295th JASCO
ENIWETOK		LINGAYEN GULF
KWAJALEIN		PALAWAN
MAJURO		MALABANG-PARANG
SAIPAN		ZAMBOANGA

   This history is based on official War Department documents and personal accounts.  We are anxious to contact anyone who served in the 295 JASCO, or individuals in units to which we were attached.  We are in need of the following information:

    -Which teams went on which operations. Names, etc.
    -Elements to which we were attached, dates, etc.
    -Ship names and numbers.
    -Any official documents concerning our organization (copies).
    -KIA and WIA information.
    -Awards and Citations.
    -Navy, Air Corps and Artillery personnel, etc.
    -Anything you want to share with us.

Please contact us with information at:

Alfred Samper Ph.D.
1316 N. Cross Street
Wheaton, IL 60187
630-668-6044
Email: samper@cdnet.cod.edu

For Reunion information please contact:

Clifford & Mildred Long 
815 Tangerine Woods Blvd.
Englewood FL 34223-6027
941-474-5143

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Unit Citation

General Orders

Company Roster

A Brief History of 295th Jasco

    UNIT HISTORY OF THE
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

The 295th Signal Company (Special) was activated 3 April 1943 at Camp Bradford, Virginia in accordance with T/O & 2 11 517S, dated 9 September 1942.(l) The Commanding Officer at the time of activation was Capt. P. B. Whittemore Cadre of approximately 20 EM.

The mission of this organization was to furnish beach communications during the assault phase of an infantry division’s amphibious landing operation.

As the result of lessons learned in amphibious landings in North Africa and Sicily, the Joint chiefs of staff decided to reorganize companies of the above type in order that certain specialist personnel, particularly for the control of the supporting naval fire for these operations, be included.

At Camp Bradford, Va., the company participated in amphibious training and training in specialist communication subjects. Four officers and seventy-four enlisted men were placed on DS to Alliance,.Nebraska, in June 1943, to operate communications for umpires in airborne troop maneuvers.

1st Lt. I. R. Obenchain assumed command of the organization 15 June 1943. Unit departed Camp Bradford, Va., 3 August 1943 and arrived U.S. Naval Amphibious Training Base, Fort Pierce, Fla., 4 August 1943.

Company underwent amphibious training with Engineer Combat Group at Fort Pierce, Fla., and took specialist and unit training.

Communication teams of unit participated in amphibious landings in the Solomon Islands, Chesapeake Bay, Md., in September and October 1943.

Unit departed Fort Pierce, Fla., 8 October 1943 and arrived camp Pickett, Va., 10 October 1943.

The 295th Signal Company (Special) was reorganized as a Joint Assault Signal Company, hereafter referred to as JASCO, on 11 November 1943,. under T/O and T/E, 11 147 Signal, dated 21 October 1943, with all changes. The organization consisted, briefly, of the following:

a. Headquarters platoon with a commanding officer, executive officer, supply officer, sixty nine (69) Army enlisted men and five (5) Navy enlisted men.

b. Shore Fire Control Section with nine (9) Field Artillery officers in grade of captain; nine (9) Naval officers in grade of lieutenant (sg); forty five (45) Army enlisted men.

c. The Air Liaison Section with thirteen (13) Army Air officers in grade of captain; thirty nine (39) Army Air Force enlisted men.

d. Shore Party Communication, Section with ten (10) Signal Corps officers in grade of first lieutenant; one hundred ninety (190) enlisted men.

e. Strength of 34 O's, 1 WO, 343 EM, 9 Naval O's, and 115 Naval EM.

10 .naval officers and 115 Naval EM attached to unit per ltr orders FE 25.7, P16-3/00/MM Serial 2401 ATB Camp Bradford, Va., dated 18 November 1943.

Unit staged for overseas movement and company time devoted mainly to completion of all firing and training.

Departed Camp Pickett, Va., 5 December 1943 For Port of Embarkation; arrived Camp Stoneman, California, 11 December 1943; and sailed from San Francisco Port of Embarkation 27 December 1943.

Arrived Pearl Harbor, T.H., 6 January: 1944 and stationed at Schofield Barracks, T.H., 7 January 1944.

Elements of organization departed Schofield Barracks 23 January 1944 for Marshall Islands invasion. Unit participated in landings at Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Majuro in the Marshalls. (2) The return of the unit's detachments was completed 8 March 1943.

Remainder of company participated in simulated amphibious landings and specialized training.

115 Navy EM relieved from attachment and transferred to Fifth Amphibious Force, c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, per VO Fifth Amphibious Force (21 April 1944).

Between the 7th and 28th of April 1944, elements of the organization engaged in amphibious maneuvers with two regiments of the 27th Infantry Division.

On 18 May the tactical elements of the company accompanied the division on a final dress rehearsal, returning to Oahu 25th May.

This tactical echelon of the 295th JASCO had a strength of 42 Officers and 335 EM (including 82 EM attached from the 27th Infantry Division). Combat elements sailed from Pearl Harbor, between 28 ,May and 1 June 1944.(3) The company headquarters composed the rear echelon of 2 officers, 1 .WO and 43 EM. Awards, decorations, and casualty lists attached. (4&5)

Rear echelon moved from Schofield Barracks to Fort Kamehameka, T.H., 18 May 1944 and was attached to Rear Echelon, 27th Infantry Division.

Roar Echelon embarked and sailed from Honolulu, T.H., 28 July 1944, and arrived in Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides 8 August 1944 and erected camp site in preparation for the return of combat elements from Saipan, Mariannas Islands. Combat elements of JASCO sailed from Saipan on 22 August 1944 and arrived Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, 6 September 1944.

Attached EM from the 27th Infantry Division reverted back to their organization 6 August 1944.

Unit relieved assignment Central Pacific Base Command and assigned to South Pacific Base Command 8 August 1944.

Informal ceremony held 14 September 1944 for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. Troops commended for Saipan operation. Entire JASCO participated.

Company followed no set training schedule as time was to be spent in rest, recuperation, and repairing of equipment.

Company alerted for movement to staging area in preparation for Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, P.I., operation.

On 14 October 1944, 88 EM were attached to unit from 27th Infantry Division. 33 additional EM were assigned as replacements on the same date.

Company sailed from Espiritu Santo 15 October 1944 and arrived at Bougainville, Soloman Islands where unit was relieved from 27th Infantry Division and attached to XIV Corps 19 October 1944.

Company time mainly spent in construction of camp area; firing on range from 8 through 10 November 1944; inspection and repair of organizational property, clothing, and equipment. Off-duty hours were devoted to organized athletics.

Company alerted for movement 30 November 1944. Combat elements were attached to the 37th Infantry Division for the Luzonoperation. One officer and 6 EM comprised rear echelon at Bougainville.

Combat elements loaded between 10th and 15th December and sailed from Bougainville 16 December 1944. Arrived Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Unit Philippine Islands 9 January 1945 and assault forces landed at 0930.(6)

One EM attached from 27th Division suffered a gunshot wound in the arm. No other casualties.

Company time spent in setting up bivouac area, perimeter defense in Binmaley, and military police duties in Port Saul, San Fabian, and Binmaley.

Organization relieved from attachment to XIV Corps and attached to ASCOM, Sixth Army 22 January 1945.

Major Irving R. Obenchain, 024658, relieved from assignment and transferred to GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area. Captain Vincent W. Fox, 01643552, assumed command of organization on 6 February 1945.

Unit sailed from Lingayen Gulf, P.I., 8 February 1945 and arrived Mindoro, P.I., 10 February 1945.

Unit relieved from assignment Sixth Army and attachment to ASCOM and assigned to Eight Army and Attached to X Corps 10 February 1945. Unit attached to 24th Infantry Division 11 February 1945. Relieved from attachment to X Corps and further attachment 24th Infantry Division and attached to 41st Infantry Division 22 February 1945.

Rear Echelon from Bougainville, S.I., joined organization at Mindoro on 25 February 1945.

Two Army, officers, 3 Navy officers, and 24 EM attached to 186th RCT, 41st Inf Div on 26 February 1945 in preparation for Palawan, P.I., V 3 operation.(7) These men returned to Mindoro for duty with organization on 4 March 1945.

Eighteen (18) officers and 101 EM were dropped from the assigned strength of the organization and accounted for on separate morning, report of Detachment #;1, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) 6 March 1945 for the V-4, Zamboanga operation. D-Day was on 10 Marc1945.(8) Awards and decorations.

(9) Relieved from attachment with 41st Inf Div and attached to 24th Infantry, Division 7March 1945.

Detachment #1, 295th JASCO, accounted for on morning report of 295th Joint Assault Signal Company 30March 1945.

Attached EM from 27th Inf Div relieved attachment and transferred back to original units 15 March 1945.

Unit relieved attachment to ASCOM and attached to Eight Army for further attachment toX Corps 10 February 1945.

Unit alerted for V 5 (Mindanao) operation in early April 1945. Four officers, one warrant officer, and 102 EM composed the rear echelon of this organization at Mindoro, P.I., for the V-5 operation. Remainder of unit composed of approximately 30 officers and 223 EM, sailed from Mindoro, P.I., 14 April 1945; arrived Polloc Harbor,Parang, Mindanao, P.I., on 17 April 1945.(9)

Unit reorganized and equipped, effective 26 April 1945, under T/O and E11-147S(30 December 1944) pursuant to authority USAFFE letter, FEGC 322, dated 1° April 1945, Subject: Reorganization of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company Under Latest T/O and E, and General Order No 86 Hq Sixth Army, 26 April 1945.(10)

Wire teams operated and maintained communications in X Corps CP area.

Unit cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, from 17 April 1945 to 1 July 1945 per General Order No 82, Hq X Corps, 11 July 1945.(11)

Lt. (jg) Warren B. Woods, 270441, USNR, WIA Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 3 May 1945. 1st Lt. James M. Amick, 0574735, WIA Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 4 June 1945.

Two officer and 17 EM from rear echelon at Mindoro, P.I., joined the organization 4 June 1945 at Parang;, Mindanao.

Company headquarters sailed from Polloc Harbor, Mindanao, 5 June 1945 Arrived Bugo (Del Monte) Mindanao 7 June 1945 where combat elements returned to company headquarters between Both and 25th June 1945. Awards and decorations(4)

Twenty one officers and 170 EM departed for TDB Amphibious Training Group, Cubic Bay, Luzon, P.I., 1 July 1945.

Unit sailed from Bugo, Mindanao, 4 July 1945 and arrived Zamboanga, Mindanao, 5 July 1945. Remainder of rear echelon joined organization at Zamboanga 5 July 1945.

Unit relieved from attachment Eighth Army and further attachment to X Corps and reverted to duty under assignment to Sixth Army.

Time spent vainly in erection of camp area.

First contingent of 20 EM eligible for release under Readjustment Regulations departed for Disposition Center on 16 July 1945.

Officers and EM on TDB Amphibious Training Group, Cubic Bay, Luzon, P.I., returned to duty 24 July 1945.

Major Vincent W. Fox, 01643552, (Commanding Officer), duty and command to TDB United States 45 days on 1 August 1945. Captain Thomas W. Hart, 01643648, assumed command of company same date.

Twelve Air Liaison officers and 38 EM dropped from the assigned strength of organization morning report and accounted for on morning report of Air Liaison Section, 295th JASCO, initiated 8 August 1945.

Second contingent of 13 EM eligible for separation from the service departed for Disposition Center 16 August 1945.

Unit relieved from control of Sixth Army and passed to control of Army Forces Western Pacific effective 20 August 1945, and further assigned to HQ Southern Islands Area Command, APO 952, and attached to 368th RCT,. APO 717, effective 20 August 1945.

Seven remaining; Naval officers relieved assignment and assigned to COMSERVPAC, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 24 September 1945.

Captain Thomas W. Hart relieved of duty and command attached unassigned to 28th Replacement Depot, APO 318, 26 September 1945, for separation from the service under readjustment regulations.

Twenty officers relieved assignment and attached unassigned to 28th Replacement Depot, APO 318, 26 September 1945, for separation from the service under readjustment regulations.

Captain Leroy S. Simon, 0416179, FA, assumed command of the company.

Eight EM over 90 points relieved assignment and attached unassigned to Disposition Center, APO 318, effective 10 October 1945.

Six EM, 38 years of age or over, relieved assignment and attached unassigned to Disposition Center, APO 318, effective 10 October 1945.

Eight EM under 60 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th(EI) Rad Team, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 17 October 1945.

Eleven EM under 60 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th(DB) Msg Cen, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 17 October 1945.

Thirty Five EM 60 to 69 points relieved assignment and assigned 8th (DB) MC, Det 8, 4025th Signal Service Group, effective 20 October 1945.

One hundred and eighty five EM relieved assignment and assigned Hq 31st Infantry Division, APO 31, effective 17 October 1945.

Pursuant to authority contained in General Order 217, GHQ AFWESPAC, APO 707, dtd 10 October 1945, unit inactivated. No personnel assigned, attached unassigned or atchd from other organizations. Effective 10 October 1945.

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ENIWETOK

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

APO 957

18 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Report on Downside Operation

TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

        We left Pearl Harbor 23 January 1944 and sailed to Kwajalein Atoll. Here on 31 January and 1 February, 1944, the Army and Marines began their attack on Japs installed there. Our regiment, the 106th Inf was held in reserve to all operations within the atoll but as the operations went better than expected, we were not committed. However, we were constantly on the alert for an immediate movement to locations where reinforcements were necessary.

       After the Kwajalein Atoll was secured, we sailed on to Eniwetok for the Downside Operation. Here we were committed on 19 February 1944 on the island of Eniwetok. We were to go ashore in the fifth wave. The type of craft used were LVT’s or Alligators. To get into these craft we were transferred to an LST the night of 18 February and here set about loading our equipment into LVT’’s prior to the push in the morning.

      At 0745, 19 February, we roared out the front of the LST and joined other LVT's in our wave. There was only a very short rendezvous, not in circles but in about 100 yards advances toward the beach. At approximately 0945 our LVT first hit the coral and its bow reared up into the air, only to be struck by some sort of Jap shell in her bow. We shipped water very rapidly but due to the fact that we had touched the beach, it didn't sink. They took the LVT up out of the water and here on a beach, no more than 50' wide and 15 or so feet high, we unloaded. The greatest difficulty here was getting our equipment out of the LVT and onto dry land. The men were exposed about 12 feet above the beach as they put the equipment over the side of the LVT.

     We were originally ordered to land on beach Yellow II but were landed about 200 yards north of this location in very hostile territory. Here we met the 8th team completely set up and operating under all kinds of enemy fire. After a trip on two up and down the beach, I located the Shore Party Commander on his proper beach. We immediately moved all men and equipment of the 9th team to this location and set up our radio and switchboard.

      It had been planned by the Regiment Commanding Officer that we we would work one radio station in a three station net, consisting of one station at Yellow Beach I, one at Yellow Beach II, and one on board the AP40. It was approximately five minutes after we moved to our new location that our radio was set up and transmitting. There were several urgent messages awaiting transmission and as the battalion Signal section had been blown up while still in the water, we were practically the only means of communication from this beach to the transport.

      The transport did not have sufficient radio equipment nor personnel to man the frequency assigned to us so we received no answer. In fact we never did receive and answer for all of the four days that we were on the beach. However, we retuned our transmitter and receiver and sent the traffic to the AP40 over the regimental command net which was manned on the APA. We used this frequency and net throughout the operation. Wire was installed in short time and we had very little trouble on our local lines. However, the lateral line and the line to the inland battalion were constantly being removed from service by LVT's and bulldozers crossing the very narrow, steep beach. We ran many lines laterally before the area was secured to the extent of putting wire overhead. A great deal of trouble was encountered by foot troops on the island from hidden Jap snipers, so linemen were not ordered to climb and put wire overhead until the area had been secured and mopped up. Our 536 local net was useless as the frequency of the 536's were the same or very near to the SFC net and interference was terrific. The shore party commander did not desire the use of this net as all installations were so close together on our very limited beach, so we did not use them. We did not use all of our EE8A's on installation. On the third day ashore the inland battalion drew same from us for use inland. Shortly afterward we set up a signal dump on a bulldozer sled and issued equipment to the inland battalion as they needed it. Panels, our BD 71, extra wire, empty rubber bags,flags, batteries, signal lamp and other signal equipment salvaged from the beach were put in this dump. Our second 284 was given to the Commanding Officer of the inland battalion within about five hours of landing as his had all been destroyed.

      At night all men were dug in and blacked out and very little activity was in progress. Telephone operated all the time and radio very infrequently.

     From my observations of our activities and our surroundings, I would like to make the following suggestions for improvement of our operation toward fulfilling our mission:

     1. Our 284 radios are too large and bulky to get ashore as safely as could 610's which could be carried by less personnel and carried on the personnel at all times, therefore lessening the exposure to enemy fire during the period of unloading on the beach. We need our own personnel manning our radios on board ship to insure contact when it is most vital. 610's are voice radios which are used principally on landings and the range satisfactorily covers the distance between ship and shore stations. 130 assault wire is desired for its small bulk and ease in handling both in landing and setting up. In the whole four day operations we used less than 2 1/2 mile of wire and our lines were being replaced time after time all day long. A lighter type of switchboard would expedite unloading and make it much easier to dig in. The deep dry sand is quite difficult to maintain a deep hole in especially with huge explosions rocking the islands continually. No use of telegraph was made which eliminates the necessity of the repeater coils. Light wire and switchboards require less equipment to supplement them such as reel units.

     Our 03 rifles were issued for use with the grenade launcher but as we had no occasion to use this weapon, they could easily be omitted. Firing of grenades would have only resulted in killing our own troops in all directions inland and laterally. These weapons are clumsy for defense in a foxhole where our primary danger existed. Either carbines or TSMG's or .45 cal pistols would be more satisfactory, the ideal situation being nearly obtained if a11 weapons be alike for simplicity in obtaining ammunition. The above mentioned weapons can be fired rapidly and have a greater capacity than 03 rifle and are easier to use. Our waterproof covering were God-sends to us as sand and water were constantly jamming up unprotected weapons. On the trip from ship to shore, the LVT was flooded many times but our weapons and equipment were kept bone dry by our protective rubber bags and covers.

     In conclusion, I noted that throughout the invasion, it was not too difficult to accomplish our mission but with lighter, smaller equipment, we could have done a more efficient job not only as regards materials and supplies but in safeguarding the lives of our men.

                                                                                                                                                                                                Roy W. REPP
2nd Lt., 295th JASCO
Team 9

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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
18 March 1944

SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations Eniwetok Operation.

T0 : Commanding Officer, 295th JASCO.

        BLT 106-3 and attached units sailed from Pearl Harbor 23 Jan and arrived at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands on 29 Jan. After standing by as a floating reserve of this operation, a portion of the  task force, including BLT 106-3, acting on information captured from the Japs, sailed for Eniwetok Atoll. The captured information proved to be correct insofar as military installations were concerned but was not up to date as to the strength of the Jap garrison. Subsequent information revealed by natives on the captured island of Engebi, on Eniwetok Atoll, resulted in a complete revision of plan of attack on the island of Eniwetok as the Jap garrison was considerably larger than anticipated. All assault elements transferred from the transport to LST's on D-l day and on D-day personnel were boated in LVT’s located on the tank decks of the LST's and at 0730 headed for the rendezvous area. Due to the extremely narrow landing beach, waves were divided into small segments, so that each wave consisted of several small waves. Signal Detachment Team #8 was scheduled to land in the first segment of the third wave, but through error landed in the first segment of the first wave at approximately 0910.

        Since the beach was practically deserted, it was assumed initially that the inland battalion had departed inland and the hazards encountered previous to attaining the shelter of the Jap built, 15 foot high fire wall, caused no particular consternation. A large well built hole, dug in the side of the dune offered perfect protection and concealment for the large and bulky switchboards but the project was abandoned when it was determined that the hole contained several homicidally inclined Japs. All the installations were then dug in closer to the water's edge, all of which spots were later found to be directly under the muzzles of a Jap 70 MM Howitzer battery. At approximately H hour plus 30 minutes the 9th Signal Team landed on this same beach and departed south where other elements of their battalion were then landing. Shortly afterward the third battalion shore party landed about 200 yards north of the original beach and established themselves there. It was then decided to move installations closer to the Shore Party and the movement was effected swiftly. The swiftness was probably occasioned by mortar fire to the left, mortar fire to the rear, and hostile small arms fire to the right (inland). Upon reaching the shore party area mortar shells commenced falling like hail stones. The Japs were attempting to hit a large number of DUKW’s which were landing a battalion of Field Artillery and as the shells were falling somewhat short,the shore party was receiving most of the fire.The DUKW’s were driven off about the time the mortar shells were falling approximately 3 or 4 feet from the ditch in which lay most of the Shore Party. After the installations were dug in this time, very little further trouble was encountered except from snipers and marauding Japs who infiltrated at night.

       No difficulty was experienced in getting any message to its destination although it was necessary several times to use nets other than those assigned. Snipers made it impossible to string wire overhead and the tracked vehicles constantly cut the lateral and inland telephone lines. Radio was the only dependable means of communication for the first 2 days and there was no failure of this medium. However the U.S.S. Custer failed to respond on the Army Ship-Shore net and after 3 days, this radio was turned over to the battalion to replace one of theirs which had burned out a generator. The Custer responded properly on the Navy Ship-Shore net. The erstwhile lateral net radio was tuned to the frequency of the Regimental Command Net and some traffic was sent out over this net. Most of the traffic was received and sent over the Inland radio which was an SCR 195 furnished by the Infantry. On about the third day wire was placed overhead and no further repairs were necessary. There was no delay of any kind in delivering messages to destinations as all were clear text and sent vocally. Encoding or CW would have occasioned some delay and virtually all messages were urgent in the assault phase.
        On the fifth day all equipment was turned over to the Regimental  Communication Officer and attached Assault Units sailed for Pearl Harbor.

RECOMMENDATIONS

        1. The B0-71 and/or BO-72 should be replaced by the special assault switchboard weighing only a few pounds. The weight and bulk of the normal switchboard make it extremely unmanageable for assault work under fire.

        2. The regular Inland, and Navy Ship Shore Nets should be retained but the Lateral Net should have its own PERSONNEL & RADIO ABOARD SHIP as the ships are generally unreliable.

        3. The SCR 284 should be supplanted by some small, compact, battery ' "-I. The Sea 284-should be supplanted by some small, compact, battery , operated set which can be unloaded easily and set up quickly, such as the SCR 610. Lack of versatility would be offset by the above mentioned shipboard installation which would have all nets available.

        4. W130-B should be issued in lieu of W110-B as the latter is too bulky and heavy for temporary assault installation. The prime consideration, however, is for the safety of the men who have to unload all this bulk under enemy fire.

        5. The Thompson Sub Machine Gun appears to be far superior to the Carbine for use by Signal men. It is much less susceptible to stoppage from sand and is much easier to handle from a fox hole. The '03 rifle is useless as its grenade launcher cannot be used successfully except by assault infantry. Highly recommend men be armed with pistol in addition to Tommy Guns.

        6. Each man should have at least twenty dollars in order that he may purchase items from the ship’s store, and buy chits for use in the ship's barber shop, and the ship's soda fountain - mostly the latter as it is a long, hot, trip.

        7. Men should have locks for Duffle bags as there is considerable pilfering, but there was no case of a locked Duffle bag being slit and robbed.

        8. CHAP-STICKS should be an item of issue. Most men suffered from lack of this or similar preparation.

CHARLES C. GILLIAM
1st Lt., Sig C

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HEADQUARTERS 27th INFANTRY DIVISION
A.P.O. #957

c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA                                                                                                                                           19 March 1944

S E C R E T

Subject: Report on Use of Air Support, Eniwetok Island, 19-21 February 1944

To:  Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, APO 958,
           c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. (THRU: Channels)

       1. A total of eighteen (18) air strikes were performed in close support of the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, at ENIWETOK Island on 19-21 February 1944. All these missions were flown in response to requests from the Battalion Commander through his Air Liaison Officer. It is believed that this is the most extensive use of close air support at the call of a single battalion for a comparable period of time on record in this theater.

       Air bombardment was conducted in areas in front of the infantry to blast enemy positions. Frequently, these target areas were selected in advance of artillery or naval gunfire, thereby alleviating the necessity for ceasing that supporting fire to permit air strikes. The target charts were carefully studied by the Battalion Commander and Air Liaison Officer and those areas in advance of the troops that appeared most suited for defensive positions were placed under air bombardment.

        Strafing attacks were performed in preparation for an infantry advance and were conducted as close to friendly front lines as was necessary. All strafing and bombing strikes were accurate, timely, and performed in good order. There were no casualties among friendly troops as a result of our air support in missions called for this battalion. While it was difficult to determine the actual effects of this support because of the complete devastation, it is felt that the strafing and bombing was both destructive and neutralizing, and materially aided the infantry in the accomplishment of its mission.

        Examples:

          (a) Bombs finally silenced enemy mortar fire that had been quite harassing.
          (b) Strafing tended to cause the Japs to run out of the brush to the beaches where they were killed by our troop
          (c) Many bodies were found with large holes in them that very likely were caused by .50 caliber fire.
          (d) Strafing from a dive angle of 45° -60° penetrated the underground installations that were lightly covered and inflicted casualties in them.
          (e) A near-miss uncovered an installation which was observed by the pilot who immediately requested permission to attack. It required not over three (3) minutes to obtain clearance for the attack. This attack was successful in helping to neutralize this area.

      2. APPREHENSION AMONG FRIENDLY TROOPS. Despite the fact that strafing and bombing were extremely accurate, an undue amount of apprehension existed among them as indicated by the following:

         (a) In a strafing attack on 20th of February in support of an advance, a tank commander repeatedly charged that VF fire was hitting his tanks. This was not so, since the Air Liaison Officer was in the front line and observed that the fire was falling sufficiently in front of the tanks. Empty brass was falling among them. Although this was pointed out, the Battalion Commander was finally compelled to order the attack to cease.
         (b) At another instance, troops thinking an air attack was coming beat a hasty retreat some fifty (50) feet as an added safety precaution. This was not necessary and such action is a "dead give-away" to the enemy of what is about to happen.
         (c) In a strafing mission on 21st of February, VF were laying a continuous preparation fire across the battalion front. The Battalion Commander and this officer were in the front lines observing the effects of the attack. Again apprehension was felt by the troops although the fire was definitely observed falling in the area requested. It was necessary for the Air Liaison Officer to persuade the troop commander not to call off the mission, Later, at the commander’s request, the VF were ordered to strafe areas further in advance of the troops. This was accomplished immediately. In this instance, control of aircraft already engaged in a mission was exceptionally well-effected.
          (d) Later, after troops had been accustomed to close support, they gained confidence and moved forward closely behind their supporting air attacks.

           Recommendations. More air ground exercises wherein aircraft bomb and fire in front of the infantry must be conducted prior to an operation. Ground troops should also have an indoctrination course in bomb effects and air support tactics.

           Air Liaison Officers should maintain a position as far forward as practical in order to observe the results of air strikes and to be able to take immediate action in the event of inaccurate bombing or strafing, and also to give CSA any necessary corrections to improve the effect.

      3. COMMUNICATIONS. Radio communication was excellent. The Air Liaison Officer remained forward with the troop commander during all air attacks and communicated with his radio station at the CP by means of SCR 536 radio. In several instances, more effective communication and orientation would have resulted had he been able to talk directly with the Air Coordinator. It was not possible to bring his SCR 193 that far forward.

                      Front line panels were not always displayed. In attacks that were delivered several hundred yards in advance of the line, it was not thought necessary to put them out. They were displayed, however, whenever requested by the air, and whenever close strafing was expected.

       4. COOPERATION. The cooperation of the Battalion Commander was excellent. Missions were suggested by the Air Liaison Officer as frequently as he deemed advisable. These were always accepted by the Battalion Commander with an open mind. From the experience gained in this operation, it is felt that unless the Air Liaison Officer is accepted as an advisor to the Battalion Commander and remains close to him during the operation, many opportunities to use air support effectively will be neglected. Usually a troop commander is busy with his other responsibilities and can not be alert for every opportunity to use air support advantageously. The Air Liaison Officer must constantly suggest the use of air whenever its need is indicated. To do this, the Air Liaison Officer must have prestige in the eyes of the troop commander and his officers and men. One good means of obtaining such prestige is to be well informed on all phases of the air plan, on the capabilities and limitations of aircraft and bombs, on current air support tactics, on the ground plan of operation. He should have his own plan of operation well thought out and make absolutely clear what he can and cannot do, and exactly what assistance and cooperation he must have from the infantry.
                 This officer conducted orientation classes on use of air support while enroute to the objective. He kept himself posted at all times (thru CSA) as to what aircraft were available for missions, weight and number of bombs to be used on each strike, number of aircraft to be employed, when every "pass" in a strike was about to start. He further kept himself posted constantly on the location of the front lines (thru Air Observer) and was able to advise, and sometimes correct, the troop commander. He was always advised when the strike had been completed and passed this information to the troop commander immediately.

         5. PROCEDURE. When q mission was decided upon, the time aircraft would be available was obtained from CSA. The location of the front line was given as accurately as possible. The Battalion Commander would pass the word along to his front line elements to stop and take cover at a certain time, usually about ten (10) minutes before the attack was to commence; panel were displayed in as conspicuous location as possible, i.e., on rear upper level of tanks, in clearings, on beaches, etc. Naval gunfire, tank fire, artillery and mortar fire were stopped if necessary. As soon as the air attack was completed, CSA notified the Air Liaison Officer who was alongside the Battalion Commander and the troops moved forward immediately. This did not hold up the advance of the line unduly in the last strafing mission, troops were moving forward within five minutes after the attack was completed.

          6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

              (a) In strafing, after the effective firing has ceased, a section should make another pass firing a safe distance ahead of the advancing troops for the purpose of deceiving the enemy and keeping him uncertain and pinned down. The Japs were fairly quick t resume their positions on cessation of fire.
               (b) Strafing should be used as close to our front lines as safety permits, but bombing should not be conducted closer than 200 yards to our troops except for extreme cases. One bomb in the wrong place would cause a lack of confidence among all ground troops and tend to nullify the advantage of close support.
               (c) Troop commander must be impressed with the necessity for keeping his line under control if he wishes to use air. Tanks also must be held up or brought back into the line.
               (d) Flotation gear should be provided for AGL equipment. This should include carbon-dioxide inflatable space incorporated into waterproof bags of portable radio equipment.
               (e) Small maps of the area to be attacked, such as the air target and gunnery charts, should be supplied to troop officers. They were constantly using the Air Liaison Officer’s maps rather than their own which were not as easily handled.

            7. The Naval Air personnel who supported this operation should be commended on the organization of their attacks, the dispatch with which they responded to a call for support, and the marksmanship and accuracy with which they executed their missions. The commander of TF 106-3 should be commended upon the manner in which he personally controlled his troops and upon the cooperation with which he received and put into effect the suggestions and requests of the Air Liaison Party.

THOMAS W. HEFFERAN, JR.,
Captain, Air Corps,
Air Liason Officer, TF 106-3

[Identical Document addressed to Regimental and Battalion Commanders over signature of HAROLD F. GREIR
Lt. Colonel, AGD, Adjutant Genera is not reproduced here.]l

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KWAJALEIN

Report of Flint Lock Operation as Observed by Lt. Howell
  17 February 1944

       I embarked aboard APA 55 D-9 days for the flint lock operations. I was attached to BLT 17-3 as a Signal Observer. The following is a report of my observations as they occurred. The conclusion of this report will contain recommendations which I feel will be beneficial in future operations.

      Shortly after the convoy had sailed a conference was held of all Troop Officers and attached Officers by the Battalion Commander and a complete briefing of the ensuing operation was had. The complete operation was described and discussed. The missions of all units concerned were described and opened for discussion. The orders and maps were made available for study. The mission of BLT 17-3 was primarily that of support for BLT 17-1 and 17-2. However alternate plans were also in readiness in case of situation changes. A ship board Training Schedule and areas for training were announced by the Battalion S-3. This schedule included Orientation Periods for Troops by Battalion Staff Officers and members of the JICPOA Team aboard, Physical Training and Training in the use of explosives.

      I observed the Training of the Shore Party Communication team during the trip to the Transport rendezvous area. Other than the Periods of Physical Training time was spent in map study, S.O.I. drills and mission of the team upon landing. The training aboard ship was sufficient to enable the team to set up a beach in a minimum of time. Radio operators were very familiar with call signs and frequencies, wire men were well up on what work would be required of them and message center personnel were drilled in the use of Shackler code and the AWC.

      Prior to D-day hand carried equipment was taken from the small closet which the Shore Party Signal Officer was able to arrange for to store Team equipment in and given to the men assigned to carrying same in. This closet or locker was on the main deck and enabled the team to get to their equipment on short notice. However small pieces of equipment were kept by the troops in their compartments.

      Reveille on D-day was at 0-300 with breakfast at 0330. Small boats were lowered into the water rapidly and circled off the transport waiting for call to their nets. Some of the small boats were davit loaded and the balance net loaded. H-Hour for the assault on Carlos and Carlson Islands was set for 0-930. BLT 17-3 was to be a floating reserve waiting on call from BLT 17-1 and BLT 17-2. All Landing Teams were in the water during the Naval shelling of these two Islands. After the Assault Battalions had landed it was decided that BLT 17-3 would land on Carlos Island. No support being required on either Island.

      Upon landing on Carlos Island in the afternoon of D-day I found that the Shore Party Communication Team attached to BLT 17-1 had set up the necessary beach communication. One Radio (TBX) being operated in the Ship to Shore net. One Radio (SCR 610) operating in the Traffic Boat Control net. And one Radio (SCR 284) maintaining a listening watch in the Rgt Command net. No lateral communicaitons were in operation as there were no adjacent beaches. Communication with the Shore Party Communication team attached to BLT 17-2 on Carlson Island could be had through the Rgt Comd net if necessary. Wire communications with the SPC -Bn Headquarters and O.P. 2 was installed.

      BLT 17-3 was moved toward the southern end of the Island (Island was completely secured at this time) and bivouaced for the night. A beach on the lagoon side fo the Island was found more suitable for landing supplies. The SP Communication Team with BLT 17-3 and Co Commander of the 50th Engr Bn proceeded to set up and make this beach ready for operation. The transport Division had moved into the lagoon at this time. A green light was erected for the right flank marker and a white light was used to mark the left flank. The Naval Section of the beach party proceeded to order the small boats in to shore. First boat load of suppplies moved across this beach at approximately 2130. The SP Comm. Team had in the meantime placed a TBX Radio in the Ship to Shore net, a SCR 284 in the Rgt Comd net maintaining a listening watch only, and a SCR 610 in the Boat Control net. Wire communication was established with the beach operated by BLT 17-1 Shore Party on the Ocean side of the Island and with the SPC Comm BLT 17-3 - Bn Hq BLT 17-3 and the outposts set up for security of the Beach Party. Assault Wire (W 130) was used for this purpose. No local net (SCR 536) was necessary on this beach as the length of the beach would not exceed fifty yards. Message center was set up in the center of the beach along the dune line. However SCR 536’s were available for the purpose. The switchboard used for the purpose of wire communication was ABD 72. Security for the beach was furnished by the Co C 50th Engrs and consisted of 3 .30 Cal. water cooled machine guns. The Naval Section used Visual signalling to guide the smaller boats in. Supplies were unloaded across this beach for approximately 4 hours. And then only after several boats had become beached was it decided to suspend unloading until daylight.

      D and 1 found the beach on the lagoon side of the Carlos Island again in operation. Engineers were repairing the pier which had been damaged by shelling but could with minor repairs be used for handling supplies. Msg Center was moved down nearer the foot of the pier as this was the most convenient location when supplies were started across the pier. I checked the fox holes and camouflage of the shore party installations and found them excellent. Upon checking the wire installations I found them too low but upon talking with one of the Shore Party Wire men and found that the lines were being policed and raised at the time. A wire line had been added to Rgt Hq. This enabled the SP to communicate with any installation on the Island. Radio communication remained the same as before (TBX in ship to shore, SCR 610 in Boat Control net and SCR 284 maintaining a listening watch in the Rgt Comd net). There were sufficient Naval Signal men to maintain communication with all small boats and a PA system had been added for additional control of incoming boats. Additional wire lines were being added to the SP switchboard as requested and the SP wire team started to repair the W 130 used in the assault phase with W 110. A complete log was being kept in Message Center of all incoming and outgoing traffic. This log contained time filed, time cleared and a description of the text. Up to the late evening all traffic had been handled in the clear with the exception of one message which had be encoded in the AWC. Radios were operating on voice having handled only one message in C.W. During the night of D plus 1 all radios stood by on a listening watch and Message Center was operated all night. Incoming supplies were stopped shortly after dark.

      D plus 2 BLT 17-3 was ordered to embark aboard APA 55 for the night preparatory to supporting an assault on Burton Island by BLT 17-1. The Shore Party Comm Team was to remain behind on Carlos Island and only the SP Comm Team attached to BLT 17-1 was to accompany. I arranged to accompany a detachment of the 50th Engrs on this operation in order to observe communications on this operation. Aboard the APA 55 briefing by the Co Comdrs and Detachment Comdrs was conducted. Reveille on D plus 3 and immediately after breakfast troops and Detachments of BLT 17-3 were embarked in small boats as a floating reserve for BLT 17-1. H-Hour was at 0930 and landing was to be effected on Orange Beach 4 which was at the southernmost tip of this island. Air and Naval bombardment preceded the initial landing and the reserve was across the same beach. Troops were transferred from LCUs to gators prior to landing. I landed with the 50th Engr Detachment and we were met by M.P.s who guided us to an area selected for bivouacing. Fighting was still in progress upon landing. Machine gun fire was aimed at the gators as they crossed the beach. The machine gun was out of range and no damage was done. Only about 400 yards of the island had been completely secured, at this time. I found that visual flank markers had been set up and a SCR 610 was in the beach control net. Signalmen were in fox holes on the beach available for contact with small boats. TBX was in the ship to shore net and a SCR 284 was maintaining a listening watch in the Rgtl. Comd. net. Wire communication included BLT 17-1, BLT 17-3 - SPC Message Center, Beach Master Radio Stations and the outposts. Message Center was well dug in beach not camouflaged. The Message Center log showed time and description of the messages. All traffic had been handled by voice and in the clear. Approximately 30 messages were handled in the first day of this operation. A concise log was being maintained by the Message Center Chief. However Message Center had encountered some difficulty in having all outgoing traffic pass thru this agency, several attempts having been made by officers to give outgoing messages directly to radio operators. Immediately after dark a Japanese ack-ack gun opened fire on this end of the island causing all beach personnel to remain closely in their foxholes. This fire continued up until approximately 0300 D plus 4 days. A mortar battery set up a short distance back of the dune lines was attempting to knock out this gun. I went over to the comabat point for this battery and found the six mortars in the battery were controlled by telephone from the control point. EE8 telephones and W-130 wire was being used for this purpose. I found that their communication was being continually interrupted by the Cannon Co’s tanks moving in. Their wire lines had not been placed at sufficient height to protect them from being broken by the tanks.

      At daylight on D plus 4 I went out to Orange Beach and checked with the SPC. I found that only supplies as were actually necessary for this operation were being brought in and that these supplies were being requested as needed. Prisoners and casualties were being evacuated across this beach also. Activity on the beach was light and the personnel on this beach were staying well under cover. Small amounts of supplies crossed the beach all morning but the work was so light that a detail from the shore party was put to work collecting and burying enemy dead. All resistance ceased and the island was declared completely secured shorty after noon hour. The balance of the day was spent in general policing and picking up of equipment. At approximately 2030 the shore party communication was ordered secured and prepared for embarkation. I embarked aboard LST 226 at 2300 and attended a briefing of the following days operation.

      D plus 5 I landed with the assault troops on Beverly Island in the second wave. No shore party troops were landed on this operation as very little resistance was met and the assault troops were only ashore approximately 2 hours. However, I did observe that a SCR 536 carried by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer failed to function at first but was finally got into operation. Contact could be maintained by the Liaison Officer and the front lines by the Bn Radio (SCR 300). So no confusion resulted. Upon securing this island the troops embarked for Carlos Island where we bivouaced for the night. Upon arriving back at Carlos Island I found that in the absence of Division wire personnel they had been called upon to install a wire system on the island. I found approximately 18 telephones working out of a telephone central located near the Supply Beach. SP Message Center was still in operation.

      D plus 6 the Bn were ordered to prepare for embarkation aboard the APA’s for the journey back to our base. I boarded the APA 11 approximately 1530 this day.

      D plus 8 we sailed from the Lagoon. A meeting was called of officers and a training schedule and training areas were announced. The remainder of the trip back was uneventfull.

      In view of the observations I was able to make, is respectfully submitted the following recommendations and the reasons for same:

      1. That each SPC communication team be allowed to carry a 1/4 ton truck and trailer to assist in getting its equipment ashore.

      2. Each team be required to carry at least 4 Dr 8’s with W-130 wire. This wire can be carried by two men and wire can be laid in four division echelons at once.

      3. That at least 8 lance poles be landed in the assault phase. Not all beaches will have trees available for overheading wire and it is imperative that wire be overhead immediately.

      4. That personnel be given additional training in the value of camouflage. Also training in camouflage methods.

      5. That a conference be held between the SPC, SPC Sig Officer, and B.M. prior to operation for the purpose of coordination and mutual understanding.

      6. That personnel be thoroughly instructed in the danger of Booby Traps and Duds - personnel was found to be extremely lax on this item.

      7. That a 3-day supply of batteries be carried ashore in the initial phase for all battery operated equipment. On two instances SCR 610’s were out of service due to lack of fresh batteries

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OBSERVATIONS AT BURLESQUE AND CAMOUFLAGE (ROI ISLAND)
KWAJALEIN ATOLL, M. I., FEBRUARY1944.

        The Naval gunfire and bombing was so heavy and devastating that it was hard for this observer to believe any living thing could have survived until D-day. All machine-gun emplacements, pillboxes and block-houses were located and completely neutralized, except for one two-story block-house on camouflage which subsequently proved to be an ammunition storage depot.

        Bombers effectively neutralized all air strips on camouflage; wrecked and burned the two hangars, and destroyed approximately eighty planes of all types on the ground. Only three planes tried to take the air and these were shot down.

        The defenders evidently expected the attack to come from sea ward where their heaviest fortifications and installations
were located. However the landing was effected from inside the lagoon where most of the reef dangers were eliminated and the beaches better adapted to amphibious operations. Landings were effected under a naval barrage and our casualties were small. The Japanese resistance was not severe, though their casualties were very heavy. It is estimated that their losses were between 25 and 30 to 1 as compared to ours. It is this observers belief that most of the Japanese casualties occurred before our forces landed. in covering both islands thoroughly, I do not believe you could find a spot where a circle could be drawn with a 12 foot radius that would not contain a shell hole or bomb crater.

         Japanese small arms ammunition and aerial incendiary bombs were scattered all over both islands. From the thousands of beer bottles I saw in the pill-boxes and trenches I would say that the Japs were allowed some of the better things of life. Many were cultivating small vegetable gardens closely adjacent to their dugouts.

        The pill-boxes and block-houses were built of reinforced steel and concrete and all interior partitions wore of the same construction. The entire shore line was studded with pill-boxes at intervals of 1 to 200 feet. Their large gun positions were all knocked out as were their radar and radio stations. Their radar equipment seemed crude.

FEBRUARY 4

        AS I left the Island this afternoon there were still an undetermined few of the enemy scattered about Camouflage. They hide in tunnels and underbrush during the day and forage for food at night. They have accounted for 20-odd Marine casualties during the past two days. Prisoners, as usual, were few and included among them were some women who had no visible means of support other than their native attractiveness.

        The "dead disposal squads" , who are all volunteers, have had a busy four days. I saw three trenches each approximately 50 yards long, 15 feet wide, and 8 feet deep half filled with dead Japs, and two others that had been covered over with a sign "279 JAPS BURIED HERE." I saw one water filled bomb crater and counted 15 Japs and 1 pig floating in the bloody water. I saw small fragments of dead bodies being swept from the floor of 1 block-house which the Navy was making ready for headquarters site. The stench of death pervades both islands.

        The communications men were busy stringing wire everywhere along the beaches and the bulldozers and trucks were tearing the hell out of it. The beaches were lined with LCT'S, V'S, M'S, LST'S, Alligators and Ducks. The ensign who manned the control boat seemed completely bewildered and hoped somebody would come along-side who knew which beach he was supposed to land on. But in spite of the control boat and the lack of lifting gear ashore, the cargo boats are plying from ship to shore all day and all night and the strategic materials and supplies are hitting the beach in tremendous volume. The large C-2 type ships are being completely discharged in 4 days. The assault troops are beginning to move out and the garrison forces and operating units are moving in.

FEBRUARY 5

        The electric lights are burning brightly over Burlesque and Camouflage tonight. One air strip is already fit for service and both islands are well secured with numerous AA batteries.

I further observed that there were enough K rations scattered around to have fed me well for months. The Marines tell me they are short on cigarettes and I think lots of the K ration boxes are opened Just to obtain the cigarettes and the food then cast aside. It is definitely recommended that a bountiful supply of cigarettes be sent in as soon after the first wave lands as possible.

The assault troops hit the beaches travelling light, carrying only their rifles, knives, spare ammunition and canteens.  Their packs were sent in later.

FEBRUARY 7

        Last night three unidentified planes were located twelve miles away. We stood G.Q. for 1 hour and 15 minutes. No raid, but during the alert all ships sent out their small boats with smoke pots. The smoke screen set up was very effective.

FROM USS MARYLAND -- NEWS BULLETIN, FEB 9

        Vice-Admiral Terou Akiyma killed at Camouflage.

         Japanese losses outnumbered those of the attacking Americans by approximately 30 to 1.

        Admiral Nimitz announced that the Japanese suffered losses of 8122 killed, 264 captured for a total of 8386. Losses of American soldiers, sailors, and marines were 286 killed, 82 missing, 1148 wounded for a total of 1516.

        The conquest of the KwaJalein Atoll was accomplished at a cost far less than the Gilbert Islands battle in November, in which Americans lost 1092 killed and 2680 wounded in a far smaller operation. This was due in large part because the Yanks were able to put to good use the lessons learned in the Gilberts and the surface ship and plane bombardments that preceded the landings on Kwajalein were probably the greatest in the history of warfare.

        There was no evidence of mines either outside or inside the lagoon. Marine assault troops report that they found no land or personnel mines or booby traps.

        A Jap transport, sunk in the initial bombardment, lies about 1200 yards due south of Camouflage in the lagoon.

FEBRUARY 8

        No alerts for the past two nights. More cargo ships have moved into the lagoon. The islands are brilliantly lighted tonight as work goes on 24 hours per day. All cargo ships are using sufficient lights to discharge.

        Three battleships and two cruisers left the lagoon this morning. The SARATOGA and two AA Cruisers departed this afternoon. We have seen various task groups leave and return in from 48 to 72 hours, indicating that they are carrying out other bombardment missions close by.

        We received 100 marines from the assault forces this afternoon. They report that 15 more Japs were killed last night. It seems that Camouflage was literally covered with underground tunnels.

        We expect about 1500 marines aboard tomorrow. They present a miserable spectacle, with a week's growth of beard, and fatigue uniforms torn and dirty.

FEBRUARY 9

        Last night at 2030 we were alerted for unidentified planes. All ships set up a smoke screen. Planes approached within 15 miles and then disappeared.

        Today we completed discharging and took 1400 marine assault troops aboard. These marines are a part of the 4th Marine Division, and came assault loaded direct from San Diego. Some came all the way in LST’S.

        We are ready to get under way now, but must await the reloading of the other ships in our task Group. The Commodore has made me Officer Guard Mail messenger. Each morning I make a trip to the MARYLAND to pick up Guard Mail for task Group 51.6 and take messages to the Chief of Staff, Task Force 53 for the Commodore.

FEBRUARY 11

        At 1300 today the Navy took over the islands from the Marines. The Island Base Commander is Captain Gwen, USN. The Garrison Group is composed of Acorn 21, the 109th CB Battalion, the Marine Guard, and the Harbor Control Group. There are about 4500 men in this Garrison Group.

        Among the group we are transporting back to the Maui Base is Lt. Col. Carlson of the Carlson's Raiders fame.

        So many marines complain that their carbines were not effective after getting wet and clogged with sand. There was some complaint of the .45's, but no complaint of the M-1 and Browning. Bazookas were used in this operation also.

FEBRUARY 12

        Well, Tojo reaped his revenge upon us this morning. Quoted below is the Navy Intelligence Officer's report of the air raid:"0200--By radio from Island Base Commander of Roi Island. TG alerted for approaching enemy aircraft bearing 245 degrees, distance 51 miles; succeeding bearings and distances 295 degrees--45 miles; 285 degrees--45 miles; 325 degrees--45 miles. Number and types undetermined

         0209--Condition Red assumed--all hands called to G.Q.
         0215--Smoke pots on ships and small boats set off
.        0220-- four search lights on Roi Island searching skies
.        0229--AA firing on Roi Island and from 3 ships in the lagoon.
         0240-_Several large bombs were dropped on Roi Island and direct hits made on the fuel and munitions stores piled on the southern beach, setting off tremendous fires and explosions from the munitions and rolling flames and smoke from the fuel. Immediately after the first bomb struck a stick of about 8 small bombs were observed bursting in succession north of the southern beach of Roi. All AA fire ceased and searchlights went out when first bombs hit.
          0420--smoke pots secured by order of Island Base Commander.
          0440--All clear.
          0600--Ships of TG sent boats and medical officers and corpsmen and medical supplies to Roi and to SS TYPHOON--that ship having been designated to receive all casualties from Roi.
          0900--Fires on Roi Island still burning.

_ _ _ _ _ _

        At about 0240 a bomb struck the water about 1000 yards off our starboard quarter. We were well Covered by our smoke screen at this time, as were most of the ships in the lagoon; however, some ship abeam of us in the vicinity of the MARYLAND and the BALTIMORE opened up with AA fire. Fires started on the beach simultaneously, with direct hits made in our oil and ammunition dumps. As the oil drums exploded it sounded like heavy gunfire, and the tracers from the ammunition dumps looked like a mammoth 4th of July celebration. I counted 8 different fires at one time.

        At 0600 the Commodore ordered me to Yokohama Pier on Camouflage to dispatch the casualties in LCV'S to the SS TYPHOON. I dispatched 23 boats with a total number of 252 wounded to the TYPHOON BY 0930. Better than 65 percent of these men had head injuries, and 5 died enroute to the TYPHOON. After combing both islands and seeing that the stream of wounded was reduced to a mere trickle of walking cases I moved back out to the TYPHOON. We were not able to get all the wounded aboard until 1400. At about 1700 we saw the last fire extinguished on Burlesque. When I left the TYPHOON there were only 11 known dead, although we hadn't had any recent intelligence from the beach.

        At 1800 we departed along with the SS ROBIN WENTLEY bound for Maui with about 3100 marines aboard the two ships.

    C. W. HUSSEY

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MAJURO

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
2 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Report and Recommendations, Majuro Operation.

                  TO : Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

             1. Attached units departed aboard the USS Cambria on 22 Jan 44.

             2. On 23 January 1944 destination was revealed and maps, photos, and orders issued, and information disseminated to enlisted men.

             3. Officers were required to stand compartment guard duty enroute.

             4. On D day, 31 January, the harbor of Majuro was entered and the approach to objective made, following the mine sweepers. Naval gunfire was being launched and aircraft on station for missions. Word from reconnaissance troops put ashore during the night caused gunfire and strafing to be ceased. At approximately noon the atoll was declared occupied and placed under the Military Governorship of C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, U.S.N. The C.O. and staff went ashore for reconnaissance and troops remained aboard until D plus 1 when a non-tactical move ashore was exercised. Attempts were made for release of attached units at this time, to no avail; the reason given was the expectancy and probability of another mission assignment for the BLT.

             5. From D plus 1 until D plus 22, a constant effort to obtain release was maintained. On D plus 22 attached JASCO personnel were detached to the Island Commander for disposition.

             6. Arrangements were made and troops embarked aboard AO 75 USS Saugatuck 230700 for return to Pearl.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. I recommend a thorough document describing JASCO in its entirety be prepared and distributed to all infantry units.

                              2. I strongly recommend a change in T/O for A.G.L. teams to be armed with the carbine except the driver                                 who should carry a TSMG.

                               3. It is urgent that A.G.L. teams be increased in enlisted strength to six (6) men involving an additional                                  radio operator, radio mechanic, and a basic.

                               4. Iron bound orders involving immediate release of personnel should accompany units being detached.

                               5. A.G.L. officers should contact the Commander Support Aircraft prior to sailing for briefing on                                  subsequent missions.

  WILSON H. DONKLE
Capt., A.C.
295th Joint Assault Sig Co

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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957
SFC SECTION

                                                                                                                                                5 March 1944

SUBJECT:  Report of Operations, SFC Team #5.

TO:  Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

       1. Naval Gunfire was not necessary on the Sundance Operation. Prearranged shore bombardment commenced as scheduled, but ceased upon receipt of reconnaisance reports.

       2. After the BLT had completed its landing operation and it was ascertained that no naval gunfire would be used, I contacted the Battalion Commander in reference to release of my team, and acting as officer in charge of J.A.S.Co. units as directed by Battalion Adjutant, I represented Signal and A.G.L. teams. I received no satisfaction and was told merely that no release could be given as yet.

      3. At different times during our stay on the island I inquired of the Battalion Commander about our release. I know that the other team commanders did likewise. Each and every answer I received was different from the previous one.

      4. Orders issued for our release by 295th were ignored. These orders were issued with CPA authority.

      5 . Duties not in accord with normal duties and functions of both officers and men were assigned to us. Attached orders will indicate that. The E.M. of the J.A.S.CO. were assigned such duties as road repair and care and guard duty which seemed to come quite often. Privates were standing guard every other night.

     6. Recommendations: I recommend that in future operations , orders assigning members of the J.A.S.CO to various units indicate that teams are assigned for special duty only (combat mission). Also I believe that separate orders for each team be made out for release so that when each team’s mission is complete it may be relieved as their combat efficiency is no longer present. Therefore, when Naval Gunfire ceases, the SFC team should be relieved.

JOHN J. COHEN
Capt., F.A.

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295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957

                                                                                                                                            14 March 1944.

SUBJECT:  Report on Sundance Operation.

TO :  Commanding Officer, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company.

        On 22 January 1944 the team embarked upon the Cambria and sailed from Honolulu on the 23rd.

        Although bunks were allotted us, none were available and the men had to sleep and live on the deck. This situation was reported to the proper officers but nothing was done to rectify it.

        While enroute to Sundance Atoll, orientation classes were had daily. The information given the officers was transmitted to the men at the earliest convenience.

        On D-1 day the Marine Rcn unit attached to BLT-2 landed and found no opposition. The Navy was notified and immediately ceased fire.

        The Cambria and its escort sailed into the lagoon on D day with no opposition. A small reconnaissance party went ashore and when they returned the battalion commander decided to wait until D plus 1 to debark the troops.

        On D plus 1 the troops went ashore and prepared living quarters.

        The communication team set up a switchboard and had communication with Battalion Headquarters. Later on as dumps were established, we laid lines to them. This was the extent of our communication while supplies were being carried over the beach.

        On D plus 2 day we were detached from the Engineers and attached the Headquarters Company for duty. The men helped the battalion communication section in laying wire, standing radio watch, and operating the battalion headquarter’s switchboard. These same men were also called upon to do K.P., Guard Duty, and to help build roads. This additional duty was questioned by Captain Donkle and Captain Cohen, but it could not be helped.

        The Battalion Commander refused to release us until 23 February. Repeated efforts were made to obtain this release prior to this date because there was no assault phase and transportation was available at all times.

        On 23 February we boarded the tanker U.S.S. Saugatuck and proceeded to Pearl Harbor, reaching there 1 March. We then procured transportation and came directly to the Company Area.

        I recommend that future orders be so worded that release from combat units may be assured. Also that the new, modified, lightweight version of the BD-72,together with five miles of W-130 be used in the initial assault phase of the landing.

  MANNING A. ELDRIDGE
1st Lt., 295th JASCO

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SAIPAN

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[ There follows a long list of missions requested and disposition of requests. These missions are not reproduced here. The missions are found in the preceding Report.]

19 Oct 44 Unit arrived Bougainville Solomon Islands 1100. Debarked from USS Cape Johnson 1500.
      Entrucked for camp area and arrived 1530.

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LINGAYEN GULF

HEADQUARTERS

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL C0MPANY
APO 321 c/o PM SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

26 March 1944

HIST0RICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE M - 1 OPERATION

SECTION I

BACKGROUND

.         1. The plan called for an amphibious assault by major units on the shores of Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, P.I. The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company was attached for the operation to the 37th Infantry Division, to furnish necessary Shore Party, Shore Fire Control, and Air Ground Liaison communications.

             a. The target beach extended from the mouth of the Dagupan River on the east to the mouth of the Calmay River on the west. The beach gradient was quite steep, generally about 2 fathoms at 100 yards from the water line. The terrain was flat, checkerboarded with fish ponds and rice paddies. The beach itself extended approximately 90 yards inland to the paddies. The entire area was honeycombed with rivers and swampland, a fact which presented some little trouble, as indicated in Section II of this report.

        2. The Lingayen Gulf area was in the hands of the Japanese for approximately 3 years, and was considered to be consequently well fortified for defense. The nature of the terrain was well suited to defensive action and made offensive assault most difficult. The road net was such that our communications could be easily disrupted by a small number of enemy troops and our advance seriously delayed.

SECTION II
OPERATI0NS

        1. It was finally decided, after lengthy conferences and discussions within the unit and with higher headquarters, that the following elements of JASCO would be furnished:

                     a. With the XIV Corps Headquarters

                        (1) One Shore Fire Control Officer as Corps Naval Gunfire Liaison Oficer

                     b. With 37th Division Headquarters

                        (1) Commanding officer, Executive Officer and a party of three men to furnish overall JASCO liaison with                                Division Headquarters, through the Signal Officer and other Staff Officers.

    ( 2) One Officer of the Shore Fire Control Section as Division Naval Liaison Officer(3) One Air             Ground Liaison party.

c. With each Assault Regimental Headquarters (2)

                       (1) One Shore Fire Control Party.

                       (2) One Air Ground Liaison Party.

                   d.With each Assault Battalion Headquarters (4)

                      (1) One Air Ground Liaison Party.

                      (2) One Shore Fire Control Party.

                      (3) One Shore Party Communications Team.

                   e. Aboard each APA and AKA

                      (1) One radio party of five men each. Composition of these parties was: one or two high speed radio operators                               and 3 message center men, wiremen or basics.

                   f. The remainder of the organization was divided into non-assault groups scheduled to land on S+1, S+4, and                         S+35. These were composed of headquarters personnel, i.e. cooks, mechanics, clerks, etc., with an officer in                         charge of each group, and Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison parties not in assault.

        2. The assault elements joined their respective Division, Regiment, and Battalion Headquarters on 10 December 1944 and prepared to embark. All assault units boarded on 11 December 1944 and sailed l6 December 1944. During the voyage, classes were held for orientation of Infantry groups in Shore Party, Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison capabilities and functions. Instruction by team and party commanders was also given JASCO personnel in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientation. A series of dry runs were made at Manus Island, where the convoy anchored for ten days. On 31 December 1944, we started the final lap of our journey to Lingayen Gulf.

        3. During the period 5 January 1945 to 9 January 1945, while the convoy was proceeding through the Leyte Gulf, Mindanao and Sulu Seas, it was the target of numerous enemy aircraft attacks by small but determined groups. Attacks consisted of bombing and suicide dives by fanatical pilots directly into ships of the convoy. The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company suffered no casualties as a result of this enemy action, nor any damage to, or loss of equipment

        4. All JASCO elements supporting assault battalions and regiments landed on beaches crimson 1 and 2 and yellow 1 and 2 during,, Jig hour (0930-1030 Item time). No resistance was encountered during the landing, as the Japanese had evacuated the area a few days previously. This organization suffered one casualty as a result of friendly carbine fire (ricochet), aimed at a carabao which had gone berserk. The casualty was a hand wound, not serious, but the man was evacuated.

        5. The Shore Party Communication teams quickly ran their lateral trunk and local lines, and established radio communication in all nets; ship to shore, lateral and inland. All communications except local lines were in within 30 minutes after teams landed.

        6. The Shore Party Communications teams turned the systems over to the Engineer Shore Parties on S+3 and reported to JASCO Headquarters, .which had been established at the town of Binmaley.

        7. The Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison parties accompanied their respective Infantry units inland against only the slightest opposition. The advance was delayed only by the restricted road net and low capacity bridges, some of which had been out of use before our landing.

        8. Although few targets were available for Naval Gunfire (the 37th Division was covered on both flanks by other assault Divisions) the situation, if resistance had been encountered, would have demanded the utmost Naval Gunfire support, as mortar and artillery units had great difficulty in moving up pieces and ammunition. The Shore Fire Control Party with the 1st Battalion, 148th Infantry fired one mission and, save for control of LCIG fire by our party with 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, that was the extent of Shore Fire Control Section employment. The Shore Fire Control parties returned to JASCO control on S+4, the supported units being outside the range of Naval Gunfire.

        9. Our Air Ground Liaison Parties landed in the assault waves with their infantry units and proceeded inland with them. They remained attached until January 18th, when they were returned to JASCO Headquarters. During their period with infantry they requested 30 reconnaissance missions, of which 26 were flown, and one strafing mission which was canceled. The supported units received much valuable information from our AGL parties, as a result of the reconnaissance flights and also information intercepted on the Support Air Observation net.

SECTION III

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

        1. Shore Party Communications.

             a. When an Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment is employed on an operation, there is little need for JASCO Shore Party teams, as the Engineer Regiment’s communications facilities are a11 but identical to ours. Recommend that JASCO Shore Party Team personnel be attached to the E B and S R only as required to augment that unit’s communications personnel.

             b. Vehicles should be loaded aboard ships carrying personnel who use the vehicle. Some vehicles were aboard ships not carrying our personnel, and some items were looted.

        2. Shore Fire Control Section.

             a. An additional net for administrative traffic is most desirable. Tactical nets cannot adequately handle administrative traffic.

             b. Shore Fire Control Parties should be attached to all battalions, not just assault battalions. When a reserve battalion is put into action, many difficulties are encountered in switching the Shore Fire Control Party to the new battalion.

             c. The SCR 694 is much more desirable than SCR 284, due in most part to its greater portability and quiet generator. Vehicular mountings for SCR 694 radios should be provided.

             d. When distance to the firing ships is greater than 15,000 yards, the range of SCR 694s and SCR 284s is not sufficient to insure communication. Recommend that SCR 193 vehicular sets be furnished Divisional, Regimental Shore Fire Control Parties for relay in such circumstances.

             e. Higher headquarters should effect distribution of plans and maps and disseminate information pertinent to the operation before the last few days. Early, complete information is essential.

        3. Air Ground Liaison Section.

             a. The personnel carrier, half track, M3Al, should be replaced by a 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, mounting the SCR 499 in HO 17. The half track remains at Division Headquarters during the operation, and the truck has sufficient terrain ability to keep up. Besides being a prime target at Division Headquarters, the halftrack rides too rough for the expensive, sensitive SCR 499 it carries.

             b. An administrative net is required to parallel the present tactical

net. One additional frequency for administrative traffic among Shore Fire Control parties, Air Ground Liaison parties, and JASCO Headquarters should be enough to handle such traffic.

             c. Air Ground Liaison party trucks ( 1/4 ton, 4x4) carry the critical A/NVRC-1 radio equipment and should not be landed until a dry landing can be made. Parties use portable equipment until these vehicles arrive and time is not too important. A landing even as late as S+2 for these vehicles should be planned, rather than risking washing out or drowning out the equipment.

VINCENT W. FOX
Capt., Sig C
Commanding

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PALAWAN

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 159 C/O P.M. SAN FRANCISCO CALF

  9 May 1945

HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V3 - PALAWAN - OPERATION

SECTION I.

BACKGROUND

        1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 186th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, on the shores of Puerta Princessa, Palawan, P.I. Shore Fire Control Parties of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control communications.

             a. The target beach was of coral, ending at a mangrove swamp. The terrain was densely wooded and had but one road, making progress difficult.

        2. Palawan had been in the hands of the Japanese for approximately
three years but the beach landing was unopposed.

SECTION II.

OPERATIONS

        1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would be furnished:

             a. With the 186th ROT Headquarters,

                 One (l) Naval Liaison Team which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer and four enlisted personnel.

              b. With each Assault Battalion Headquarters,

                  One (l) Shore Fire Control Party which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer, one Artillery Spotter, and ten enlisted personnel.

        2. The elements joined their Regiment and Battalion Headquarters on 26 February 1945 and prepared to embark the same date. JASCO personnel were instructed by team officers in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientations.

        3. The landing was made at 0845, 28 February 1945. The Regimental N.L.O. station wee set up on the beach by lOOO; shortly thereafter the Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties checked in. Communication was good.

        4. No firing was called for by JASCO parties except one request for a mission which was denied. All JASCO teams were relieved attachment 1 March 1945 and embarked same day for return to organization.

        5. No casualties were incurred during the operation.

SECTION III

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

        1. The type map used 1/50000, gunfire maps could and should have been replaced with 1/25000 photo maps which were available.

        2. Essential materials for Naval Gunfire Control on this operation were either of inferior quality or non-existent due to difficulty in contacting Navy. No gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available for our officers.

        3. The rapid advance of the troops, due to absence of enemy opposition, placed a burden on the radio carrying team and also resulted in poor reception on the SCR 694 due to its limited range.

        4. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads over long distance, rough terrain, and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons.

        5. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters as enclosures.

  VINCENT W. FOX
Captain, Sig C
Commanding

1 Incl:
Roster Officers

ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 295TH JASCO, PARTICIPATING IN V-3 PALAWAN OPERATION

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Consolidated Report on PALAWAN Operation, 2/25 - 3/2

1. PREPARATION.

             This operation was marked by the decidedly poor preparation relative to liaison with the infantry unit supported and distribution of maps and data.

             Assignments to units were made at such a late date as to allow practically no time for discussions with commanding and subordinate officers on the capabilities of naval gunfire. Since several of the unit commanders had previously suffered unfortunate losses from our own fire, it was more necessary than ever to win back their confidence in our supporting weapon. Last minute pressures and preparations prevented us from fulfilling this initial phase of our naval gunfire liaison duty. What liaison was attempted was in the hands of an officer independent of our organization knowing little of our methods, and apparently desirous of handling the whole problem alone.

             Essential materials for naval Gunfire control on this operation were either of inferior quality or nonexistent. Due to difficult liaison with the Navy contact officer, no gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available for our officers. Much valuable information ordinarily carried in such an annex was absent from the verbal summary which we received shortly before loadinq. The other essential, good maps, was likewise neglected when we received small scale, 1/50,000 gunfire maps despite the availability of excellent photomaps a 1/25,000 r.f. for the field artillery. The type map used in the LUZON operation was ideal with its r.f. of 1/36,000. Either this type or artillery photomaps should be sought for future landings.

2. THE LANDING.

             After an intensive gunfire and rocket preparation we landed on an undefended beach at 0845, February 28. The Rgt. N.L.O. station was set up on the beach by 1000; shortly thereafter the Battalion teams began to check in. Communi- cation was good.

             With no enemy opposition our troops advanced quite rapidly and continuously, placing a great burden on our radio-carrying team members and in the case of the F.O. teams bringinq them to the point of utter exhaustion. In addition this swift progress of our forward teams increased the distance between them and the Rgt. station, thus creating a new problem of poor reception by our SCR 694 radios. When distances were more that three or four miles between sets of this type, we found that they were incapable of efficient communication with each other. Messages between these stations were either relayed via the firing or control ships on sent through the Battalion SCR 284s.

             All officers who participated in this operation have agreed that unles the terrain is absolutely impassable to vehicular traffic, jeeps with mounted SCR 284s are essential to the proper fulfillment of our duties.

B.D. Mathon
Lieut. USNR

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MALABANG-PARANG

HEADQUARTERS
295th JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 717 % PM, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

9 August 1945

HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295^th JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V-5 OPERATION

SECTION I
BACKGROUND

          1. The plan called for an Amphibious landing by the 24th Division, with the 31st Division and elements of the 41st Division in reserve, on beaches in the Malabang - Parang Area 17 April, 1945..Twelve ( 12) Air Liaison Parties, twelve (12) Shore Fire Control Parties, four (4) Signal radio operators and three (3) wire teams from the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to the 24th Division for the operation, with the provision three (3) Air Liaison Parties be detached on or about R+ 5 days for duty with the 31^st Division. In addition, one ( 1) Shore Fire Control Party and one Officer and one ( 1) EM landed at Parang with the 24^th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, prepared to give Naval Gunfire Support and Aircraft Support to that unit.

             a. The target beaches located in the Malabang - Parang Area were characterized by a relatively slight gradient, while steep slopes arose just behind the water’s edge. The road paralleling the beach was in poor condition.

          2. Although the Malabang - Parang Area had been n under theoretical Japanese control for more than three years, garrisons were reported to be small and long stretches of beach already secured by Filipino Guerrilla forces.

SECTION II
OPERATIONS

          1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would be furnished:

             a.. With 24th Division Headquarters.

                  (1)One Shore Fire Control Officer
                  (2) One Air Ground Liaison Officer I

             b. With 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop

                 (1) One Shore Fire Control Party
                 (2) One Officer and one (1) EM to provide Air Support during initial phase.

             c. With each Regimental Headquarters

                 (1) One Air Liaison Party
                 (2) One Naval Gunfire Party

             d. With each Battalion Headquarters (except the 2^nd Battalion, 34th Infantry.

                 (1) One Air Liaison Panty
                 (2) One Naval Gunfire Party

             e. The remainder of the organization was scheduled to land on D+10. This group was composed of headquarter personnel, i.e. cooks, mechanics, clerks, etc. and Signal personnel not committed for the operation.

          2. The assault elements joined their respective Division, Regimental and Battalion Headquarters on Mindoro Island 8 April 1945 and prepared to embark. During the voyage, classes were held for the orientation of Infantry groups in Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison capabilities and functions. Instruction by team and party commanders was also provided for Jasco personnel in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientation.

          3. The voyage from Mindoro to the Malabang - Parang Area was made without enemy opposition.

          4. The assault landing was made on three beaches in the Malabang -Parang Area. These beaches were designated Red, White, and Blue from North to South. All Jasco elements supporting assault battalions landed with their respective units during "How" Hour on "Roger" Day. No organized resistance was encountered during the landing. One battalion of the 21^st RCT landed on White Beach for the purpose of securing Malabang Town and the air field area. Two battalions of the 21^st RCT and the 19^th RCT landed on Blue Beach with the mission of proceeding southeast along the coast and capturing Parang, and opening Polloe Harbor to amphibious shipping. The 34^th RCT held in reserve and landed on friendly shores in the Parang Area on R+2. No organized resistance was encountered during any of the landings. The 2^nd Battalion of 21^st RCT left Parang the night of Roger Day by LCM’S and secured Cotabato Town early on R+1.

          5. Three wire teams from the Signal Section assisted the 99th Signal Battalion in running trunks and locals in Corps Area, while an Officer and 12 EM reported to the 116 AAA Group at Malabang to operate a message center at that headquarters and to operate a radio in a Corps net. Six radio operators reported to the 24^th Signal Company to assist that unit, and on 25 April six additional radio operators reported to 116 AAA Group to operate a radio for Marine Air Group 24.

          6. Between 17 April and 10 May three wire teams attached to the 24^th Signal Company laid 450 miles of W-110 wire. One of their vehicles was damaged by a Japanese convoy during a raid on their convoy near Santa Cruz. There were no casualties.

          7. Shore Fire Control Parties landed with their respective infantry battalions. Since the initial resistance was negligible and the ensuing action was a pursuit, there were no remumerative targets for Navy Gunfire.

          8. Other than the pre-assault bombardment, two missions were fired, an illumination mission for the 3^rd Battalion, 19^th Infantry, when a retiring force of enemy approached an established road block, and a preparation on the town of Calobato by fire from the main batteries of the cruiser Cleveland. The observation aircraft carried by the cruiser division affected numerous reconnaissance missions, and the Naval gunfire communications channels carried a considerable quantity of command traffic for the Army. The action passed out of Naval gunfire range on 19 April, and teams were relieved.

          9. Air Ground Liaison Parties attached to units of the 19^th Infantry and 21^st Infantry landed with assault waves in the Malabang - Parang Area 17 April. The first air strikes of' the operation were run in the Cotabato Area. Parties attached to units of the 34^th Infantry landed with their battalions upon secured beach heads, passed through the 19^th and 21^st RCT'S, and proceeded up the Mindanao River in LCM’S. From Fort Pickett, battalions of the 34^th Infantry pushed through to Dyas, meeting minor resistance on several occasions. This march received air cover throughout most of the daylight hours, and several tons of bombs were dropped on installations near Dyas.

          10. Three Air Liaison Parties were released by the 24^th Division 25 April and attached to the 31^st Division for the remainder of' the campaign.

          11. One Air Liaison Party was attached 30 May to the 3^rd Battalion, 162^nd Infantry to support that unit's landing at Luayon, Balut Island, and Cape San Agustine. Subsequently this unit supported the 152^nd Infantry in the Talomo River sector.

          12. Close air support was utilized to the fullest possible extent in the Davao and central Miindanao sectors. Strikes were directed against entrenchments, reinforced concrete pill boxes, coastal guns, supply depots, rocket installations and other key targets. Between 17 April and 22 June Air liaison parties supporting the 24^th Division and elements of the 31^st and 41^st Divisions ran a total of 384 missions, firing 16 rockets and dropping 793 tons of bombs and 15,267 gallons of Napalm

          13. A total of four officers and sixteen enlisted men of the organization received Bronze Star award during this operation

          14. Per General Order No. 82 Hg. X Corps, the 295 Joint Assault Signal Company was cited, the provisions of Executive Order Number 9396 (Section 1, Bulletin 22, War Department, 1943) and Section IV, Circular Number 333, War Department, 22 December, 1943, for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Minadano, Philippine Islands, from 17 April to 1 July 1945..

SECTION III

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

          1. Shore Party Communications

              Since Shore Party Communications teams were not assigned to the work for which they were organized, they learned little which would help them in future operations as Shore Party Teams. However the duties they performed were greatly beneficial to them in overall signal work.

              It is suggested that DR-5's be substituted for DR-4's in as much as the latter are inconvenient for large scale wire laying.

          2. Shore Fire Control

              The SCR 694 again proved to be the best equipment used to date for the communications required by battalion teams. Its superior portability undoubtedly meant the difference between failure and success for parties whose actions was never assisted by vehicular transportation. Its range is apparently equal to an SCR 264 with hand generator.

              An SCR193 should be obtained for the division team at least. In this operation ships were appropriately stationed for the sole purpose of acting as a relay for radio sets that did not give adequate out put for existing circumstances. In a stiffly contested landing, ships could not have been used for this purpose, and the burden of relaying could not have been handled adequately by the command ship because of the increased volume of command traffic. This same situation was met by an SCR 193 on the M-1 operation.

              Net discipline and operational standards were satisfactory. In view of the man power shortage it may be timely to investigate the possibilities of F. M. nets and SCR 600 radios.

              Administrative arrangements for the care of JASCO parties was entirely satisfactory.

              On this operation there was need of a clear, concise gunfire annex.

              The numbering plan for SFC Parties should follow strictly the numerical designation of regiments and battalions from high to low in order to avoid dangerous communication confusion during the initial phases of an operation.

              Gridden gunfire charts proved unsatisfactory. It would have been better to have issued only the more detailed Army maps, thus lightening the map load, improving front line reports, and preventing possible fatal error in target designation.

              Each Battalion N.L.O. should be supplied with at least five men and driver if the jeep is to arrive by the end of the first day, or with six men if no vehicle is to be available for several days

.          3. Air Liaison Section

              Throughout the operation, most teams had direct communication with the Air Craft through the SCR 542. This close liaison between ground and air yielded exceptionally fine results. Any mission that threatened the safety of our own troops could thus be called off immediately. A substantial number of American lives were saved in this manner..

              By the same token it was possible to guide the pilot to his target with a maximum of accuracy by giving him exact bearings and descriptions and by correcting on his first run.

              It is therefore recommended without reservation that in all future operations Air Liaison teams be permitted to contact and direct support air craft.

THOMAS W. HART
Captain, Sig C
Commanding

3 Incls:
1. Roster of Officers
2. Certified true copy of orders
3. Unit Citation

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* Awarder Bronze Star Medal

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JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL OPERATIONS

        The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company performed the missions of furnishing communication and direction of Naval gunfire support and close air support. It also assisted in normal communication functions for X Corps.

        Shore Fire Control Parties and Air Liaison Parties were assigned to each infantry battalion and regimental headquarters of the 24th Division for the landing operations at Parang and Malabang.

        Fire Control Parties remained with these units until they moved out of range of Naval gunfire support. Thereafter, these units assumed the role of Field Artillery Forward Observation Parties, and remained with the 24th Infantry Division during its rapid advance across Midanao. Upon reaching the Davao Gulf, their function reverted to that of Shore Fire Control Parties and they directed supporting Naval gunfire during the advance north to Davao. When the Division began its advance west toward Hintal and passed out of range of Naval support, the teams again served as Forward Artillery Observers and assisted in the direction of supporting artillery fire for the duration of the Operation.

        Air Liaison Parties remained with the units to which initially attached during the assault phase and furnished valuable service in the direction of close support strikes. Then the 31st Division began its advance north from Kabakan along the Sayre Highway, five Air Liaison Parties were attached, performing a similar mission.

        The communications personnel, other than those in the Fire Control and Air Liaison Parties, functioned directly under the Corps Signal Officer in assisting the 99th Signal Battalion. A complete radio and message center team was furnished the Malabang Area Command. In addition, teams were furnished for installing and operating switchboards and telephones for numerous service units. then the X Corps Rear Echelon moved from Parang to Del Monte, wire construction and maintenance teams were formed and the 295th JASCO assumed responsibility for the construction and maintenance of all wire lines in the Malabang, Parang, and Cotabato areas.

        The varied and outstanding services performed by the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company contributed greatly to the successful outcome of the Mindanao Operation. The unit was awarded the Theatre Citation for heroism and bravery in action against the enemy for the services rendered.

History of X Corps on Mindanao
30 June 45
pages 77 - 78

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OPERATIONS REPORT V-5 OPERATION
26 April 1945.

CHRONOLOGY

        1. Shore Fire Control Parties landed with their respective infantry battalions in the Malabang-Parang area 17 April. The landing was effected against negligible resistance. The ensuing action was a pursuit. Since the enemy rear guard had no weapons heavier than those capable of being carried by hand, there were no remunerative targets for navy gunfire.

        2. Other than the pre-assault bombardment, two missions were fired. An illumination mission for 3rd Bn, 19th Inf, when a retiring force of enemy approached an established road block, and a preparation on the town of Catabato by fire from the main batteries of the cruiser Cleveland. The observation aircraft carried by the cruiser division carried out numerous reconnaissance missions, and the navy gunfire communication channels carried a considerable quantity of command traffic for the army. Units supported were 19th and 21st Infantrys and 24th Div Recon. Troop. The action passed out of navy gunfire range on D+2 and all parties obtained formal release at 0835 D+3. Command net was closed by C13 acting as N.C.S. at 1500, D+3.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Equipment.

        1. The SCR 694 again proved itself as being the best equipment used to date for the required communications in bn teams. Its superior portability undoubtedly meant the difference between failure and success for parties whose action was never assisted by vehicular transportation. Its range is apparently equal to a 284 with hand generator.

        2. An SCR 193 should be obtained for division team as a minimum. In this instance ships were appropriately stationed solely to act as a relay for radio sets that did not give adequate output for their then existing special circumstances. In a stiffly resisted action, ships could not be used for this purpose and the burden of relaying could not be handled adequately by the command ship because of the increased volume of command traffic. Hence an SCR 193 should be obtained for division team. This same situation was met adequately by an SCR 193 on the Lingayen Gulf operation. Net discipline and operation standards were satisfactory. In view of the manpower shortage it may be timely to investigate the possibilities of F.M. nets and SCR 600 radios.

PERSONNEL.

        1. Again the method of obtaining adequate personnel left much to be desired. This has been fully discussed in previous reports.

ADMINISTRATION

        1. Administrative arrangements for recovery and care of JASCO parties was entirely satisfactory. See also attached individual reports.

 PAUL H. ROFKAR
 Capt., F.A.
295th Joint Assault Signal Co.

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REPORT OF PARANG OPERATION

                                                                                          25 April 1945

        1. The planning aspects of this operation do not speak well for the naval command which failed to prepare a clear, concise, gunfire annex and to present one requiring no last minute, confusing changes.

        2. Notably poor was the scheme for the designation of Shore Fire Control Parties in descriptive rather than numerical terms. My own battalion, initially designated as the reserve unit, was subsequently ordered into the assault on the right half of the beachhead, which change would have resulted in a complete reversal of call signs, as it were, in midstream. The numbering plan for SFC Parties should follow strictly the procession of Regiments and Battalions, low to high, to avoid dangerous communication confusion during the initial phases of the operation. The last minute change, though praiseworthy in intention, met the same difficulties that all such changes will inevitably occasion -- many parties, including my own, did not "get the word".

        3. Another phase of the planning, the maps, was improperly handled. There was no excuse for the distribution of and implied suggestion for reliance on as poor maps as the naval gridded gunfire charts subsequently proved to be. It would have been far better to issue out only the more detailed Army maps thus lightening the map load, improving front line reports, and preventing possibly fatal errors in target designation. Both this matter and the one discussed in the paragraph above should be brought to the attention of the naval authorities.

        4. Our experience in the post-landing phases of the operation proved beyond doubt that the shore fire control team must be enlarged to enable it to carry forward sufficient clothing, food, and radio equipment to keep up with the infantry advance and maintain proper and sustained radio communications. With a four man team and a jeep held up by unbridged rivers, it was a back breaking job for us to pack the 284 and 536 radios, and at that we were travelling light with no clothing or personal gear outside of ponchos and the meagerest of rations. Had we been required to control naval gunfire for any extended period of time, we would have been faced by the pressing problem of ration and battery shortages plus the missing benefits of sound powered communications.

        5. It is therefore requested that each battalion N.L.O. be supplied with at least five men and driver if the jeep will arrive by end of first day or six men if no vehicle will be made available for several days. The distribution of the load would be as follows:

            1st man (Team Chief) - Two 536’s plus part of his personal requirement to fill the rubber bag; 2nd man - 284 radio; 3rd man - generator, extra batteries for 284 & 536’s and some food; 4th man - antenna bag plus pack containing his personal items and food; 5th man - spare parts, sound powered telephones plus personal items to fill bag; 6th man - remaining personal items and rations plus reel of telephone wire.

        6. The 284 set used by my team worked satisfactorily with no failure of any type during the entire three days of its use. Reception and transmissions to the ships were perfect, as may not have been the case with the weaker 694’s. However, if existing bugs can be removed from the 694, battalion teams should be provided with this set exclusively. The regiment unit, on the other hand, moving less swiftly, must carry a 284 to complement the 694 and relay if necessary.

        7. A final note on personal clothing. We found that all infantry units have been provided with a woolen undershirt-sweater that served admirably in damp weather. Every effort should be made to procure this valuable piece of clothing for our personnel.

BENJAMIN D. MATHON
Lieut. USNR
295th Joint Assault Signal Co

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ZAMBOANGA

HEADQUARTERS
295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 717

4 August 1945

HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT
ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V4 - ZAMBOANGA - OPERATION

SECTION I

Background

        1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 41st Infantry Division on the shores of Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands. Elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to the 41st Infantry Division to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control and Air Ground Liaison Communication. Attachment orders per Authority, Commanding General, Eight Army, dated 23 February 1945.

        2. Zamboanga had been in the hands of the Japanese for approximately three years and the landing on the shore was lightly opposed by mortar and artillery located on the high ground some distance from the beach.

SECTION II

Operations

        1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company be furnished:

            a. With the 41st Infantry Division Headquarters.

                One (1) Naval Liaison Team consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer and five (5) enlisted Men.

            b. With the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams Headquarters.

                One (1) Naval Liaison Team consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer and five (5) enlisted                   men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men.

                One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men

            c. With each assualt battalion of the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams less 2nd                   Bn, 163rd.

                One (1) Shore Fire Control Party consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer, one (1) Artillery                   Spotter, one (1) Signal Corps Officer as student observer for artillery spotting, and ten                   (10) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer and five (5)                   enlisted men..

             d. With the 2nd Bn of the 163rd Regimental Combat Team

                 One (1) Shore Fire Control Party consisting of one (1) Liaison Officer, one (1) Artillery                    Spotter, and ten (10) enlisted men. One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1)                    officer, and five (5) enlisted men.

   e. With the reserve battalions of the 162nd and 163rd Regimental Combat Teams.

                 One (1) Air Liaison Party consisting of one (1) officer, and five (5) enlisted men.

        2. The elements joined their respective headquarters prior to embarkation. Jasco personnel were instructed by team officer in SOI, Field Orders, and General Orientations.

        3. All teams with the exception of the Division Naval Liaison Team landed on the enemy held shore several minutes after H-hour and advanced inland rapidly against light opposition although there was considerable artillery and mortar fire falling from enemy positions on the high ground inland. With exception of Division Naval Liaison Officer station, all Naval Gunfire communications were quickly established and Naval Gunfire commenced against enemy batteries on the left and center of the Division Sector. Division Naval Liaison Officer, aboard LCI with elements of Division Artillery, was delayed in landing until H plus 150 minutes by intense artillery and mortar fire falling on and in front of landing beaches. All Naval Gunfire Communications were in by H plus three hours. The gunfire was being employed very effectively against enemy batteries and OP's on the left and enemy personnel on the right. On the right flank, the advance of the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry was greatly expedited by the employment of a floating O.P. (LVT) requested by the Naval Gunfire Spotter, as his observation ashore was seriously hampered by dense growth and special terrain features. Considerable air-spot was used in all sectors upon request of Shore Fire Control Parties and proved highly effective.

            Shore Fire Control Parties were released and recalled to their respective Regimental CP’s by D + 4, at which time the main fire support group was released from the area. Fire support ship from the screening force remained available in case of emergency (especially for night illumination). Arrangements were made by Division Naval Liaison Officer with Division Artillery S-3 for emergency call fires through Artillery F.O's. No such fires were called however.

            On D plus 6, one Shore Fire Control Spotter Team was assigned the mission of furnishing Naval Gunfire Support to Basilan Island Task Force. In conjunction with this, two spotters were requested to furnish air-spot from artillery cub planes. Communications on this assignment was excellent and several preparation missions were fired from Air and Ground Observation. In addition to original Basilan landing same Shore Fire Control Team accompanied elements of Task Force on two separate landings on west coast of island.

           On the whole, the use of Naval Gunfire Support during the initial phases of the operation, especially, was highly effective and was instrumental to a large degree in silencing enemy mortar and artillery positions

        4. Air Ground Liaison Activities. The Air Liaison Parties were not requested to call missions until the Marine Air Groups 12 and 32 were in a position to support the ground troops. The Air Liaison Parties of the two regiments conducted sixteen (16) air strikes. Strikes were conducted in which one Air Liaison Officer was Air-borne over the target in an artillery plane, registered artillery smoke and directed the planes to the target. Some difficulty was encountered with this set-up in that artillery plane used a frequency modulated set and the attacking planes used amplitude modulated sets making direct contact between planes impossible. This was remedied by the air-borne Air Liaison Officer contacting the forward Air Liaison Officer on the ground on the frequency modulated set who in turn relayed the message to the attacking planes.

           Napalm, 500 pound bombs, and strafing were used to good advantage. The cooperation between the Marine Air Groups and the Air Liaison Parties was excellent

SECTION III.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

        1. Naval Gunfire:

            a. Naval Gunfire Maps were too large a scale for accurate work. Small scale maps would be much more beneficial. It would be desirable if Infantry Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Air Support operate from a common map system.

            b. Air-spot for Naval Gunfire is extremely desirable and it is recommended that arrangements for cooperation with the Division Artillery Air Observation Section be made on all operations in which availability of cruiser and battleship planes is uncertain. Difference in spotting procedure could be corrected by Division Naval Liaison Officer. Communications to be arranged by having the Division Naval Liaison Officer's second set check in a firing ship net, and receiving commands at Division Artillery Fire Director Center. This would allow efficient handling of a limited activity.

            c. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads over long distances, rough terrain and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons.

        2. Air Ground Liaison. The idea of the Air Liaison Officer directing attacking planes from an artillery plane is very good. On numerous occasions visibility is hampered by terrain features or some other objects and the use of the plane to rise above these would result in calls for accurate strikes which heretofore would be almost an impossibility. The difference in the radio sets necessitated a relay station. Similar sets in the spotting and attacking planes would speed the strikes by having direct contact between them.

        3. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters as enclosures.

THOMAS W. HART
Captain, Sig C
Commanding

2 Incls:
A certified True Extract Copy of Attachment Orders.
Roster of Officers

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Unit Citation

HEADQUARTERS X CORPS

Office of the Commanding

General

APO 310 GENERAL ORDERS 11 July 1945 NUMBER 82

CITATION

Under the provisions of Executive Order Number 9396 (Section I, Bulletin 22, War Department, 1943) and Section IV, Circular Number 333, War Department, 22 December 1943, the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, from 17 April 1945 to 1 July 1945.

The Shore Fire Control Section of this unit accompanied initial assault elements in the landing operations on MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, and directed Supporting Naval gunfire in a highly effective manner. During the advance inland beyond the range of supporting Naval gunfire, the Shore Fire Control Parties were converted to Field Artillery Forward Observers Parties, and in this capacity, beyond the call of duty, accompanied the Infantry units in the rapid movement across the island. They reverted to Shore Fire Control Parties for the direction of Naval gunfire in the neutralization of enemy coastal defense batteries and the destruction of other important enemy installations in the Davao Gulf area. At the conclusion of these missions they again assumed the duties of Field Artillery Forward Observers, and assisted in the direction of fire of Corps Artillery for the duration of the operation.

The Air Liaison Parties of this organization landed with the assault infantry elements on MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, and directed air bombardment of beaches and initial objectives. They remained continuously with front line infantry battalions of two Infantry Divisions for the duration of the MINDANAO campaign furnishing invaluable aid to tactical units by accurate observation and direction of air bombardment and low level attack in the destruction of many enemy positions and installations at times when artillery support was not available.

The Communications Section of this organization performed highly valuable services throughout the operation by assisting in the installation and maintenance of communications to forward combat elements and operation and maintenance of communications in rear areas, thus greatly assisting in furnishing the excellent communications which characterized this campaign despite almost unparalleled difficulties of transportation. Communications Sections were organized and equipped by the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company in order to furnish Message Center, Wire and Radio personnel to units of a Corps who were not authorized organic communications personnel although their need therefor was great.

The duties thus assumed by the organization were far beyond the call of duty and the manner of performance of these duties is an example of the cooperative spirit, general efficiency and individual bravery that was evident throughout the conunand. The 295th Joint Assault Signal Company has contributed greatly to the successful outcome of the MINDANAO campaign, reflecting great credit upon the personnel of that organization. The services rendered are in line with the highest traditions of the military service.

F. C. SIBERT
Maj Gen, USA
Commanding .

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General Orders

The following are Genaral Orders relating to 295 Jasco. If you have any General Orders or Oficial Documents relating to the Unit please forward them to me at the above address.

HEADQUARTERS

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

APO717

4 August 1945

SPECIAL ORDERS)

NUMBER.......... 70)

                1.   In compliance with Circular No. 1, War Department, 1943, as changed by Section II, Par 3b (2) Circular 307, War Depatment, 1943 Private First Clas David W. Lahman, 18148022, having completed thirty consecutive days in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater, is authorized the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, and is awarded the service ribbon in lieu thereof.

                2. FIRST LIEUTENANT WAYNE E. HAWLEY, 01636327, is appointed Acting Executive Officer, in addition to his other duties.

                3. Under the provisions of AR 615-5, the following promotions are announced:

TO BE TECHNICAL SERGENT (TEMPORARY)

Technician Third Grade Robert C. Phillips, 20112904

TO BE STAFF SERGENT (TEMPORARY)

TechnicianThirdGradeErnestP.Brigham,20106830
TechnicianFourthGradeWeslelyE.Rand,20112905
SergentStanleyJ.Adamski,37545180

TO BE SERGENT (TEMPORARY)

Technician Fifth Grade Roy V. Cornwall, 12139541

TO BE CORPORAL (TEMPORARY)

Private First Class Frederick Chambliss, 34802782

TO BE TECHNICIAL FIFTH GRADE (TEMPORARY)

PrivateFirstHolstrom,37003669
PrivateDavidR.Saunders,20367256

TO BE PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

PrivateJohn.F.Burke,Jr.,31208158
PrivateWillisC.Burrell,34680378
PrivateSalvatoreA.Bussacco,32606873
PrivateArcangeloN.Carlo,32599129
PrivateIrwinGreenspahn,36650917
PrivateVictorD.Keith,Jr.,33049042
PrivateDaltonN.MacFarland,36810834
PrivateNickV.Marcic,33404512
PrivateFrederickR.Pentzion,16171269
PrivateJamesG.Phillips,11088543
PrivateEllsworthS.Sandrock,33177766
PrivateJamesR.Skinner,12158307
PrivateJosephSilver,33802523
PrivateJohnA.Tverdosi,35301138
PrivateHerbertWendel,33554402

                     By order of Captain Hart:

James E. Jenks
2nd Lt., AC
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

(Signature James E. Jenks)

  295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY
APO 957

24 March 1944

ORDER)

NO 21   )
                   
                    1. Under the provisions of P 3 AR 35-320, 1941, First Lieutenant John F. Hilz, 0-577922, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company, APO 957, is detailed Class "A" Agent Finance Officer to L. (?) Graham, Lt. Col. F.D. Finance Officer 27 Inf Div APO 957, for purposes of making payment of regular, supplementary, and partial pay-rolls for the month of March 1944. Attention is invited to  5 AR 35-320 which prohibits officers designated as agent officers for making payments of pay-rolls to act as witnessing officer to such payment.

                    2.The following named enlisted men who were attached to the Seventh Infantry Division during the Marshall Island operation are entitled to wear a bronze star on the Asiatic-Pacific Theater Service Ribbon: (Auth) Section V, GO #17, WD, dtd 26 February 1944.

Remember one thing please. There are many miles between us and home. There may be many days between us and home, but we definitely want to get home. I ask the members of this outfit to stick behind me as much as possible. The more cooperation the sooner the possibility of us returning home alive in 45 (Fingers Crossed).

Thomas Hart

Captain Sig C

Commanding

 

 

295 TH Joint Assault Signal Company
APO 27

 

24 September 1944

 

Special Orders)

:

No. 53)

 

1. UndertheprovisionsAR615-5,thefollowingpromotionsare announced:

TOBESTAFFSERGEANTTEMPORARY

TechnicianThirdGrade(Temporary) RobertF.Mikos,36706128

TechnicianThirdGrade(Temporary) BradleyD.12180285

TOBETECHNICIANTHIRDGRADE(TEMPORARY)

TechnicianFourthGrade(Temporary) HubertCorbitt,34058724

   TechnicianFourth(Temporary)

ErnestPBrigham,20106830

TechnicianFourthGrade(Temporary) EvaldJAlkrektson,31056515

TOBESERGEANT(TEMPORARY)

TechnicianFifthGrade(Temporary) CarrollA.Smith,13137571

TechnicianFifthGrade(Temporary) StanleyJ.Adamski,37545180

TOBETECHNICIANFOURTHGRADE(TEMPORARY)

TechnicianFifthGrade(Temporary) WilfredH.Aubrey,12173502

TOBETECHNICIANFIFTHGRADE(TEMPORARY)

PrivateFirstClass WalterW.Payne,34380878

PrivateFirstClass AlfredSamper,15359642

PrivateFirstClass JoeB.Standlee,38133634

PrivateFirstClass MartinJ.Qualters,36351520

PrivateFirstClass PaulA.Henkel,33391903

TOBEPRIVATEFIRSTCLASS

Private

LeonBeech,34612173

Private WilliamJ.Martin,Jr.14181245

Private RaymondL.Barnett,38542770

2. FirstLieutenant JOHNGRANTON,01634818, 295^thJointAssaultSignalCompany,isreldasgmtfrHqPlatoonandprimarydyasMessO,andasgd totheShorePartyCommunicationSection.
3. FirstLieutenant JOHNGRANTON,01634818,295^thJointAssaultSignalCompanyisaptdMessOinadditiontohis otherduties.
4. UndertheprovisionsofAR615-5 TechnicianFifthGradeCharlesL.Pankiewicz,12171973isreducedtothegradeofPrivateformisconduct.
5. Thatpartofpar2SO52,thishq,dtd23Sept44,whichreads1March1944isamendedtoread"1September1943".
6. Thatpartofpar3,SO52,thihq,dtd23Sept44whichreads15Januaryisamendedtoread"1September43".
7. Thatpartofpar4,SO52,thishq,dtd23Sept44whichreads15January1944isamendedtoread"31July1944".

By order of Major Obenchain,

 

Wayne E. Hawley1^st Lt., Sig C

Adjutant

 

 

 

HEADQUARTERS

295^TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

APO 717

29 August 1945

SPECIAL ORDERS )

:

NO . . . . . . . . . . . 92)

 

1. Under the provisions of the War Dept. Circular #465, dated 9 December 1944, and Ltr. Hq. Eighth Army, AG 200.6 (D), dated 8 August 1945, the following officers and EM are authorized to wear the Bronze Service Arrowhead for participating in the Amphibious Assault on enemy-held Eniwetok, Marshall Islands.

NAME	RANK	ASN
Wentzel, Nicholas	Capt	0349217
Wick, Henry C. III	Capt	0315152
Gilliam, Charles G.	1st Lt	01643587
Repp, Roy W.	1st Lt	01645940
Hiltz, John F.	1st Lt	0577922
Aubrey, Wilfred H.	S/Sgt	12173502
Birks, Raymond G.	Tec 3	35313076
Burke, John F., Jr.	Pfc	31208158
Cain, Virgil D.	Pfc	35745334
Chapandy, Anthony F.	Tec 3	35385759
Cole, Reuben D.	Tec 5	31268027
Cooper, John W.	Sgt	33378764
Cottle, John	Sgt	36632966
Dobson, Gerald	Tec 5	36810564
Dubik, Michael	Pfc	12202828
Ferreira, Herman	M/Sgt	31223398
Gersbach, Paul A.	S/Sgt	13153720
Gossman, Milton O.	Tec 5	36583232
Greco, John A.	Pfc	36436948
Grieme, William F.	Tec 5	32963073
Harman, Robert F.	Pfc	33618511
Harrington, Arthur	S/Sgt	36718997
Hatch, Henry O.	Pfc	36582976
Higgins, Lurton L.	Sgt	36741173
Iannotti, Herman J.	Tec 5	32293611
Johnson, Ralph L.	Tec 4	36649361
Keadle, William	Tec 4	13119298
Kendrick, Thomas H.	Pfc	34686125
LaCroix, Sam H.	Cpl	38387669
Lanham, Cecil C.	Cpl	35741883
Lich, Robert F.	Tec 4	36478556
Masters, James L.	Tec 4	34517132
Maze, James A.	Tec 5	34587745
McClellan, Harry A.	Tec 5	13145433
McDougal, Hugh E.	S/Sgt	37341185
Nation, Roy	Pfc	35573656
Nilsen, Kenneth B.	Tec 5	36650708
Nugent, Alfred J.	Tec 5	32773505
Orr, Warren J.	S/Sgt	36478364
Parker, Clyde	Tec 5	34596076
Popovich, Steve G.	S/Sgt	36701465
Pugh, Lester L.	T/Sgt	33327134
Rider, Thomas F., Jr.	Pfc	12211594
Rosenberg, Frederick W.	Sgt	35558584
Shanahan, Harold L.	Sgt	36478540
Silvia, Edward P.	Tec 4	31223273
Sleeper, Norman D.	Tec 5	31339183
Smith, Carroll A.	T/Sgt	13137371
Spencer, Abraham	Sgt	32340351
Stenrud, Ingvald J.	T/Sgt	36275195
Strasser, Raymond C.	Tec 4	32753587
Strassman, Solomon E.	Tec 4	32341433
Thornton, Robert L.	Sgt	36478554
Topercer, Albert	Cpl	36355258
Varjensky, Vincent M.	Tec 4	11072045
Velasco, Edward A.	Tec 4	39097481
Walsh, John R.	Tec 5	36402388
2. Under the provisions of War Dept Circular #465, dated 9 December 1944, and Ltr. Hq. Eight Army, AG 200.6 (D), dated 8 August 1945, the following Officers and EM are authorized to wear the Bronze Service Arrowhead for participation in the Amphibious Assault on enemy-held Saipan, Marianas Islands.
NAME	RANK	ASN
Blake, Benjamin S., Jr.	Capt	0415648
Duling, Claude C.	Capt	01287325
Freeny, Samuel C.	Capt	01287334
Hart, Thomas W.	Capt	01643648
Herm, Abraham L.	Capt	0367043
Hire, Robert L.	Capt	0561280
Jensen, Walter H.	Capt	01175756
Lentz, James E.	Capt	01171644
SO 92 Bronze Service Arrowhead, Hq 295th JASCO, cont’d.
NAME	RANK	ASN
North, Robert C.	Capt	0578735
Rofkar, Paul H.	Capt	0343414
Amick, James H.	1st Lt	0574735
Bernardo, Dominic B.	1st Lt	0449655
Burge, Robert L.	1st Lt	0416381
Cash, Clayton R.	1st Lt	01640841
Eldridge, Manning A.	1st Lt	01645549
Gillespie, Thomas B.	1st Lt	0438986
Hawley, Wayne E.	1st Lt	01636327
Kinsaul, James R.	1st Lt	01175767
Kruidenier, Edward D.	1st Lt	01298248
Lovorn, Richard T.	1st Lt	01645772
Porter, Jesco L.	1st Lt	01294189
Tremper, Claude S.	1st Lt	01647389
Vanderpool, Henry N.	1st Lt	01307593
Jenks, James E.	2nd Lt	02023331
Fox, Vincent W.	Major	01643552
Mathon, Benjamin D.	Lieut.	USNR 171137
Detwiler, John T.	Lieut. (jg)	USNR 269568
Abdoler, Leonard J.	Tec 3	37251498
Adams, Charlie W.	Tec 5	38099246
Addison, Julius O.	Pfc	34649345
Admaski, Stanley J.	S/Sgt	37543160
Albrektson, Evald J.	T/Sgt	31056515
Allen, Ivan G.	Pvt	36808834
Allen, William E.	S/Sgt	36445008
Alonzo, Anthony	Tec 3	15523516
Anderson, Lloyd M.	S/Sgt	36717077
Bakes, Joseph E.	Pfc	13126747
Barnes, Clifford F.	Tec 5	34649045
Barnhart, Henry J.	Tec 5	32377323
Barnott, Raymond L.	Cpl	38542770
Beech, Leon	Pfc	34612173
Bergman, Carl	Tec 3	12180496
Bergmann, George N.	Pfc	32697048
Bledsoe, Will T.	Tec 5	34588387
Boeninghaus, Robert	Tec 4	32691850
Boisvert, Marcel J.	M/Sgt	31185221
Brandes, Elliot	Tec 5	32803312
Broten, Edward L.	S/Sgt	36255901
Brown, Carroll M.	Tec 3	33680442
Brunswick, Eugene E.	Tec 5	15337870
Burdick, Norman L.	Tec 5	32475091
Burrell, Willis C.	Pfc	34680378
Burt, Henry C.	Pvt	34702961
Bussacco, Salvatore A.	Pfc	32606873
Byrd, Norman R.	Tec 4	34347653
Byrne, James W.	T/Sgt	12180894
Caputo, John C.	M/Sgt	32533694
Carlo, Arcangolo N.	Pfc	32599129
Carlson, Carl B.	S/Sgt	36741742
Carnohan, Lester C.	S/Sgt	35126347
Carroll, Alex	Pfc	34118094
Case, Lewis B.	Pfc	34596019
Christakos, John	Tec 4	36478471
Cianci, Rudolph	Pvt	31291383
Clint, Bernard P.	Tec 5	35064793
Cobb, Joe H.	Sgt	34681325
Colatutto, Nicholas R.	Tec 4	32819247
Colletti, LeRoy J.	Pfc	36739734
Collier, Paul M.	Pfc	33530968
Cook, James J.	Tec 4	32648516
Corbitt, Hubert	Tec 3	34058724
Costello, John M.	Tec 4	36275606
Crim, Henry L.	Tec 4	35128259
Croamer, John M.	Pvt	31357592
Csuti, Arthur	Tec 5	35516918
Dalton, Robert J.	Pfc	32553071
Davis, Henry E.	Pfc	34230008
Davis, Henry E.	Pfc	34230008
Davis, Paul	Sgt	13044382
Davis, Robert F.	Tec 5	34612266
DeCosta, John J.	Tec 4	31208480
DeVinney, Heston C.	Tec 4	33496119
Diffley, John T.	Tec 4	12156297
Draper, James Jr.	Tec 5	36291929
Drew, Ted	Pfc	35671517
Dunphey, Terrance N.	Tec 4	32484137
Earnhardt, Jacob A.	Tec 5	34596536
Eaton, Charles S.	Tec 4	31223573
Edwards, Ernest	Pfc	6851759
Ely, Bradley D.	Tec 3	12180283
Factor, Robert O.	Tec 4	35539981
Feasel, Chester E.	T/Sgt	35539966
Fischer, Carl M.	Tec 4	12180161
Fleming, Joseph G.	T/Sgt	32566743
Foshay, Glenn E.	S/Sgt	36478932
Fossum, Harold L.	S/Sgt	16155230
Francis, Everett T.	Pvt	31182612
Frederick, Oscar C.	S/Sgt	34587862
Funk, Carl L.	Tec 4	36741916
Gantt, John G.	Pfc	33378463
Garcia, Helvio	Tec 5	12159038
Gauvin, Paul A.	Pfc	51315851
Giorato, Manuel	Tec 5	31185227
Goodman, Rex	Sgt	36478895
Goodrich, Stuart L.	Pfc	31339895
Goodwin, Joseph R.	S/Sgt	32625761
Gordon, Joe H.	Pfc	38394658
Gordon, Paul E.	Tec 5	31185184
Greenspahn, Irwin	Pfc	36650917
Gregory, Eugene E.	Tec 4	13326185
Grosser, Eugene D.	Tec 4	13067435
Grua, Elvino	Tec 3	36479565
Guzman, William	S/Sgt	39562636
Hall, Marcell V.	T/Sgt	18170180
Harpar, Arthur F.	Tec 4	34010375
Harris, Hubert H.	Tec 5	34588016
Havard, Leon W.	Sgt	34612268
Henderson, Woodrow	Tec 5	15273755
Henkel, Paul A.	Tec 4	33391903
Holway, Frank A.	T/Sgt	110544605
Hood, Gordon D.	T/Sgt	19148263
Hopkins, Thomas S.	Sgt	32269417
Hostert, Robert D.	S/Sgt	16145449
Howell, Lottie H.	Sgt	34588026
Johnson, Harry K.	M/Sgt	35230165
Kamuf, Leo J.	Tec 5	35516337
Kasperski, Edwin C.	Pfc	32732588
Keith, Victor D., Jr.	Pfc	33049042
Kuehne, Benedict	Tec 4	32771775
Lamb, Kenneth A.	M/Sgt	17078693
LeBlanc, Albert G.	Tec 4	33509014
Lee, Sam J.	Tec 5	34686076
Levy, Harold	S/Sgt	110533353
Lilly, Philip A.	Pfc	31368209
Loar, John F.	Sgt	33405752
Love, Cecil K.	Pfc	38508109
Lowing, Howard L.	S/Sgt	36649990
MacFarlane, Dalton R.	Tec 5	36810834
Malafronte, Crescienzo	Tec 4	51182622
Marcio, Nick V.	Pfc	33404512
Martin, William J., Jr.	Pvt	14181245
Martindale, Molvin R.	Tec 5	34594003
Matheny, Clifford C.	Pfc	35641516
Matreso, Salvedor P.	Pfc	33461656
Matuseski, David A.	Tec 4	37567312
Maxwell, Harry W.	Tec 4	36477072
McCasland, Norman A.	Pfc	36478450
McCollum, Edmon R.	Tec 5	39333067
McCrickard, Willie I.	S/Sgt	33637131
McDermott, Wilbur J.	Pfc	36584394
McLemore, Ralph	Pfc	35675467
McMillen, Voris D.	T/Sgt	35313084
McMurry, Palmer Jr.	S/Sgt	34396063
Mediavilla, Mariano	Pfc	35534107
Micklo, Charley F.	Tec 4	34704307
Miller, Hilliard J.	Pfc	35524362
Miller, John S.	T/Sgt	13080142
Morrow, Robert H.	Tec 5	12035508
Nall, John O., Jr.	Sgt	34596506
Nelson, Reider G.	Tec 4	36706445
Nelson, Thomas J.	Tec 5	37378964
Newcomer, Donald	Pfc	13089738
Nielsen, Milo W.	Pfc	17040708
Nikos, Robert F.	S/Sgt	36706128
Nolan, James H.	Tec 5	37384301
Nourse, Bernard D.	S/Sgt	35449112
Palling, Charles H.	Sgt	36740255
Pankiewicz, Charles L.	Cpl	12171973
Pante, Germano H.	Tec 5	33579457
Payne, Walter W.	Tec 5	54580878
Peterson, Arthur R.	Pfc	39017186
Phillips, James G.	Tec 5	11088548
Pisano, Paul P.	T/Sgt	32364962
Pittinato, Mathew J.	Pfc	56543447
Polifroni, Nicholas J.	Pfc	32773458
Qualtors, Martin J.	Tec 4	36351520
Rapol, Donald N.	Pfc	35600933
Rattie, Theodore E.	S/Sgt	19193159
Roberts, William R.	Tec 4	34890191
Ross, Gene L.	Tec 4	37511862
Ross, Patrick J.	Tec 5	42041475
Rumph, Fred L.	Sgt	54510040
Russell, Willard A.	Sgt	15529310
Sacks, Seymour	Tec 4	12180075
Sacks, Seymour	Tec 4	12180075
Sallack, Theodore	Tec 4	12160250
Samper, Alfred	Tec 4	15559642
Sarratt, J.L.	Pfc	34595881
Schaefer, John G., Jr.	S/Sgt	12094573
Schuetz, Charles E.	M/Sgt	16097483
Sekely, Robert P.	Pfc	15170639
Serafin, Joseph B.	Tec 5	35740254
Sexton, Donald	Tec 5	35448158
Sirignano, Thomas O.	S/Sgt	12153102
Skinner, James R.	Tec 5	12158307
Smith, Foster W.	Tec 5	35597960
Smith, Richard L.	Sgt.	35618842
Sodlmeir, Louis F.	Pfc	42015180
Somers, Willard E.	Pvt	37441038
Spinicelli, Joseph L.	Tec 5	12151521
Standlee, Joe B.	Sgt	38133634
Stanton, Lee R.	Tec 5	15157523
Stark, Edward C.	S/Sgt	16095862
Stephenson, Raymond T.	Sgt	11110755
Stratton, Hubert W.	Pvt	18045367
Tarquino, John E.	Sgt	12166064
Tesch, Richard M.	T/Sgt	31167783
Thomas, Clayton L.	Pvt	13093698
Thompson, Harold A.	T/Sgt	37500744
Totaro, Vincent D.	Tec 4	32506727
Trimble, Samuel M.	Pvt	32349699
Valdez, Refugio C.	Tec 5	39247591
Valint, John	Sgt	32683098
Vincent, Clarence E.	Pfc	35747708
Wallace, Neil A., Jr.	Pfc	11023892
Watters, William J.	S/Sgt	33438112
Wendel, Herbert L.	Pfc	33554402
Wernick, Gary J.	Tec 5	12161737
Withers, Donald S.	Pfc	31216245
Wojciehowski, Edward A.	Sgt	35582762

 

 

By order of Captain HART:

 

JAMES E. JENKS

2^nd Lt., AC

Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

 

 

JAMES E. JENKS

2^nd Lt., AC

Adjutant

 

 

DISTRIBUTION:

Off Concerned (2) EM Conccrnod (1) BB (1) File (1)

Go to top of page.

Company Roster

 

 

 

Aug. 10, 1993

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

Page

 

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

1 ALEXANDER, AUSTIN A. 18005622 521 PFC

1 ALONZO, ANTHONY 14323516
766 TEC 3

1 ANDERSON, LLOYD M, 36717077 595 S/SGT

 

1 BAK, EDWARD J. 31204591 650 TEC 5

1 BEECH, LEON 34612173 641 PFC

1 BLEDSOE, WILL T. 34588387 641 TEC 5

1 BRANDES, ELLIOTT 33803312 650 TEC 5

1 BRIGGS, CLYDE E. 350180g7 766 M/SGT

1 BURT, HENRY C. 34702961 675 PVT

1 CSUTI, ARTHUR 35516918 766 TEC 5

1 FOSSUM, HAROLD L. 15155230 674 S/SGT

1 FRANCIS, EVERETT T. 31182612 766 PVT

 

1 KAMUF, LEO J. 35316337 650 PFC

1 KEITH, VICTOR D., JR. 35049042 776 PVT

1 LeBLANC, ALBERT G. 33509014 595 TEC 5

1 LOAR JOHN F. 33405752 667 SGT

1 MALAFRONTE, CRESCIENZO 31182622 766 TEC 4

1 PISANO PAUL P. 32364962 766 S/SGT

1 SARRETT J.L 34595881 641 PFC

1 SEDLMEIR, LOUIS F. (D) 42013180 521 PFC

1 VALINT, JOHN 32683098 595 SGT

10 BOISVERT, MARCEL J. 31185221 766 M/SGT

10 BROWN, CARROLL M. 33680442 766 TEC 3

10 CARROLL, ALEX 34118094 641 PFC

10 CLINT BERNARD P. 35064793 766 TEC 5

10 CREAMER, JOHN M. 31357592 650 PVT

10 FISCHER, CARL M 12180161 766 TEC 4

l0 GROSSER EUGENE D 1306,435 595 TEC 5

10 HOLWAY, FRANK A. 11054605 574 S/SGT

10 HOWELL, LOTTIE H.7 34588026 641 TEC 5

10 JOHNSON HARRY K 35230163 595 S/SGT

 

10 McCOLLUM, EDMON R. 39333067 766 TEC 5

10 McMURRY, PALMER, JR. 34596063 675 SGT

10 NELEN, JAMES H. 37384501 766 TEC 5

10 NELSON, THOMAS J. 37578964 650 PFC

10 PETEPSON, ARTHUR R. 39017186 521 PFC

10 ROSS, PATGRICK J. 42041475 521 PFC

10 SIRIGNANO, THOMAS C. 12153iO2 766 S/SGT

10 STANDLEE, JOE B. 38133634 674 SGT

10 WENDEL, HEPBERT L. 33554402 667 PVT

2 ADAMS, CHARLIE W. 2.8099246 521 PVT

2 ALBPEKTSON, EVALD J. 31056515 766 TEC 3

2 BARNHART, HENRY J. 32377523 766 TEC 5

2 BOSNINGHAUS, ROBERT 326gl850 69Q TEC 5

2 PUSSACCO, SALVATORE A. 33606873 521 PVT

2 CARLO, ARCANGELO N. 32599l2g 650 PVT

2 DREW, GTED 35671517 675 PFC

2 FEASEL CHESTER E. 3553g966 595 S/SGT

2 GARCIA, HELVIO C. 12159038 7S66 TEC 5

2 HARDCASTLE, ALBERT W. 38053200 766 S/SGT

2 LONG, CLIFFORD W. 121S8810 641 PFC

2 MICHAELS, ERNEST J. 7001571 595 T/SGT

2 PAYNE, WALTER W. 34380878 641 TEC 5

2 OUALTERS, MARTIN J. 36351520 667 TEC 5

 

Aug. 10, 1993

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

2 RAPOL, DONALD M. 35600933 521 PFC

2 SCHAEFER, JOHN G. 12094573 674 SGT

2 SEKELY, ROBERT P. 13170639 641 PFC

2 SKINNER, JAMES R. 12158307 766 PVT

2 STARK, EDWARD E. (D) 16095862 595 SGT

2 THOMPSON, HAROLD A. 37500744 674 S/SGT

2 WILLIAMS, ROBERT B. 36705230 766 TEC 4

2. CASS, LEWIS B. 34596019 641 PFC

3 BRIGHAM, ERNEST P. 20106830 766 TEC 3

 

3 DAVIS, ROBERT F. 34612266 641 TEC 5

3 DIFFLEY, JOHN T. 12156297 766 TEC 4

3 EARNHARDT, JACOB A. 3459636 641 TEC 5

3 FORTIER, EDWARD A. 11023701 650 PFC

3 GIORATO, MANUEL 31185227 766 TEC 5

3 GOODRICH, STUART L. 31339895 521 PFC

3 HA AFD, LEON W. 34612268 595 SGT

3 HOOPER, ROBERT W. 39713260 641 PFC

3 LAMB, KENNETH A. 17078693 766 T/SGT

3 LANHAM, CECIL C. 35741883 776 PFC

3 LEVY, HAROLD (D) 11053353 674 S/SGT

3 LOVE, CECIL X. 38508199 521 PFC

3 MARTIN, WILLIAM J., JR. 14131245 675 PFC

3 McWILLIAMS, FLOYD W. 7013534 595 S/SGT

3 MIKOS, ROBERT F. 36706128 766 S/SGT

3 PHILLIPS, JAMES G. 11088548 667 PVT

3 STEPHENSON, RAYMOND T. 11110735 766 TEC 5

3 TARQUINO, JOHN E. 1216 674 SGT

4 ALLEN WILLIAM E. 36445008 674 S/SGT

4 BAKES, JOSEPH E. 13125747 650 PFC

4 BERGMAN, CARL 12180496 766 TEC 3

4 BURRELL, WILLIS C. 34680378 641 PVT

4 CARROLL, RICHARD A. 16132651 776 PFC

4 COSTELLO, JOHN M. 36273605 766 TEC 5

4 EATON CHARLES S. 31223573 766 TEC 5

4 FREDERICKS, OSCAR C. 34587862 595 S/SGT

4 GREENSPAHN, IRWIN 36650917 766 PVT

4 HENDERSON, WOODROW W. 15375755 667 TEC 5

4 HNOSTERT, ROBERT L. 16145449 766 S/SGT

4 MATHEN7, CLIFFORD O. 35641516 641 PFC

4 MoCRICKARD, WILLIE I. 33637137 595 SGT

4 SCHUETS, CHARLES E. 16097483 595 T/SGT

4 SEXTON, DONALD 55448158 641 TEC 5

4 VALDEZ, REFUGIO C. 39247591 766 TEC 5

4 WARREN, LYNN J. 3S046555 595 M/SGT

4 WOJCIEHOWSKI, EDWARD A. 35582762 674 SGT

5 BALL, HARRY J. 42102863 667 PFC

5 BURDICK, NORMAN L. 32475091 674 PFC

5 COBB, JOE H 34681325 595 SGT

5 COHEN, LEONARD H. ? ? ?

5 COOKE, JAMES J. 3264S516 650 TEC 5

5 CORBITT, HUBERT 34058724 766 TEC 3

5 CRIM HENRY L. 3512B259 766 TEC 4

5 DeCOSTA, JOHN J. 31208480 766 TEC 5

5 DeVINNEY HORACE P. (D) 3349606U 541 PFC

Page 2

 

Aug. 10, 1993

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

5 DeVINNEY, HESTON C. (D@) 33496119 641 TEC 5

 

5 ELY, BRADLEY D. 12180285 766 S/SGT

5 ESTES, CLIFFORD B. SR. 34879969 667 PFC

 

5 GAMACHE, JOSEPH F. 20114144 674 S/SGT

5 GAUVIN, PAUL A. 31313851 667 PFC

5 GROSS, ALBERT A. 32435582 766 PVT

5 HENKEL, PAUL A. 33391903 641 TEC 5

5 HOOD, GORDON(D) 19148263 595 S/SGT

5 HULL, HAROLD (D) 6895682 766 M/SGT

5 LEE, SAM J. 34686076 641 PFC

5 McLEMORE, RALPH 35675467 521 PVT

5 MEDIAVILLA, MARIANO 35534107 675 PFC

5 RUMPH, FRED L. 34510040 674 SGT

6 ADAMSKI, STANLEY J. 37545180 667 SGT

6 BISHOP, CHARLES G. 42092626 650 PFC

6 BONAR, LEON P. 19025865 641 PVT

6 BYRNE, JAMES W (D) 12180894 766 T/SGT

6 CAPUTO, JOHN C. 32533694 766 S/SGT

6 DRAPER, JAMES JR. 36291929 650 PFC

6 DUNPHEY, TERRENCE N. 32484137 650 TEC 5

6 FLEMING, JOSEPH G. 32566743 674 S/SGT

6 HARPER, ARTHUR F. 34010375 766 TEC 4

6 HARRIS, HUBERT H. 34568016 641 TEC 5

6 HOPKINS, THOMAS S. 32Q69417 595 SGT

6 JACOBSEN, VIVIAN G. 19216084 776 PFC

6 KIL3RETH, J.M. 36726432 674 TEC 5

6 MARTINDALE, MELVIN R. 34594003 641 PFC

6 PANTO, GERMANO M. 33579457 675 TEC 5

6 PHILLIPS, ROBERT C. 20112904 766 TEC 3

6 SACKS, SEYMOUR 12180075 766 TEC 5

6 SERAFIN, JOSEPH B. 35740254 766 TEC 5

6 TOLLEY, EDMOND R. 6998813 595 S/SGT

6 WALLACE, NEIL A., JR. 11023892 674 PFC

6 WITHERS, DONALD E. 31216245 641 PFC

7 ABDOLER, LEONARD J. 37231498 766 TEC 3

7 ANDERSON, DEAN A. 37581682 650 PFC

7 BRUNSWICK, EUGENE E. 15337870 766 TEC 5

7 CORNWALL, ROY B. (D) 12139541 650 TEC 5

7 DAVIS, EDWARD L 7025324 595 M/SGT

7 DOWLER, WAYNE (D) 37462180 667 PFC

7 GANTT, JOHN G.(D) 33378463 667 PFC

7 GORDON, PAUL R. 31185184 766 TEC T

7 HALL, MARCELL V. (D) 18170180 595 S/SGT

7 KELLER, HENRY H. 7020961 650 PVT

7 KOVALOSON, LAURENCE P.(D) 20114794 674 S/SGT

7 McMILLEN, VORIS D.(D) 35313084 766 S/SGT

7 MILLER, HILLIARD J. (D) 35524362 641 PFC

7 NALL, JOHN C. JR. 34596506 641 SGT

7 NELSON, REDDAR G. (D) 36706445 766 TEC 5

7 PITTINATO, MATTHEW J. 36545447 641 PFC

7 SAMPER, ALFRED 15359642 595 TEC 5

7 SMITH, FOSTER W. 33597960 641 TEC 5

7 SMITH, RICHARD L. 45618842 674 SGT

7 SPINICELLI, JOSEPH L. 12151321 766 TEC 5

Page 3

 

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

Aug. 10, 1993 Page 4

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

8 AUBREY, WILFRED,H, 12173502 766 TEC 4

8 CARDIFF, ROBERT L. (D) 36950716 641 PFC

8 CHAPANDY, ANTHONY F. 35385789 766 TEC 3

8 DUBIK. MICHAEL 12202828 521 PFC

8 DUNFIELD, WILLIAM B. 397263g7 641 PFC

8 FISKE. ROBERT E. 11020932 674 T/SGT

8 GRIEME, WILIAM F. 32963073 766 TEC 5

8 JACKSON, PAUL 18132323 776 TEC 5

8 KASPERSKI, EDWIN C. 32732588 521 PFC

8 MASTERS, JAMES L. 34517132 641 PFC

8 McDOUGAL, HUGH B. (D) 37341185 674 S/SGT

8 NATION, ROY (D) 35573656 641 PFC

8 POPOVICH, STEVE G. 36701465 766 S/SGT

8 ROSENBERG, FREDERICK W. 35538584 641 SGT

8 SILVIA, EDWARD P. 31223273 766 TEC 5

8 SLEEPER, NORMAN D. 31339183 675 PFC

8 SMITH, CARROLL A. 13137571 595 S/SGT

8 SPENSER, ABRAHAM 32340351 674 SGT

8 STRASSMAN, SOLOMON E. 32341422 667 TEC 5

8 VINCENT, CLARENCE E. 35747708 641 PFC

8 WALSH, JOHN R. 36402388 650 TEC 5

9 BARNETT, RAYMON8D L. 38542770 521 PFC

9 BERGMANN, GEORGE W. 32697048 650 PFC

9 BIRKS, RAYMOND G. 35313076 766 TEC 3

9 BURKE, JOHN F., JR. 31208158 766 PVT

9 COOPER, JOHN W. 33578764 667 SGT

9 COTTLE, JOHN 36632966 641 SGT

9 DALTON, ROBERT J (D) 32533071 766 TEC 5

9 FERREIRA, HERMAN 31223398 766 S/SGT

9 GEP~SBSACH, PAUL A. 13153720 674 S/SGT

GILLISPIE, JOHN L. 35642278 521 PVT

9 JACKSON, LEE A. 380858Q8 521 PFC

9 KEADLE, WILLIAM R. 13119298 674 TEC 5

9 MAZE, JAMES A. 34587745 641 TEC 5

9 NEWMAN, EDWARD 15013981 595 T/SGT

9 PARKER, CLYDE 34596076 650 PFC

9 PUGH, LESTER L. 3352S7134 595 S/SGT

9 RAND, WESLEY E. 20112905 766 TEC 4

9 RIDER, THOMAS F., JR. 12211594 650 PFC

9 SHUR3EN, FRANK A. 385898Q3 521 PFC

9 VARJENSKY, VINCENT M. 11072045 595 TEC 5

9 VELASCO, EDWARD A. 39097481 766 TEC 5

AGL TOPERCER, ALBERT 36355258 648 CPL

AGL 1 ADDISON, JULIUS C. 34649345 345 PFC

AGL 1 FRANCIS, BILLIE R. 38626452 776 PFC

AGL 1 NIELSEN, MILO W. 17040708 245 PFC

AGL 1 RATTIE, THEODORE E. 19193159 755 S/SGT

AGL 10ANDERSON, WALTER T. 1715,462 776 PFC

AGL 10GRECO, JOHN A. (D) 34636948 345 PFC

AGL 10STENRUD, INGVALD J. 36275195 755 S/SGT

AGL 11CARNOHAN, LESTER G. 33126347 755 S/SGT

AGL 11TOTARO, VINCENT D 325067~7 756 GPL

AGL 12PANKIEWICZ, CHARLES L. 12171973 648 CPL

AGL 12SOMERS, WILLARD E. 37441038 345 PFC

 

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

Aug. 10, 1993 Page 5

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

AGL 12THOMAS, CLAYTON L. 13093698 345 PFC

AGL 13HOLSTROM, HOLLAND L. 37003669 345 PFC

AGL 13STINEMIRE, ALVIN H. 42016070 755 CPL

AGL 13TRIMBLE, SAMUEL M., JR. 32749899 756 S/SGT

AGL 2 BARNES, CLIFFORD F. 34649045 345 PFC

AGL 2 DUNN, THOMAS F. 32222779 759 S/SGT

AGL 2 GUZMAN, WILIAM 39562636 756 SGT

AGL 3 CAIN, VIRGIL D. 35745334 345 PFC

AGL 3 HARRINGTON, ARTHUR 36718997 756 CPL

AGL 3 STRATTON, HUBERT W. 18045367 755 S/SGT

AGL 4 BADEKER, HEINZ M 39045786 245 PFC

AGL 4 CHAMBLISS, FREDERICK 84802782 345 PFC

AGL 4 DAVIS PAUL 13044382 756 CPL

AGL 4 MERRITT, KENNETH L. 6880931 755 S/SGT

AGL 5 BAUGH, JAY G. 17175703 776 PFC

AGL 5 COLLIER, PAUL M. 33530968 345 PFC

AGL 5 TOOCH, RICHARD M. 3 755 S/SGT

AGL 6 BAGGAN, THOMAS C. 32695042 667 PVT

AGL 6 LaCROIX, SAM H. 38387669 756 CPL

AGL 6 WATTERS, WILLIAM 33418112 766 S/SGT

AGL 7 DAVIS, HENRY E. 34230008 345 PFC

AGL 7 MILLER, JOHN S. 13080142 756 S/SGT

AGL 8 LILLY, PHILIP A. 31368209 345 PFC

AGL 8 NEURSE, BERNARD B. 35449112 755 S/SGT

AGL 8 RUSSELL, MILLARD A. (D) 15329310 756 CPL

AGL 9 BLUNT, ROBERT F. 1716,2286 776 PFC

AGL 9 GORDON, JOE H. 38394658 345 PFC

HQ CARPENTER, RICHARD E. 16008233 641 PFC

HO CHAIT, HAROLD 6973961 766 M/SGT

HO CHEANEY, RUSSELL E. 35485996 521 PVT

HQ CHRISTENSON, DALMAR (D) 171066S1 648 TEC 5

HQ COSGROVE, EDWARD J. (D) 6944842 585 1ST SGT

HQ DONOVAN, TIMOTHY J. 11054239 821 S/SGT

HQ FACTOR, ROBERT C. 35539981 060 TEC 5

HQ FELIX, JAMES M. 16126096 648 S/SGT

HQ GARNER, JAMES A. 35535920 521 PFC

HQ GOULD, ELTON S. 12090895 648 TEC 4

HQ GRANT, JOSEPH R. 15372668 766 PFC

HQ GREENBERG, HAROLD A. 13096018 405 TEC 5

HQ GREGORY, EUGENE H. 15396185 097 TEC 4

HQ IANNOTTI, HERMAN J. 32293611 641 PFC

HQ KEITH, GEORGE W. 6152033 014 TEC 5

HQ KENDRICK, THOMAS H. 34686125 675 PVT

HQ KOCH, WILLIAM R. 20820623 521 PVT

HQ MAHER, MARTIN H. 31223800 014 TEC 5

HQ MATRESE, SALVADOR P. 33461656 050 PFC

HQ MATUSESKI, DAVID A. 37567312 345 TEC 5

HQ MENCONI, LAWRENCE J. 36726922 014 SGT

HQ MICKLE, CHARLEY F. 34704307 641 PVT

HQ MORROW ROBERT H. 12085508 521 PFC

HQ MOYER, EDGBERT A. 32553362 060 TEC 4

HQ NEWCOMER, DONALD R. 13089738 766 PVT

HQ NOYES, EDWARD A. 11085557 835 TEC 5

HQ O'KEEFE, JOHN F. 32532999 014 TEC 4

 

Aug. 10, 1993

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

HQ OVERSKEI, GRAYDON J. 37547242 511 TEC 4

 

HQ PETERS, FRANK 6939074 014 TEC 4

HQ POLLOCK, CHARLES J. 35207898 014 TEC 4

HQ POPERNICK, RUDOLPH 16071110 060 TEC 5

HQ POVIAC, STEVE J. 35026773 060 TEC 4

HQ ROSSETTI, VICTOR A. (D) 35615021 014 TEC 4

HQ SALLACK, THEODORE 12160~50 766 TEC 4

HQ SANDERS, CHARLES A., JR. 33412940 060 TEC 5

HQ SANDROCK, ELLSWORTH S. 33177766 521 PVT

HQ SAUNDERS, DAVID R. 20367256 060 PVT

HQ SHREVE, CLIFFORD 35259511 060 TEC 5

HQ SHUTT, WILLIAM B. 33012558 821 T/SGT

HQ SMITH,TED 38158341 870 SGT

HQ STANCIL, KARL E. 6968030 824 S/SGT

HQ TVERDOSI, JOHSN A. 35301138 521 PVT

HQ VENTURELLA, SALVATORE V. 13110419 055 TEC 3

HQ VOSS, FREDERICK W. 32823467 075 TEC 4

HQ WEBER, JOSEPH 37413178 835 TEC 5

HQ WERNICK, GARY J. 12161737 667 PFC

HO WITHAM, OWEN S. 312216511 521 PFC

SFC BROTEN, EDWARD L. 36255901 766 TEC 4

SFC DICKERSON, WADE D 11080119 641 TEC 5

SFC EDWARDS, ERNEST 68517759 521 PFC

SFC McCLELLAN, HARRY A. 13145433 641 PFC

SFC 1 BAILEY, MARSHALL B. 6738987 641 TEC 4

SFC 1 GRUA, ELVINO 36479565 776 TEC 3

SFC 1 MARSHALL, JOHN R. 17078616 345 PVT

SFC 1 THORNTON, ROBERT L. (D) 36478554 775 TEC 4

SFC 1 WUEST, BRYAN J. 36477653 641 PVT

SFC 2 CIANCI, RUDOLPH 31291353 641 PVT

SFC 2 HARMAN, ROBERT F. 33618511 641 PVT

SFC 2 HATCH, HENRY O. 26582976 761 PFC

SFC 2 LICH, ROBERT F. 36478556 766 TEC 5

SFC 2 ORR, WARREN J. 36478364 776 SGT

SFC 3 GOSSMAN, MILTON C. 36583232 641 TEC 5

SFC 3 JOHNSON, RALPH L. 36649381 761 TEC 4

SFC 3 POLIFRONI, NICHOLAS J. 32773458 641 PFC

SFC 3 SHANAHAN, HAROLD L. 36478540 766 SGT

SFC 3 SILVER, JOSEPH 338025~3 776 PVT

SFC 3 STOFKO, JOHN J., SR. 35143985 776 TEC 4

SFC 4 FUNK, CARL L. 36741916 766 TEC 5

SFC 4 GOODWIN, JOSEPH R. 32825761 761 SGT

SFC 4 MARCIC, NICK V. 33404512 650 PVT

SFC 4 McCASLAND, NORMAN A. (D) 36478450 641 PVT

SFC 4 ROSS, GENE L. 3751186~ 776 TEC 4

SFC 5 BYRD, NORMAN R. 34547653 761 TEC 4

SFC 5 CHRISTAKOS, JOHN 36478471 776 TEC 5

SFC 5 COLLETTI, LeROY J. 36739734 641 PFC

SFC 5 FOSHAY, GLENN E. 36478g32 776 SGT

SFC 6 BAUR, KENNETH C. 34612173 641 PFC

SFC 6 GOODMAN, REX 36478895 776 SGT

SFC 6 KUEHNE, BENEDICT 32771775 776 TEC 5

SFC 6 MacFARLANE, DALTON H. 36810834 641 PVT

SFC 6 McOERMOTT, WILBUR J. (D) 36584394 641 PFC

Page 6

 

Aug. 10 9 1993

295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

TEAM NAME ASN SSN GRADE

SFC 6 VOLLENWEIDER, JOHN A. 32773210 761 SGT

SFC 7 ALLEN, IVAN G. 36808834 641 PVT

SFC 7 BOGGS, WILLIAM D. 39338624 776 PFC

SFC 7 COLE, REUBEN D. 31266027 641 TEC 5

SFC 7 LOWING, HOWARD L. 36649990 776 SGT

SFC 7 MARTIN, ANTHONY 20015255 761 SGT

SFC 7 ROBERTS, WILLIAM R. 34890191 641 PFC

SFC 8 BROWN, ELLIS C. 17151869 766 TEC 5

SFC 8 DOBSON, GERALD 3681S0364 641 TEC 5

SFC 8 HIGGINS, LURTON L. 36741175 776 SGT

SFC 8 MAXWELL, HARRY W. 36477072 766 TEC 4

SFC 8 NUGENT, ALFRED J. 32773305 641 TEC 5

SFC 8 STRASSER, RAYMOND C. 32753597 776 TEC 5

SFC 9 BALLING, CHARLES H. 36740235 761 TEC 4

SFC 9 CARLSON, CARL B. 356741742 776 SGT

SFC 9 COLATUTTO, NICOLAS R. ? 776 TEC 5

SFC 9 NIELSEN, KENNETH B. 36650708 641 TEC 5

Page 7

 

OFFICERS 295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

 

CAPTAINS

 

BLAKE, BENJAMIN S., JR. 0415648 FA

DOLING, CLAUDE O. 01287325 AC (INF)

FOX, VINCENT W. 01643552 SC (COMDG)

FEENY, SAMUEL C. 01287334 AC (INF)

HART, THOMAS W. 01643648 SC

HERM, ABRAHAM L. 0367043 FA

HIRE, ROBERT L. 0561280 AC

HOWELL, HOWARD L. 01645680 SC (EXEC)

JENSEN, WALTER H. 01175756 FA

KORNBLUM, IRA 01170454 FA

LENTZ, JAMES E. 01171644 FA

NORTH, ROBERT C. 0578735 AC

ROFKAR, PAUL H. 0343414 FA

SIMON, LEROY S. 0416179 FA

WENTZEL, NICHOLAS W. 034g217 FA

WICK, HENRY C., III 0315152 FA

 

FIRST_LIEUTENANTS

AMICK, JAMES M. 0574735 AC

BERNARDO, DOMINIC B. 0449655 AC (INF)

BROOKIE, FRANK S. 01178032 FA

BURGE, ROBERT L. 0416381 FA

CASH, CLAYTON R. 01640841 SC

CAUFIELD, JAMES H. 0549948 FA

ELDRIDGE MANNING A. 01645549 SC

GILLESPIE, THOMAS B. 0438986 AC (INF)

GILLIAM, CHARLES O. 01643587 SC

GRANTON, JOHN 01634818 SC

HAWLEY, WAYNE E. 01636327 SC

HILZ, JOHN F. 0577922 AC

KINSAUL, JAMES R. 01175767 FA

KRUIDENIER, EDWARD D. 01298248 AC (INF)

LOVORN, RICHARD T. 01645772 SC

PORTER, JESSE L. 01294189 AC (INF)

REPP, ROY W. 01645g40 SC

SAWYER, ROBERT P 01647389 SC

TREMPER, CLAUDE S. 01647389 SC

VANDERPOOL, HENRY N. 01307593 AC (INF)

 

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

 

JENKS, JAMES E. 02023331 AC

KOONTZ, HARRISON B. 01643767 SC

 

 

 

WARRANT OFFICER (JG)

 

SCHROEDER, GEORGE R. W2120854

 

 

LIEUTENANT

GAVIN, CHESTER, JR. USNR 103807

MATHON, BENJAMIN D. USNR171137

MEYTHALER, VIRGIL W. USNR 162936

 

 

LIEUTENANT (JG)

CHARLES, THOMAS E. USNR 188714

DANNING, CURTIS B. USNR 224768

DETWILER, JOHN T. USNR 269568

FURBEE, JAMES W. USNR 336811

HARRIS, MELVIN R. USNR 312152

HERRICK, ROBERT H. USNR 228649

KARNOPKY, SAMUEL USNR 228077

LARSON, HARVEY L. USNR 269895

McDIARMID, WILLIAM S. USNR 224697

WOOD, JOHN N. USNR 226302

WOODS, WARREN USNR 270441

 

 

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