the T/O strength be permanently assigned and available to S.F.C. Section, based on: per Bn 1 Chief of Section 2 Radio Operators 1 Radio Operator, WT man 2 Driver 6 54 per Regt 1 Chief of Section 1 Radio Operator 1 Driver 3 9 per Div 1 Chief of Section 1 Driver 2 2 T/O and total 65 Benjamin S. Blake Capt. F.A.
KWAJALEIN |
MAJURO |
SAIPAN |
LINGAYEN GULF |
PALAWAN |
ENIWETOK |
MALABANG PARANG |
UNIT CITATION |
GENERAL-ORDERS |
COMPANY-ROSTER |
295 JASCO HOMEPAGE |